Employers' Liability Law and the Indiana Railroads, 1880-1915 by Hutchinson, Heather
EMPLOYERS' LIABILITY LAW AND 
THE INDIANA RAILROADS, 
1880-1915 
Heather Hutchinson 
Subrnitted to the faculty of the University Graduate School 
in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree 
Master of Arts 
in the Department of History, 
Indiana University 
May 2002 
Accepted by the Graduate Faculty, Indiana University, in partial 
fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Master of Arts. 
Master's Thesis 
Committee 
&z~Pruwl Y)fp~==--
El(zabeth Brand Monroe, Ph.D. 
~-Yr.~ 
Robert G. Barrows, Ph.D. 
11 
ACKNOWLDEDGEMENTS 
I would like to thank Elizabeth Brand Monroe for her tireless efforts in 
reviewing this work, even at its 1nost pritnitive stages. Without her guidance and 
encouragetnent, I would not have completed this task. I would also like to express 
tny appreciation for her assistance and support throughout tny education. I would 
also like to express tny appreciation to Robert G. Barrows and Annie Gilbert 
Coletnan for their efforts and cotntnents while serving on tny thesis con11nittee and 
throughout tny education. Finally, I would like to thank tny husband, Totn, for his 
suppoti and understanding throughout this process. 
111 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
INTRODUCTION 1 
CHAPTER 1 
REVIEW OF THE SECONDARY LITERATURE 7 
CHAPTER2 
A BRIEF HISTORY OF EMPLOYERS' LIABILITY LAW 39 
CHAPTER3 
INDIANA SUPREME COURT CASES 72 
CHAPTER4 
THE INDIANA WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION LAW 109 
CONCLUSION 141 
APPENDIX A 
THE FELLOW-SERVANT DEFENSE 148 
APPENDIXB 
THE CONTRIBUTORY NEGLIGENCE DEFENSE 180 
APPENDIXC 
THE ASSUMPTION OF RISK DEFENSE 212 
WORKS CONSUL TED 235 
TABLE OF CASES 242 
I 
IV 
INTRODUCTION 
Prior to the Atnerican Industrial Revolution, Indiana was a rural agricultural 
coininunity. Most people were self-e1nployed farmers or crafts1nen who worked 
near their homes. So1ne people worked as laborers, hiring their services out to 
others, but they often worked directly for a fanner or crafts1nan. Large co1npanies 
like we know today simply did not exist. If an individual was injured while 
perfonning his job duties, he relied on his fmnily, friends, fraternal order and 
church for support until he could return to work. Because coininunities were 
stnall, injured employees knew their e1nployers well and were perhaps fa1nily 
Inetnbers or neighbors. Because of this immediacy, e1nployers helped suppo1i their 
injured e1nployees. 
In the nineteenth century, Indiana, like 1nost of the United States, undenvent 
dra1natic change. The Industrial Revolution, first occurring in England in the 
eighteenth century and transforming the United States in the nineteenth century, 
changed the way people lived and worked. Inventions like the railroad helped to 
industrialize Indiana. Workplace innovations introduced by the Industrial 
Revolution reorganized the means of production. Many workers took jobs in 
factories rather than s1nall shops, worked for total strangers under the supervision 
of 1niddle managers, and perfonned mechanized tasks and ran the ne\v 1nachinery. 
Pride in a finished product no longer was the driving force behind work; work now 
revolved around how tnuch product could be produced ("piece work") or how 
quickly natural resources and finished products could be transported. 
With this change in work came an increase in accidents. Unlike their 
counterparts prior to the Industrial Revolution, industrial workers-many of thetn 
immigrants to America or migrants frotn fanns-did not have the connections to 
ensure support. Because industrialists were tnainly concerned \Vith tnaxitnizing 
profit, and because immigration and urbanization provided a nearly inexhaustible 
workforce, etnployers had no incentive either to prevent workplace injury or to 
care for injured workers. 
While the nature of work and the nature of an ernployee-etnployer 
relationship changed dratnatically thanks to the Industrial Revolution, the law of 
ernployers' liability stagnated. Prior to the Industrial Revolution, cotntnunity 
charity provided for injured workers who had no need for the courts. Once 
industrial accidents began to occur, injured employees looked to the legal systern 
for answers, and judges turned to the only resource which existed, the co1nn1on 
law. 
The corn1non law stated that ernployers were only liable for harms done to 
ernployees if the ernployer was negligent. Absent a showing of fault on the part of 
an etnployer, an ernployee could not recover. The cotn1non law also afforded 
ernployers three defenses to help overcotne work-related personal injury clain1s: 
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the fellow-servant defense, contributory negligence defense, and assu1nption of 
risk defense. 
Under the fellow-servant defense, etnployers could evade liability for 
injuries if they showed that another etnployee (a fellow servant) of the injured 
e1nployee caused the accident. The injured etnployee could then bring an action 
against his fellow servant but, as both tnen were generally wage laborers with few 
resources, this strategy was usually fruitless. Etnployers could also clai1n 
innocence based on the contributory negligence defense. This defense worked to 
deny recovery to an employee if he was negligent in any aspect of the accident. 
The assu1nption of risk defense allowed employers to escape liability by showing 
that the injured employee either knew of or conte1nplated the risk of injury before 
accepting etnployment. Etnployers vigorously used these defenses to avoid the 
costs of industrial accidents. 
Chapter 1 exatnines the secondary literature surrounding legal history in 
general and employers' liability specifically by investigating econo1nic, social, and 
legal change. Historians and legal scholars alike agree that the etnployers' liability 
defenses and the negligence standard itself worked to transfer the cost of 
industrialization to the worker. Had judges held etnployers accountable fro1n the 
beginning, entrepreneurs would have feared investing in industry because of 
potential liability. The legal system helped to finance industrialization by giving 
etnployers an advantage. This advantage tnade sense in a growing industrial 
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econotny where progress depended largely upon who could produce the fastest or 
travel the furthest. In the nineteenth century capital gains frotn risky investlnents 
fed the econotny. 
Chapter 2 discusses the foundations of workplace liability. Etnployers ' 
liability law, as it developed in the courts and was adopted from the cotntnon law, 
was used by judges to encourage economic growth nationally. Modifications to 
etnployers' liability laws were a reaction to the continued econon1ic growth, the 
resulting dangerous workplace, and an increasing nutnber of injuries. Workers' 
cotnpensation represented the ultitnate revision of etnployers' liability law because 
it created a no fault compensation systetn where etnployers could insure against the 
possibility of etnployee injury and budget for this cost. 
However, prior to the passage of workers' compensation laws in the first 
few decades of the twentieth century, etnployers' liability law consisted pritnarily 
of case law. Thus, we 1nust first look to court decisions to understand how and 
why workers' cotnpensation developed. Chapter 3 analyzes all Indiana Supretne 
Court decisions where an e1nployee sued a railroad cotnpany for personal injury 
and the railroad cotnpany alleged one or more of the three e1nployers' liability 
defenses: fellow servant, contributory negligence, and assumption of risk. An 
exmnination of Indiana Supretne Court cases frotn 1880 through 1915 illustrates 
the problems confronted by injured workers--inconsistency of judgtnents and the 
sotnetimes indiscriminate application of the employers' defenses. 
4 
This study exatntnes whether the Indiana Supretne Court responded 
adequately to the needs of injured workers and how the context of the changing 
econotny and industry played into the Court's decisions. Ultitnately the Court was 
unable to develop a strong body of case law to adjudicate workplace injury. The 
case law that developed alongside industry proved ineffective when confronted by 
the successes of industrialization. 
While the courts grappled with the increased nutnber of etnployee injuries 
and a growing case load, a wave of progressivistn swept the nation. Atnong other 
political refonns social refonners catnpaigned for shorter work days, the 
elimination of child labor, and safer workplaces. Scholars who study workers' 
cotnpensation legislation in other states and countries have found that workers' 
compensation legislation happened much faster than other progressive refonns 
because of the diversity of groups supporting cotnprehensive changes. Most 
scholars find that workers and etnployers alike, along vvith insurance cotnpanies, 
legislatures, and unions supported workers' compensation. 
Chapter 4 exatnines Indiana's struggle for a legislative solution, looking at 
early etnployers' liability acts, interest groups that supported cotnprehensive 
workers' cotnpensation legislation, and the success of Indiana's 1915 Workmen's 
Cotnpensation Act. Indiana legislators attetnpted to statutorily abrogate the 
cotntnon law etnployers' liability defenses before the turn of the century and 
continued until they passed comprehensive legislation. Like the Indiana Supretne 
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Court's case law, the legislature's attetnpts to heighten etnployer liability through 
the 1893 act and its subsequent tnodifications failed. 
The Indiana General Assen1bly passed a cotnprehensive workers' 
compensation act in 1915 that finally addressed the concerns of both workers and 
etnployers and forever ended legal adjudication of workplace injury claitns. The 
legislature had accotnplished what the Indiana Supretne Court had not been able 
to, largely with the support of workers, insurance cotnpanies, and unions. 
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CHAPTER 1 
REVIEW OF TI-lE SECONDARY LITERATURE 
This history of workers' cotnpensation laws is intertwined vvith the histories 
of labor, jurisprudence, and the Progressive Era. Because of this overlap, the 
secondary literature needed to examine the development of vvorkers' cotnpensation 
laws (and the railroad industry) spans several disciplines. As tnany authors 
discussed in this review would likely agree, it is nearly itnpossible to separate 
econotnic, social, and legal change. Econotnists, legal scholars, historians, 
sociologists, (tnuckraking) journalists, and political scientists have all contributed 
to the pool of relevant sources. 
This review tnoves frotn the general to the specific. First, the revtew 
examines the content of legal history. Second, I analyze the tnore detailed history 
of tort law, specifically how tort law developed and its foundations for liability. 
Third, the review considers labor history and how labor historians' attitudes shape 
their discussions of the fonnation of workers' cotnpensation statutes. Fourth, I 
look at historians' interpretations of progressivistn and welfare legislation to better 
understand the climate in which workers' compensation was born. Finally, this 
review investigates the literature on workers' cotnpensation laws as vvell as 
specific state case studies. 
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Legal History 
Legal historians appraise broad legal changes in conjunction with social, 
economic, and political ones. Cotnpared to other areas of history, new legal 
history is relatively young. 1 It has only been within the last thirty years that this 
field has truly blossomed. Only a few general histories of Atnerican law exist, 
with A History of American Law by Lawrence M. Friedman, published in 1973, the 
earliest and best known. 2 
In one volutne Friedtnan discusses substantive la\v, procedure, legal 
institutions, and judicial interpretation of law from the seventeenth century to the 
beginning of the twentieth century, with su1n1nary treattnent beyond that period.3 
Friedman pays considerable attention to the adoption of English cotntnon law 
traditions that helped to shape Alnerican law. In broad tenns, Friedtnan asserts 
1The tenn "new legal history" refers to tnore recent \Vorks, published in the 
last thirty or so years, that exatnine law critically. The developtnent of tnodern 
social science offered legal scholars and historians a new tneans of discussing the 
interaction between law and history. New legal history considers the developtnent 
of laws while also analyzing social, political, and econotnic changes affecting the 
law, tnaking legal history part of the general history rather than keeping legal 
history separate. 
2Upon publishing this work, Friedtnan reaffinned the need for a tnore 
extensive exmnination of legal history, stating in his preface, "There are dozens of 
articles and books about the Supretne Court, about great judges, great cases, about 
the legal profession, about this or that aspect of law. There are patches and pieces; 
but no fabric as a whole." Lawrence M. Friedtnan, A History of American Law 
(New York: Sitnon and Schuster, 1973), 9. 
3Friedtnan acknowledges that his last chapter serves only to highlight the 
tnain themes of the twentieth century. 
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that law does not exist in a void and he believes changes and developtnents in the 
law parallel changes and developments in society. He states that "the strongest 
ingredient in American law, at any given titne, is the present: current etnotions, 
real econotnic interests, concrete political groups. "4 
In his discussion of torts, Friedtnan finds a connection between the 
Industrial Revolution, injuries, profits, and laws passed to regulate or free business 
frotn financial responsibility. Friedtnan connects tnost leading tort cases to the 
railroad industry, finding that railroad law and tort law evolved together.5 For 
Friedtnan, the railroad is an exatnple of a developtnent in society that paralleled 
substantial changes in tort law. Friedman also offers an insightful glance at the 
developtnent of workers' cotnpensation laws. Like his treattnent of Atnerican la\v 
in general, he finds that workers' compensation laws developed because business 
and government realized these laws efficiently allocated the cost of doing business. 
However, in The Transformation of American Law, 1870-1960: The Crisis 
of Legal Orthodoxy, Morton J. Horwitz disagrees with Friedtnan's assertions.6 
Horwitz contends that "[t]he developtnent of law cannot be understood 
independently of social context."7 He exatnines what he calls the transition fron1 
4Friedman, History of American Law, 14. 
5Ibid., 410. 
6Morton J. Horwitz, The Transfonnation of American Law, 1870-1960: The 
Crisis of Legal Orthodoxy (New York: Oxford University Press, 1992). 
7Ibid., 2 
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"Classical Legal Thought" (explained as a late nineteenth-century, laissez-faire 
conservative view) to "Progressive Legal Thought" (explained as a liberal, pro-
govermnent involvement) generated by sweeping social and econotntc 
transfonnation. According to Horwitz, changes including rapid centralization of 
econotnic resources, urbanization, itntnigration, industrialization, and social 
struggle were the itnpetuses for transfonnations in the law. 
Unlike Friedman, who sees workers' cotnpensation laws as a positive 
change enriching the lives of workers, Horwitz understands workers' 
cotnpensation laws as a conspiracy of big business at the expense of labor and 
consumers. Horwitz paints a picture of progressive refonners fighting against 
conservative legal thought. Law was one way to force society to change. Horwitz 
points to workers' compensation legislation as a dratnatic exception to tnost pre-
World War I progressive tneasures because it was not centered in the courts. 
Workers ' cotnpensation laws, according to Horwitz, sought to extract disputes 
frotn the judicial systetn and tnake liability for injury another cost of doing 
business that could be estitnated, insured against, and included in the price paid by 
the public, benefiting big business. Horwitz ties this legal transfonnation to 
progressive social change, actually reaffinning Friedtnan' s idea that law does not 
exist in a vacuum. 
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Like Friedtnan and Horwitz, Kennit L. Hall offers a concise treattnent of 
Atnerican legal developtnent in The Magic Mirror: Law in A1nerican History. 8 
However, Friedtnan and Horwitz offer a history of American jurisprudence, while 
Hall analyzes the role law has played in Atnerican history. Specifically, Hall 
writes "to elucidate the interaction of law and society as revealed over titne 
through the tnain lines of development in American legal culture. "9 Hall sees law 
as a "cultural artifact, a moral deposit of society," in other words, law is inevitably 
an expression of society, culture, econotnics, and politics. 10 
Hall understands legislative tort law as a means for the legislature to 
distribute the cost of accidents among interested parties. He argues that one way to 
reduce the cost to entrepreneurs and encourage econotnic growth was to litnit the 
liability for railroad accidents. While the onus of financial responsibility for 
industrial ills was often placed on the worker during the Industrial Revolution, 
Hall finds that antebellum jurists began to seek tnore of a tniddle ground, placing 
sotne responsibility on the entrepreneurs. This tnove to the tniddle ground 
eventually led to the passage of workers' compensation laws by legislatures. 
Within this explanation, Hall sheds light on the legislative developtnent of 
8Kermit L. Hall, The Magic Mirror: Law in American History (New York: 
Oxford University Press, 1989). 
9Ib.d .. 1 ., Vll. 
10Jbid., 4. 
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workers' cotnpensation laws as well as regulations of railroads, as he looks at 
Progressive-Era ideals and their legal impletnentations. 
While Friedman and other authors find that changes in law reflect changes 
in society, there is another view. Sotne scholars conclude that law is autonon1ous, 
and transfonnations in society and the econotny do not influence the growth of the 
law. For example, James Willard Hurst does not believe that changes in society 
and econotnics were solely responsible for shaping the law. In Law and the 
Conditions of Freedom in the Nineteenth-Century United States, Hurst tnaintains 
that nineteenth-century law created a legal order that promoted the release of 
individual creative energy, while also mobilizing cotntnunity resources. 11 Hurst's 
work is itnportant as one of the first general characterizations of Alnerican legal 
developtnent. Contemporary sources all seetn to pay hotnage, although sotne ever 
so slightly, to Hurst's effort. 
While Hurst does not exatnine the progress of workers' cotnpensation laws 
in detail, he offers insightful findings. By applying I-Iurst's theory to etnployer 
liability law, the reader could deduce that nineteenth-century law created a clin1ate 
favorable to the release of energy, because laws offering employers shelter frotn 
liability allowed for the expansion of the railroads. The fellow-servant rule, along 
11 J atnes Willard Hurst, Law and the Conditions of Freedom in the 
Nineteenth-Century United States (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 
1956). 
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with other legal theories, litnited etnployer liability and allowed for the growth. 
Once this "release of energy" was complete, these rules were changed by courts. 
History of Tort Law 
As Friedman, Horwitz, Hall, and others detnonstrate, along with the rise of 
industry in the late nineteenth century catne an unprecedented rise in injuries and, 
consequently, tort law came of age. Tort law is broadly defined as the law 
governing civil hanns or wrongs. This thesis examines torts con11nitted by 
employers, specifically railroads, against their en1ployees. An understanding of 
Oliver Wendell Holtnes Jr., Guido Calabresi, and Richard A. Posner enriches the 
discussion and helps explain why progressive state courts and legislatures 
abandoned the negligence standard and adopted strict liability under workers ' 
cotnpensation laws. With the birth of modem tort law catne the questioning of the 
justification for fault liability in cases of unintended hann. Two distinct views 
tnerit attention here. 
In The Common Law, Oliver Wendell Holtnes Jr., argued for an objective 
standard of due care, tneaning that individual actions should be held to the 
standard of a reasonable person. 12 This vie\¥, known as the negligence standard, 
dotninated late nineteenth century thought. Of course, in the late nineteenth 
120liver Wendell Holtnes Jr., "The Cotnmon Law," in Perspectives on Tort 
Law, 4th ed., ed. Robert L. Rabin (New York: Little, Brown and Cotnpany, 1995). 
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century, cotnmon law principles-such as the fellow-servant rule, 13 contributory 
negligence, 14 and assumption of the risk 15-worked alongside the negligence 
principle to shield etnployers frotn liability for workplace injuries. While Holmes 
finds the basis for holding sotneone liable for unintended hann in tnorality, recent 
scholars disagree. 
Led by Richard Posner, recent scholars suggest that the rationale for 
liability based on fault comes from economic justifications. 16 In Economic 
Analysis of Law, Posner articulated what sotne scholars tenn a new school of 
jurisprudence known as econotnic jurisprudence. 17 In "A Theory of Negligence," 
13The cotntnon law fellow-servant rule acts as a defense to a claitn of 
negligence. This rule states that a tnaster (i.e., etnployer) cannot be held liable for 
a hann done by one servant (i.e., employee) to another. 
14If an etnployer could detnonstrate that an etnployee contributed, even in 
the slightest, to his own injury, the comtnon law principle of contributory 
negligence would keep the etnployer frotn being held liable, even if the etnployer 
was also negligent. 
15 At comtnon law, the assutnption of risk principle allowed etnployers to 
escape liability for workplace injures where they could show that an etnployee had 
accepted the risk that caused the hann. Oftentimes knowledge that a specific 
industry, like railroads, was dangerous worked to bar an injured etnployee's claitn. 
16 Posner and law and econotnic scholars rely on Judge Learned I-Iand's 
fonnula In United States v. Carroll Towing Co. to prove that courts rely on 
considerations of economic efficiency when assigning fault. Judge Hand put the 
negligence calculus in mathematical tenns: "[I]fthe probability [of injury] be 
called P; the injury L; and the burden [of protection] B; liability depends upon 
whether B is less than L tnultiplied by P." United States v. Carroll Towing Co., 
159 F .2d 169, 173 (2d Circ., 194 7). This fonnula basically states that an actor 
should be held at fault only when the costs of avoiding the hann are less than the 
hann itself. 
17Richard A. Posner, Economic Analysis of Law (Boston: Little, Brown & 
Co., 1992). 
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appearing in the Journal of Legal Studies, Posner argues that the judgtnent of 
liability ulthnately depends upon a weighing of costs and benefits. 18 If the 
magnitude of a loss plus the probability that such loss will occur is 1nore than the 
cost of avoiding the hann, that is negligence. 
In Econo1nic Analysis of Law, Posner examines the general relationship 
between judicial and legislative decisions on 1narket econo1nics generally. Posner 
also offers other econo1nic explanations of tort law. In The Economics of Justice , 
he argues (sitnilar to Hurst and Horwitz) that judges, when assigning liability (and 
ultitnately fault), look at what tnaxitnizes the wealth of society and econotnic 
efficiency! 9 In The Economic Structure of Tort Law, Posner and Willian1 M. 
Landes suggest that tort law is best explained as judges trying to protnote efficient 
resource allocation.20 Guido Calabresi agrees. In The Costs of Accidents: A Legal 
and Economic Analysis, Calabresi argues that the law of accidents is a tneans for 
courts to mandate behavior and resource allocation.21 He views judges and 
legislators as important independent actors in assigning fault to best serve 
econotnic needs. 
18Richard A. Posner, "A Theory of Negligence," Journal of Legal Studies 1 
(January 1972): 29-48. 
19Richard A. Posner, The Economics of Justice (Catnbridge, Mass.: 
1-Iarvard University Press, 1981 ). 
20Willimn M. Landes and Richard A. Posner, The Econo1nic Structure of 
Tort Law (Cmnbridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1987). 
21 Guido Calabresi, The Costs of Accidents: A Legal and Economic Analysis 
(New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1970). 
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The intellectual foundations of tort law or the rationale for the development 
of the tort systetn may seem only tenuously connected to the fonnation of workers' 
cotnpensation, but both offer explanations of liability based on fault. Although the 
differences between Holmes and Posner may seetn unitnportant when exatnining 
the end result of court cases or the passage of workers' cotnpensation legislation in 
Indiana, their views have certainly influenced secondary literature. Moreover, 
depending on the views of those adjudicating disputes, whether the fault principle 
is based on a moral or economic justification can affect the outcon1e of cases and 
possibly the passage of legislation. 
Aside frotn understanding the ideological roots of negligence and liability, 
understanding the history of the tort systetn is also itnportant. In order to 
appreciate the broad changes workers' compensation legislation brought, we must 
examine negligence law in tnore depth. Most general histories of the law, 
including Friedtnan's and Horwitz's works, as well as brief treattnents in tnany of 
the journals consulted, offer concise treatments of the history of torts. 
The most thorough monograph on the history of tort law is G. Edward 
White's Tort Law in America: An Intellectual History. 22 He shows that before the 
nineteenth century, torts were not a distinct area of the law such as property or 
crime. Because tort la\v was a relatively young field, White provides a thorough 
22G. Edward White, Tort Law in Anzerica: An Intellectual History (New 
York: Oxford University Press, 1980). 
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exatnination of the history of the commentary on torts. He also discusses the 
acadetnics and judges who helped to shape tort law. White disagrees with legal 
scholars who argue that American judges adopted the negligence principle because 
they feared that the alternative-strict liability-would discourage risk-taking 
entrepreneurial activity and slow down progress. White tnaintains that academic 
and intellectual attitudes of the late nineteenth century shaped tort law. White 
draws frotn Robert Wiebe's argument in The Search for Order, 1877-1920, 
contending that by the late nineteenth century intellectuals were trying to restore 
the order that characterized eighteenth-century thought. 23 White finds that the tort 
systetn was organized to build a sitnple and comprehensive systetn which would 
offer order. 
Three authors complement White's history of tort law. Both Leonard W. 
Levy, in The Law of the Commonwealth and Chief Justice Shaw, and Charles 0. 
Gregory, in "Trespass to Negligence to Absolute Liability," exatnine the 
foundations of tnodem tort law.24 Levy looks at influential Massachusetts 
appellate judge Letnuel Shaw during an itnportant period in Atnerican legal 
history, 1830 to 1860. Levy tnaintains that Shaw's contributions to the law of 
23Robert Wiebe, The Searchfor Order, 1877-1920 (New York: Hill & 
Wang, 1976). 
24Leonard W. Levy, The Law of the Commonwealth and Chief Justice Shaw 
(Catnbridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1957); Charles 0. Gregory, 
"Trespass to Negligence to Absolute Liability," Virginia Law Review 37 ( 1951 ): 
359-370. 
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cotrunon carriers (railroads), the fellow-servant rule, and the law of negligence 
cannot be underestiinated. Despite Levy's focus on a period prior to that exatnined 
in this thesis, Shaw's contributions to jurisprudence help explain the rationale for 
nineteenth-century tort law. 
In "Trespass to Negligence to Absolute Liability," Charles 0. Gregory 
traces the fonns of civil liability from their foundation in English cotntnon law 
through the industrial era. Like Levy, Gregory credits Chief Justice Shaw with 
laying the foundations for a consistent theory of liability for unintentional hann. 
While Gregory and Levy exatnine the early foundations of tort law, Robert 
L. Rabin concentrates on the period fro1n the Civil War to World War I in "The 
Historical Development of the Fault Principle: A Reinterpretation" and "Sotne 
Reflections on the Process of Tort Refonn."25 In the first article, Rabin exmnines 
several noteworthy cases fro1n this period and finds that liability based on fault 
was not pervasive as 1nany historians argue. Rabin 1naintains that during this 
period neither I-Iolmes' nor Posner's explanation of the fault principle works: he 
finds that the fault syste1n was much more cotnplicated. l-Ie states that "[t]he great 
failure" of tort historians is their "tendency to ignore [the] fundatnental 
25Robert L. Rabin, "The Historical Development of the Fault Principle: A 
Reinterpretation," Georgia Law Review 15 (1981): 925-963; Robert L. Rabin, 
"Some Reflections on the Process of Tort Reform," San Diego Law Review 25 
(1988): 13-23. 
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distinction" between negligence in terms of the violation of a duty and the legal 
eletnents of negligence: duty, cause-in-fact, proximate cause, and damages. 26 
In a second article, "So1ne Reflections on the Process of Tort Reform," 
Rabin argues that dissatisfaction with accident law was tied directly to the rise of 
the railroad. Rabin finds this "engine of destruction" a serious risk to the labor 
force. As tnore and more injury cases catne before the cout1s, judges accepted the 
defendant's reliance on a trinity of defenses--contributory negligence, assutnption 
of the risk, and the fellow-servant rule. Rabin points to a second tnajor change in 
tort law with the Progressive Era tenet of workplace reform. He argues that states 
becmne social welfare laboratories with tort refonn, which first tnanifested as 
workers' cotnpensation legislation. 
Labor History 
Labor historians traditionally look at the interaction bet,veen labor, 
managetnent, the economy, and the law. In The Visible Hand: The Managerial 
Revolution in American Business, Alfred D. Chandler argues that between 1850 
and 1920 the visible hand of managetnent replaced the invisible hand of n1arket 
forces thereby controlling the economy and allocating resources during the 
26Rabin, "The Historical Developtnent of the Fault Principle, 929. 
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formative years of tnodem capitalism?7 According to Chandler, the techniques 
used by modern tnanagers (the visible hand) began with the railroads. Chandler 
points to new technology, an expanded tnarket, increased production, and tnass 
distribution, as well as modern business enterprise, as the dotninant influences 
during the second half of the nineteenth century. Chandler does not see general 
public policy, or Progressive Era policy, as the driving force. He tnaintains that 
the strategies adopted by the railroads show the visible hand working to tnaxitnize 
profit and tninitnize liability. 
In Belated Feudalis1n: Labor, the Law, and Liberal Develop1nent in the 
United States, Karen Orren offers a history of labor-etnployer relations and their 
itnpact on the development of liberalistn. 28 Orren follows the thinking of 
Friedtnan and Horwitz, arguing that courts took an active role in shaping policies 
that facilitated the social and economic needs of society. Orren also agrees vvith 
scholars like Christopher L. Totnlins when she argues that lawtnakers and judges 
selected laws, especially labor laws, that placed the burden of labor costs on 
workers rather than industrialists. Concentrating on labor relations and the 
railroads, she finds that during the height of industrialization, railroads were the 
27 Alfred D. Chandler, The Visible Hand: The Managerial Revolution in 
American Business (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1977). 
28Karen Orren, Belated Feudalism: Labor, the Law, and Liberal 
Development in the United States (New York: Catnbridge University Press, 1991 ). 
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beneficiaries of policies that allowed them to flourish without the burden of strict 
liability laws. 
Totnlins in Law, Labor, and Ideology in the Early An1erican Republic, 
looks at the role of governtnent, particularly the courts, and antebellutn labor 
history. 29 Tomlins finds that courts endorsed theories and legislative rules 
supporting etnployer itrununity. Tracing Indiana's adoption of the fellow-servant 
rule and the exceptions that were eventually carved out for etnployer liability, 
Totnlins argues that 'judges and treatise writers who were engaged in the 
resolution of disputes and the description of legal relationships were of necessity 
allocating power, authority, and responsibilities."30 Their actions endorsed a 
relationship between labor and capital that placed the burden of progress and 
industrialization on the workers. According to Tomlins "[p ]eople at work vvere not 
citizens but servants. "31 
29Christopher L. Totnlins, Law, Labor, and Ideology in the Early American 
Republic (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1993). 
30Ibid., xiv. Totnlins looks specifically at how state courts in Indiana and 
other tnidwestern states underwrote etnployer itnmunity during the 1850s and 
1860s. He explains that Indiana adopted a "different-department" exception 
tetnpering etnployers' itnmunity to etnployee lawsuits. However, in less than ten 
years, the courts slowly diluted this exception and continued to find etnployers 
itnpervious to tnost negligence claitns. 
31 Ibid., 384. 
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Progressivism and Welfare Legislation 
In the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, refonners sought to 
solve probletns like overcrowding, industrialization, disease, hazardous 
workplaces, and poor living conditions for many children. Progressive-Era 
refonners wanted to itnprove the health and safety of industrial workers, and 
catnpaigned for greater employee benefits and cotnpensation for accidents by the 
employers. Progressivistn was fundatnentally a social and politicaltnovetnent, not 
a legal one. 
Several scholars address the interaction between politics, society, and 
econotny in the Progressive Era. In Creating the Welfare State: The Political 
Economy of Twentieth-Century Reform, Edward Berkowitz and Kitn McQuaid 
argue that the American welfare state, which would include workers' 
cotnpensation laws, was created by big business to develop the type of workplace 
that would best serve its needs. 32 They ultimately conclude that capital accepted 
and encouraged the developtnent of a tnoderate welfare state in part to avoid a true 
welfare state. 
32Edward Berkowitz and Kitn McQuaid, Creating the Welfare State: The 
Political Economy of Twentieth-Century Reform (New York: Praeger, 1988). 
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Melvin I. Urofsky exatnines state reactions to welfare legislation in "State 
Coutis and Protective Legislation During the Progressive Era: A Reevaluation. "33 
Urofsky tnaintains that Progressive-Era cases have been tnischaracterized as too 
conservative by historians Gilbert Roe and Roscoe Pound when in reality courts 
reflected tnoderate refonnist views. He states that '" [t]he Progressives, for all 
their cotnplaints, could really have asked for no tnore. "34 Urofsky exatnines 
Progressive-Era cases dealing with child labor, tnaxhnutn hours, tninitnutn vvages, 
and etnployer liability, to find that state courts supported these refonns. In his 
exatnination of workmens' cotnpensation laws, Urofsky finds that a rather rapid 
spread of legislation was accepted by tnost state courts. Furthennore, Urofsky 
reasons that state courts are often tnischaracterized as conservative because state 
legislatures passed only litnited employers' liability laws, and state coutis did not 
uphold thetn uniformly for a variety of reasons. A few decisions rejecting 
cotnpensation legislation received a lot of attention, sotne laws lacked effective 
enforcetnent tnechanistns, and sotne state courts' tnetnberships' resetnbled the 
United States Supreme Court, which was in the tnidst of a long period of 
conservative domination until the end of the Progressive Era. 
33Melvin I. Urofsky, "State Courts and Protective Legislation During the 
Progressive Era: A Reevaluation," Journal of A1nerican History 74 (June 1985): 
63-91. 
34Ibid., 91. 
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Workers' Compensation Studies 
Most workers' cotnpensation scholars argue that the laws created by state 
legislatures and interpreted by state courts, tnore often than not, resulted frotn 
employers and etnployees working together. To prove this contention, workers ' 
co1npensation scholars (including historians, sociologists, econo1nists, and political 
scientists) examine the period prior to the enactment of workers' co1npensation 
laws along with the reasons for the enactinent of such laws. 
One of the best concise treatinents of the development and iinpletnentation 
of workers' co1npensation laws is "Social Change and the Law of Industrial 
Accidents" by Lawrence M. Friedtnan and Jack Ladinsky.35 The authors analyze 
the evolution of etnployer liability law fro1n the co1nmon la\:v tort systen1 to the 
establishment of workers' co1npensation laws. They take a historical approach, 
examining the fonnation of the fellow-servant rule, the application of the rule, the 
weakening of the rule, the rising pressure for change, and the final step to the 
workers' cotnpensation system. Ladinsky and Friedtnan apply Friedtnan's basic 
pre1nise in A History of American Law, arguing that social change and legal 
change are tied together. As Progressive-Era refonners pushed to hold e1nployers 
liable for workplace accidents, and as courts began to carve out exceptions to the 
35Lawrence M. Friedtnan and Jack Ladinsky, "Social Change and the Law 
of Industrial Accidents" in American Law and the Constitutional Order, ed. 
Lawrence M. Friedtnan and Harry N. Scheiber (Catnbridge, Mass.: Harvard 
University Press, 1978). 
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fellow-servant rule, etnployer iinmunity was eventually replaced by the workers' 
cotnpensation regime, a rational actuarial systetn that balanced the current interests 
of labor and tnanagetnent. 
In "State Timing of Policy Adoption: Worktnen's Cotnpensation in the 
United States, 1909-1929," sociologist Eliza Pavalko exatnines factors 
contributing to the passage of workers' compensation laws in the states.36 She 
finds that states were quicker to adopt cotnpensation legislation when both work-
accident litigation and productivity were high. Data fron1 individual states 
detnonstrates the strength of laws and the speed of their passage. She concludes 
that labor activity, the success of lawsuits filed by injured workers, and the 
strength of capital, affected the passage of workers' cotnpensation lavvs in the 
states. By analyzing the nutnber of state supreme court cases decided in favor of 
workers, Pavalko also looks at how court cases affected the titning of adoption of 
workers' cotnpensation laws. Pavalko finds that states adopted legislation faster 
when there were 1nore court cases, regardless of who was victorious in court. 
Labor historians have also exatnined workers' cotnpensation, generally 
finding that business leaders supported the passage of workers' cotnpensation law 
36Eliza Pavalko, "State Tiining of Policy Adoption: Worktnen's 
Cotnpensation in the United States, 1909-1929," American Journal of Sociology 
95(Novetnber 1989): 593-615. 
25 
because, more often than not, such laws passed the cost of accidents on to 
etnployees. In "Worklnen's Compensation and the Prerogatives of Voluntaristn," 
Roy Lubove argues that workers' compensation laws really were progratns to tneet 
the needs of private business groups as tnuch as the needs of injured workers.37 
Lubove also tnaintains that even after the passage of workers' cotnpensation 
legislation, workers continued to bear most of the cost of injuries in the form of 
low benefit schedules, waiting periods, skitnpy tnedical coverage, and the 
exclusion of occupational diseases. 
James Weinstein agrees with Lubove's findings in "Big Business and the 
Origins of Worklnen's Cotnpensation.'~38 Weinstein chronicles the role big 
business played in the developtnent and eventual codification of workers' 
cotnpensation laws. He concludes that the eventual adoption of workers' 
cotnpensation legislation \Vas largely due to an understanding on the part of big 
business that passage of such legislation 'Nould strengthen business. 
Like Lubove and Weinstein, Daniel M. Bennan in Death on the Job: 
Occupational Health and Safety Struggles in the United States argues that business 
controlled the tnove for workers' cotnpensation legislation and other work safety 
related progratns because it could then etnphasize cotnpensation over prevention of 
37Roy Lubove, "Worklnen' s Compensation and the Prerogatives of 
Voluntarism," Labor History 8 (Fall 1967): 254-279. 
38James Weinstein, "Big Business and the Origins of Workmen's 
Cotnpensation," Labor History 8 (Spring 1967): 156-17 4. 
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accidents and tnaxuntze profits.39 Berman chronicles business organizations 
which saw the changing legal tide in the Progressive Era and responded by taking 
control of workers' cotnpensation initiatives to ensure that radical legislation did 
not pass. Berman also looks at labor's initial hesitance to join the workers' 
cotnpensation tnovement because big business interests controlled the tnovement. 
Harry Weiss's chapter "Etnployers' Liability and Worktnen's 
Cotnpensation," in History of Labour in the United States, 1896-1932, exatnines 
the formation and impletnentation of workers' cotnpensation laws. 40 Weiss 
describes legislation passed prior to workers' cotnpensation that also made 
en1ployers liable for workers' injuries. He explains the itnportance of state 
comtnissions and investigative bodies in establishing and adtninistering workers' 
cotnpensation laws. Weiss characterizes workers' con1pensation as too 
conservative and concludes that while workers' compensation laws were a step 
forward, their adtninistration and exclusionary provisions were too restrictive. 
Progressivistn brought changes in workers' cotnpensation on the federal 
level as well. The railroads were a particular target of federal refonners because of 
39Daniel M. Berman, Death on the Job: Occupational Health and Safety 
Struggles in the United States (New York: Monthly Review Press, 1978). 
40 Harry Weiss, "Employers' Liability and Worktnen's Compensation," in 
John Rogers Comtnons et al., eds., History of Labour in the United States (New 
York: A.M. Kelley, 1966 [1935]. 
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the dangers they posed to railroad workers. In "Worlanen's Cotnpensation on 
Interstate Railways," first published in 1934 and undoubtedly affected by New 
Deal thought, Lester P. Schoene and Frank Watson look at the effects of the 
federal Etnployer's Liability Act of 1906, its overlap with sitnilar state provisions, 
and what types of injuries and occurrences it covered.41 They find that the added 
costs associated with recovering under the Act discouraged the assertion of the 
right itself. The authors found that the result of the Act was certainly not the 
original legislative intent, which was to provide for injured railroad etnployees.42 
Schoene and Watson present a call for uniform change and increased liability. 
By far, the leaders and tnost prolific writers in this field are Shawn Everett 
Kantor and Price V. Fishback, both economics professors at the University of 
Arizona. Aside frotn articles dealing with the historical, sociological, and political 
effects of workers' cotnpensation laws, several of their articles focus specifically 
on the economic itnpact of workers' compensation. While these articles often 
offer mathetnatical calculations and data to support their findings, they also use 
this data to draw historical conclusions that are itnportant when considering why 
courts abandoned the fellow-servant rule, as well as other legal doctrines litniting 
41 Lester Schoene and Frank Watson, "Worlanen' s Cotnpensation on 
Interstate Railways," Harvard Law Review 47 (January 1934): 389-424. 
42Schoene and Watson state that "any systetn which has inherent in it the 
possibility of tnaking recovery depend upon the generosity of the etnployer can 
scarcely be an effective safeguard for the interests of the worker." Ibid., 409. 
28 
etnployer liability, and adopted a systetn placing the cost of workplace injuries on 
etnployers. 
The tnost gennane article from Kantor and Fishback is "The Adoption of 
Workers' Cotnpensation in the United States, 1900-1930. "43 The authors tnaintain 
that while workers certainly benefited frotn the passage of workers' cotnpensation 
laws, employers and insurance cotnpanies actually pushed for the legislation. The 
authors provide a more thorough examination than sotne, as they discuss insurance 
cotnpanies extensively. Kantor and Fishback propose that workers, business 
owners, insurance companies, and labor unions supported workers' cotnpensation 
laws, \Vhich succeeded while tnost other social welfare progratns of the 
Progressive Era failed. The authors also analyze etnpirical data to detennine the 
factors that contributed to the adoption of workers' cotnpensation laws and 
conclude that social reformers played a much smaller role than tnost scholars 
believe. 
In "Nonfatal Accident Cotnpensation and the Cotntnon Law at the Turn of 
the Century," Kantor and Fishback, with data (including court decisions) cotnpiled 
by the Michigan Bureau of Labor and Industrial Statistics, investigate the etnployer 
liability system from 1896 to 1903, to paint a picture of the impact of the common 
43Shawn Everett Kantor and Price V. Fishback, "The Adoption of Workers' 
Cotnpensation in the United States, 1900-1930," Journal of La-w & Econo1nics 61 
(October 1998): 305-335. 
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law before the passage of workers' cotnpensation laws. 44 They find that the 
efficacy of common law defenses of contributory negligence, assutnption of the 
risk, and the fellow-servant rule, along with legal costs, tnade injured workers less 
likely to file lawsuits because of the uncertainty of recovery. They show that these 
legal doctrines allowed etnployers to avoid liability, presenting a strong case for 
the necessity of workers' cotnpensation legislation. 
In another article by Kantor and Fishback, "Did Workers Pay for the 
Passage of Workers' Cotnpensation Laws?" the authors examine the effect of 
workers' compensation laws between 1907 and 1923 on the real wages of 
employees in three industries: coal tnining, lutnber milling, and the unionized 
business trades.45 The authors look at wages and benefits before and after the 
passage of workers' cotnpensation laws to find that wages fell as benefits rose. 
Kantor and Fishback provide a table of compensation averages using data frotn 
several sources, as well as a table of expected benefits under each state's workers' 
con1pensation legislation characterized as a percentage of annual earnings frotn 
1910 and 1923. Kantor and Fishback conclude, as have many authors looking at 
workers' compensation, that etnployers led the way in supporting legislation. They 
44Shawn Everett Kantor and Price V. Fishback, "Nonfatal Accident 
Cotnpensation and the ColTilnon Law at the Turn of the Century," Journal of Law, 
Economics & Organization 11 (April 1995): 406-433. 
45Shawn Everett Kantor and Price V. Fishback, "Did Workers Pay for the 
Passage of Workers' Cotnpensation Laws?," Quarterly Journal of Economics 110 
(August 1995): 713-742. 
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also detnonstrate etnpirically that etnployers likely supported the legislation 
because they passed a substantial portion of the cost on to workers in the fonn of 
lower wages. In other words, Kantor and Fishback conclude that the workers 
thetnselves paid for compensation laws because etnployers took the cost of the 
insurance pretniutns fro1n the workers' wages rather than fro In cotnpany profits. 
In "Precautionary Savings, Insurance, and the Origins of Worker's 
Con1pensation," Kantor and Fishback examine the effect of workers' 
cotnpensation laws on individual savings and insurance. 46 The authors look at the 
results of a 1917-1919 survey of industrial workers to determine if employees self-
insured against accident risk by either purchasing individual insurance or placing 
1noney in savings. Kantor and Fishback conclude that workers, after the passage 
of workers' compensation laws, reduced their own savings and the atnount of 
insurance coverage they obtained because they could rely on benefits provided by 
workers' cotnpensation. 
Kantor and Fishback also offer a look at the state's involvetnent in 
underwriting workers' cotnpensation insurance. Depending on each state's statute, 
insurance could be provided by the state or by private insurance cotnpanies. In 
"The Durable Experiinent: State Insurance of Workers' Compensation Risk in the 
46Shawn Everett Kantor and Price V. Fishback, "Precautionary Savings, 
Insurance, and the Origins of Worker's Compensation," Journal of Political 
Economy 104 (April1996): 419-442. 
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Early Twentieth Century," the authors present quantitative and case-study analysis 
of state choices between public and private insurance.47 In Washington, Ohio, and 
Minnesota they maintain that opposition from insurance cotnpanies and fanners 
pushed tnost state legislatures to adopt private insurance despite pleas from labor 
unions. 
In "Square Deal or Raw Deal? Market Cotnpensation for Workplace 
Disatnenities, 1884-1903," Kantor and Fishback look at tnale data on workers 
frotn Kansas, Maine, and California, fetnale workers in Indianapolis and child 
laborers in New Jersey.48 For each group, the authors cotnpiled cotnpensating 
differentials ( disamenities) for unemploytnent risk, accident risk, and occupational 
illness to test whether Progressive Era refonners were correct in their assertions 
that workers' cotnpensation legislation was needed. Kantor and Fishback prove 
through these mathetnatical computations that before the passage of workers' 
cotnpensation laws, accident risk was partially cotnpensated, and occupational 
47Shawn Everett Kantor and Price V. Fishback, "The Durable Experitnent: 
State Insurance of Workers' Cotnpensation Risk in the Early Twentieth Century," 
Journal of Economic History 56 (Decetnber 1996): 809-836. 
48Shawn Everett Kantor and Price V. Fishback, "Square Deal or Raw Deal? 
Market Compensation for Workplace Disamenities, 1884-1903," Journal of 
Economic History 52 (December 1992): 826-848. Kantor and Fishback obtained 
their data from the Historical Labor Statistics Project at the University of 
California that evaluated many state labor reports. They looked specifically at 
wotnen in Indianapolis in 1892 and found that they were not paid any tnore based 
on the danger of their job. However, these data are not used for this paper as there 
were no female railroad workers who were injured and sued their e1nployer (with 
either party appealing to the Indiana Supretne Court) between 1880 and 1920. 
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illness was never compensated. In sum, the authors used these data to prove the 
need for workers' compensation laws during the Progressive Era. 
Finally, in the only book published by Kantor and Fishback, A Prelude to 
the Welfare State: The Origins of Workers' Compensation, the authors utilize the 
data collected for their many journal articles to dra-vv broad conclusions about the 
developtnent of workers' cotnpensation laws.49 They point to the widespread 
itnportance of workers' cotnpensation legislation and argue that workers' 
cotnpensation set the precedent for other social welfare progrmns, including 
unetnployment insurance, Social Security, and Medicare. They also claitn that 
workers' compensation laws helped set the stage for the acceptance of no-fault 
liability rules for auto accidents and strict liability for product flaws. In A Prelude 
to the Welfare State, the authors also "use a blend of quantitative and qualitative 
studies to develop a cotnprehensive interpretation of the origins of workers' 
cotnpensation."50 Lastly, they use the data to prove that, while workers, 
etnployers, and insurance cotnpanies disputed the details of workers' 
compensation, in general they all supported the legislation. 
Price Fishback also teamed with Seung-Wook Kim, an econotnics professor 
at Chung-Ang University in Korea, to again examine cotnpensating differentials 
49Shawn Everett Kantor and Price V. Fishback, A Prelude to the Welfare 
State: The Origins of Workers' Compensation (Chicago: University of Chicago 
Press, 2000). 
50Ibid., 4. 
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vvith railroad employees. In "Institutional Change, Cotnpensating Differentials, 
and Accident Risk in Atnerican Railroading, 1892-1945," Fishback and Kiln look 
at the effect of federal, rather than state, laws on the cotnpensating differentials.51 
They found that compensation rose as unions and governtnent becmne tnore 
interested in the post-accident compensation of injured workers. Fishback and 
Kiln's data are itnportant because they show that workers' compensation laws 
specifically led to itnprovetnents for railroad workers. The authors also provide 
etnpirical data on railroad workers' benefits during both World War I and World 
War II. 
In those states that have been examined in detail, scholars find that workers' 
cotnpensation legislation was largely a result of cooperation between business and 
labor. In "Conflict and Cotnpromise: The Worktnen's Cotnpensation Movetnent 
in New York, 1890s-1913," Robert F. Wesser, an econotnist, offers a political 
history of the successes and failures of workers' compensation legislation in Nevv 
York, a state chosen because it "provides a good illustration of this pattern of 
conflict, interaction, and cotnprotnise."52 Wesser etnphasizes the role of business 
support of workers' cotnpensation, finding that business was interested in 
51 Seung-Wook Kim and Price V. Fishback, "Institutional Change, 
Compensating Differentials, and Accident Risk in American Railroading, 1892-
1945," Journal of Econo1nic History 53 (December 1993): 796-823. 
52 Robert F. Wesser, "Conflict and Comprotnise: The Workmen's 
Cotnpensation Movement in New York, 1890s-1913," Labor History 12 (Su1nn1er 
1971): 341-372, 348. 
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legislation because it heightened the predictability of costs of lawsuits by injured 
etnployees, protnoted harmony with organized labor and encouraged conservative 
unionistn. Wesser also exatnines the role of organized labor in the passage of the 
New York legislation. 
Economists Shawn Everett Kantor and Price V. Fishback exatntne 
Missouri's experience with workers' compensation in "Coalition Formation and 
the Adoption of Workers' Compensation: The Case of Missouri, 1911 to 1926. "53 
These authors, like Wesser, point to the element of comprotnise between workers 
and etnployers. They argue that etnployers, labor union representatives, and the 
Missouri bar all exercised considerable influence over the adoption of workers' 
cotnpensation legislation. Kantor and Fishback's research is largely quantitative, 
but they provide an excellent chart comparing the year of enactment, ratio of 
benefits to annual earnings, type of compensating insurance schetne, and the 
tnethod of adtninistration in all fifty states.54 While Wesser, Kantor, and Fishback 
look at the economic effects of workers' cotnpensation to show how coalitions of 
53Shawn Everett Kantor and Price V. Fishback, "Coalition Fonnation and 
the Adoption of Workers' Cotnpensation: The Case of Missouri, 1911 to 1926" in 
Claudia Goldin and Gary D. Libecap, eds., The Regulated Econo1ny: A Historical 
Approach to Political Economy (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1994): 
259-297. 
54Ibid., 261-62. Kantor and Fishback calculate that Indiana, when 
cotnpared with other states, had a low ratio of benefits to annual earnings (offered 
less cotnpensation to injured workers). However, this study is based on all 
industries, not just railroads. 
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interests aided its passage, labor historians come to siinilar conclusions. In "An 
Instance of Labor and Business Cooperation: Workmen's Cornpensation in 
Washington State," Joseph Tripp finds that this legislation resulted frorn the 
cooperation between organized labor and employers, mostly lurnber ernployers 
who could no longer control legal judgments, as most cornrnon law defenses were 
unraveling. 55 At the same time judgrnents, insurance, and litigation costs were 
rising. Tripp uses Washington court cases, labor organization records, and the 
personal papers of lurnber cornpany executives to show this cooperation. 
Robert Asher examines New York State in "Failure and Fulfilhnent: 
Agitation for Employers' Liability Legislation and the Origins of Workn1en' s 
Compensation in New York State, 187 6-1910. "56 Asher also finds that business 
and labor cooperated to pass cornpensation legislation, but unlike Wesser, Kantor 
and Fishback, and Tripp, he finds that labor leaders did rnore than any other group 
to secure the passage of workers' compensation legislation. Asher argues that 
labor brought the issue of liability to the voter, and in close elections, legislators 
gained their support by voting for reform bills. He identifies the syrnpathy and 
support of the middle class refonners for the plight of the industrial worker. He 
55 Joseph Tripp, "An Instance of Labor and Business Cooperation: 
Worktnen's Compensation in Washington State," Labor History 17 (Fall 1976): 
530-550. 
56Robeti Asher, "Failure and Fulfilhnent: Agitation for Employers' 
Liability Legislation and the Origins of Workmen's Cornpensation in New York 
State, 1876-191 0," Labor History 24 (Spring 1983): 198-222. 
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finds that the expansion of legal liability made the controlled costs of workers' 
cotnpensation insurance tnore attractive to etnployers. 
Joseph Castrovinci looks at the passage of workers' cotnpensation tn 
Illinois. In "Prelude to Welfare Capitalistn: The Role of Business in the 
Enactment of Worklnen's Cotnpensation Legislation in Illinois, 1905-12," 
Castrovinci, like Asher, finds that as courts began to pull away frotn the 
established cotnmon law and increasingly found for workers suing etnployers, 
business began to favor the passage of workers' cotnpensation laws.57 
Castrovinci' s study is broader than Asher's, as it exatnines the state cotntnission 
established to study workers' compensation laws and the involvetnent of business 
interests in Illinois's cotrunission. Like other scholars who exatnined state 
workers' compensation laws, Castrovinci also looks at labor's role. 
The general histories of law or tort law explain the developtnent of the 
cotntnon law that governed workplace liability as well as the birth of the cotntnon 
law etnployers' liability defenses (fellow-servant, asstunption of risk, and 
contributory negligence). These sources also discuss the transition and the 
rationale for the developtnent of cotnprehensive workers' cotnpensation 
legislation. The labor histories also explain the transition in the econotny 
57 Joseph Castrovinci, "Prelude to Welfare Capitalism: The Role of 
Business in the Enacttnent ofWorkinen's Cotnpensation Legislation in Illinois, 
905-12," Social Service Review 50 (March 197 6): 80-102. 
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(specifically industrialization) that facilitated legal change. More specific sources 
offer detailed case or industry studies. While none of these sources focus on 
Indiana, they show what factors influenced courts and legislatures in general. 
Usually, these studies deal with larger, tnore influential industrial states such as 
New York, while others center upon states like Washington or California that were 
on the cutting edge of sotne Progressive-Era refonns. 
This thesis tests some of those theories. Historians like Friedtnan and Hall 
contend that law and society are intertwined. Totnlins supports thetn, finding that 
lawtnakers and judges selected laws, especially labor laws, that placed the burden 
of labor costs on workers rather than industrialists. Legal scholars like Posner 
argue that judges based tort rulings on resource allocation. This thesis exatnines 
Indiana Supretne Court cases that considered workplace liability in the railroad 
industry to test if the cotntnon law defenses (fellow-servant, assumption of risk, 
and contributory negligence) denied injured employees recovery and helped lead to 
the passage of workers' compensation in Indiana. 
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CHAPTER2 
A BRIEF HISTORY OF EMPLOYERS' LIABILITY LAW 
After the Civil War the United States industrialized at a rapid pace. 
Industrialization also initiated change in the law. In the law of industrial accidents 
the common-law negligence standard governing workers' liability was transforn1ed 
into a workers' cotnpensation system, where etnployers cotnpensated injured 
etnployees regardless of who was at fault. Between 1900 and 1920, the federal 
governtnent and forty-three states enacted workmens' cotnpensation laws.58 
Rarely in American history has legislation been so powerful and accepted so 
quickly and completely. This chapter discusses the turn-of-the-century legal 
environment, the Industrial Revolution, and the railroad. It also sets the context 
for Indiana's experience, which will be analyzed in Chapters 3 and 4. 
Understanding the origins of etnployers' liability laws is the first step in 
analyzing thetn. Tort law (the law of civil wrongs or harms), the law that governed 
workplace liability, did not develop until the nineteenth century.59 There was little 
58 Shawn Everett Kantor and Price V. Fishback, "Coalition F onnation and 
the Adoption of Workers' Cotnpensation: The Case of Missouri, 1911 to 1926" in 
Claudia Goldin and Gary D. Libecap, eds., The Regulated Economy: A Historical 
Approach to Political Economy (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1994), 
261-63. 
59Kermit L. Hall, The Magic Mirror: Law in American History (New York: 
Oxford University Press, 1989), 4 7. 
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reason in the colonial and early national periods for employers' liability laws to 
develop, since only a small portion of the pre-industrial labor force \Vas 
categorized as "employees. "60 Richard A. Posner explains pre-negligence liability 
prior to the nineteenth century, finding that employers were held liable for banns 
caused by their accidents whether or not they were at fault. 61 Industrialization 
brought about significant and rapid changes in manufacturing techniques, which 
necessitated change in the law of workplace liability and the abandonrnent of the 
no-fault standard of liability. 
Industrialization was a gradual process, happening in phases. 62 The first 
phase of the Industrial Revolution began in England by the 1niddle of the 
eighteenth century. Invention of the stea1n engine brought stemn power into the 
industrial setting as well as for transportation; innovative textile rnachinery such as 
the spinning jenny and the rnule revolutionized the rnanufacture of cloth. 
England's economy was transfonned from agriculture to industry as productivity 
60In 1800, 10 percent of the white labor force was characterized as 
etnployees; by 1860 the nurnber was only 20 percent. Slaves were not included in 
these numbers as they were governed by a separate body of laws. Ibid., 112. 
61 Richard A. Posner, "A Theory of Negligence," in Robert L. Rabin, 
Perspectives on Tort Law, 4th ed. (Boston: Little, Brown & Company, 1995), 15. 
62The material for the following eight pages is largely drawn from 
discussions of the Industrial Revolution in Walter Licht, Industrializing America: 
The Nineteenth Century (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1995); 
George Brown Tindall and David Emory Shi, America: A Narrative History, 4th 
ed. (New York: W. W. Norton & Co., 1997); and Alan Trachtenberg, The 
Incorporation of America: Culture and Society in the Gilded Age (New York: 
Hill and Wang, 1982). 
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and technical efficiency powered by the new inventions led to risk taking, 
investlnent, new business ventures, and an increase in material goods. These 
inventions, once they made their way to the States, brought about the sarne drastic 
changes in this country. 
A second wave of industrialization hit the United States in the late 
nineteenth century, bringing rnore technical and organizational advances. The 
technological inventions that rnarked the first phase of the Industrial Revolution 
fulfilled their promise and changed the way that goods and services were 
produced. 
This second wave of the Industrial Revolution happened rnore in the United 
States than in England. In the United States, all the elernents necessary for rapid 
industrialization were present: abundant natural resources, a governrnent eager to 
prornote growth, arnbitious entrepreneurs, a corporate fonn, and technology. A 
labor surplus was also available, which provided the workers needed to run these 
new machines. In addition, the United States experienced both native population 
growth and imrnigration during the industrial period. 63 Accornpanying this 
63Population growth accompanied industrialization. Between 1860 and 
1900 the population rnore than doubled and, rnore in1portantly, the industrial labor 
force nearly tripled between 1880 and 1910. As population and the labor force 
increased, the pool of potential employees became larger and employees disabled 
by workplace accidents were quickly replaced. This growing population allowed 
industrial employers to treat workers as an unlimited cotnmodity; when one was 
injured or incapacitated, another waited to take his place. 
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population explosion was urban growth. 64 As people tnoved to the factories, old 
cities grew and new ones developed. 
Just as ilnportant as technological advances and population growth was the 
changing structure of business. Beginning with the large railroad cotnpanies, 
entrepreneurs learned how to organize large work forces, tasks, and capital. 
Engineers looked for the 1nost efficient means to organize factories and control 
production. Once they coupled their new techniques with the new technology, 
they reduced their labor costs and reinvested their profits--which led to tnore 
growth. 
The Industrial Revolution also brought transfonnations to the workplace, as 
the self-etnployed artisan gave way to the wage laborer. Prior to industrialization, 
workplace accidents were less frequent because workers either worked alone or 
enjoyed a close working relationship with their etnployer. Furthennore the close 
personal relationship between en1ployer and etnployee often ensured that 
employers paid for injuries--there was little question about why an accident 
occurred or who was at fault. 65 Also, because labor was in shorter supply, 
64The urban population went frotn 6 tnillion in 1860 to 44 tnillion in 1910 
and by 1920, more than half this nation's population lived in urban areas. Tindall 
and Shi, America: A Narrative History, 631. 
65!-Iarry Weiss, "Etnployers' Liability and Worklnens' Compensation," in 
History of Labour in the United States, 1896-1932, ed. John Rogers Co1111nons et 
al. (New York: A.M. Kelley, 1966 [1935]), 564; Christopher L. Tomlins, Law, 
labor, and Ideology in the Early A1nerican Republic (New York: Catnbridge 
University Press, 1993), 260. 
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etnployers were more likely to be interested in the long term services of their 
etnployees. . 
As products traditionally tnade in homes or stnall workshops with a stnall 
number of employees began to be tnanufactured in factories with tnany etnployees, 
the nature of work changed. The close relationship between etnployer and 
employee that characterized the pre-industrial econotny did not exist in the factory. 
Absent personal ties, employers viewed etnployees as capital, rather than as 
individuals. Etnployers saw employees as expendable because an injured 
etnployee was not a threat to overall productivity--there was always sotneone else 
to take his place. This itnpersonal relationship meant that "no ties of blood or love 
prevented one cog in the machine frotn suing the machine or its owners. "66 
The nature of the work done also changed with industrialization. Advances 
in technology segmented work into distinct individual tasks. While specialization 
improved productivity, it also tnade work tnore repetitive and rote. Mechanization 
and connection to power sources allowed bigger and bigger tnachines to operate 
faster. Furthennore employees were expected to work longer hours than before 
industrialization. As markets expanded, nationally and internationally, etnployees 
were encouraged to tnake more products, and were often paid by the nutnber of 
66Lawrence M. Friedman, A History of American Law (New York: Simon 
and Schuster, 1973), 410. 
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products they tnade ("piece work") rather than the nutnber of hours they labored, a 
systetn which encouraged even longer hours. Repetitive tasks, fast machines, and 
long hours cotnpromised safety, which resulted in tnore (and tnore serious) 
accidents. 
Lawrence Friedman identifies the ilnportance of large industry, and 
specifically the railroad, in the developtnent of tort law. As he puts it, "the railroad 
created the law of torts."67 With tnore injured workers, and little etnployer-
employee rapport, tort law came in to regulate these new relationships. According 
to Friedman, "[t]his branch of law [totis] deals above all with the wrenching, 
grinding effects of tnachines on hutnan bodies. It belongs in the world of 
factories, railroads, and tnines. "68 
Railroads were vital to industrialization. 69 The railroad took advantage of 
the technological innovations of the first wave of the Industrial Revolution (such 
as the steam engine and iron production) to be ready when the second wave hit the 
67Ibid. 
68Lawrence M. Friedtnan, A1nerican Law: An Introduction (New York: 
W.W. Norton and Cotnpany, Inc., 1984), 144. 
69Historians disagree over the importance of the railroad in the developtnent 
of nineteenth-century Atnerica. Robert Fogel, for one, argued that the contribution 
tnade by railroads was not as crucial as others maintained. Robert W. Fogel,. 
Railroads and American Economic Growth: Essays in Economic History 
(Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1964). 
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United States.70 Not only did railroads represent a single industry born frotn 
technological innovations, they also represented a lifeline for other industries. 
Railroads allowed access to both raw n1aterials and to 1narkets; they stitnulated the 
economy, creating surplus capital to invest in other industries; they supported the 
iron, lumber, and coal industries; and they created new profit tnaking corporations 
that served as tnodels for other industries.71 
The construction of railroads in the United States was so supported by 
federal, state, and local governments that changing the legal systetn to favor 
railroads, as this chapter discusses later, seemed logical. Between 1852 and 1870, 
Congress gave over 100 million acres to land protnoters who protnised to build 
railroads across the West. State and local governments gave over 280 n1illion 
dollars in cash or credit to help build railroads.72 Federal, state, and local 
govemtnents realized the importance of the railroad early on. Railroads could 
7
°F or more infonnation on the developtnent of the railroad systetn, see 
Walter Licht, Working for the Railroad (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 
1983) and Fogel, Railroads and American Economic Growth. 
71 Before the widespread use of railroads, other tneans of transportation 
helped to fuel industrialization. River transportation by steatnboat, turnpikes, and 
canals also helped move goods and raw tnaterials, but did not do so on the scale 
that railroads would. Alan Brinkley, The Unfinished Nation: A Concise History of 
the American People (New York: McGraw-Hill, Inc., 1993), 175-180. 
72Fogel, Railroads and American Economic Growth, 3. 
73Railroads were even responsible for our tnodetn titne zones. In 1883, 
railway executives divided the nation into four titne zones, the ones we still use 
today, and Alnericans began to abide by the rhyth1n of the railroad industry. Bruce 
Laurie, Artisans into Workers (New York: Hill and Wang, 1989), 114. 
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bring business, work, finished goods, and people to even the rnost rernote towns. 73 
Railroads eventually became the pritnary Atnerican transportation systetn and 
remained so until the construction of interstate highways in the rnid-twentieth 
century.74 
The United States not only inherited the Industrial Revolution frorn 
England, it also adapted English laws to deal with the concornitant changes. The 
Atnerican legal tradition of liability for negligence (fiscal responsibility based 
upon fault) cotnes from the English legal tradition. In the eighteenth and rnost of 
the nineteenth centuries, negligence referred "to failures to perfonn a specific 
duty-often a contractual one. It was not defined as a failure to rneasure up to a 
general standard of care, the behavior of the reasonable tnan."75 
When injured etnployees turned to the legal systern for redress, judges 
looked to the cornmon law for answers because a cornprehensive body of 
employers' liability law had not yet developed. English cotntnon law, which was 
widely adopted in the United States, held that an etnployer was like a tnaster while 
the ernployee was akin to a servant. For exarnple, the tnaster was responsible for 
74Brinkley, The Unfinished Nation, 222-224. 
75Friedtnan, History of American Law, 262. 
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the actions, including civil wrongs, done by his servant. 76 Because the Industrial 
Revolution had started earlier in England, English tort law had adjusted to the new 
workplace problems and offered a stable legal system that encouraged enterprise 
and rewarded initiative. American judges borrowed heavily fro1n English co1n1non 
law when adjudicating industrial accidents. 
The com1non law doctrines of e1nployers' liability date back to the English 
case, Priestly v. Fowler, decided in 1837.77 In Priestly, a butcher's driver sued his 
e1nployer when he was injured by a tipped cart that had been overloaded by 
another e1nployee. The standing law at the ti1ne was that a 1naster ( en1ployer) 
could be held liable for injuries to a third party caused by the negligence of his 
servant (employee). In Priestly, the judge did not follow established precedent and 
denied recovery to the injured driver, finding it would be absurd to hold an 
employer responsible for injuries to one etnployee arising out of the negligence of 
another etnployee. This theory that a 1naster should not be liable for hann done by 
one servant to another became known as the fellow-servant rule. 
The English co1nmon law rule quickly found its way into the United States. 
One of the earliest cases affinning the co1runon law of e1nployer liability was 
Murray v. South Carolina Railroad, decided by the South Carolina Supre1ne Court 
76Hall, Magic Mirror, 124. For a discussion of colonial master servant law, 
see To1nlins, Law, Labor, and Ideology, 223-294. 
77 Priestly v. Fowler, 3M. & W. 1 (England 1837). 
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in 1841.78 In Murray, the Court overturned the jury verdict against an employer 
for its etnployee's injury. Murray, a locotnotive firetnan, lost his leg vvhen a train 
derailed. In overturning the initial verdict, the Court affinned that an etnployer did 
not owe a responsibility to his etnployee unless directly responsible for the injury. 
The case that firmly embedded the English comtnon law idea of etnployer 
liability came from Chief Justice Letnuel Shaw of the Massachusetts Supretne 
Judicial Court. Most historians attribute the foundations of Atnerican tort law to 
Shaw and his introduction of "the principle of blameworthiness; that there could 
be no liability without fault."79 Shaw extended this principle in the leading 
employer liability case, Farwell v. Boston and Worcester Railroad.8° Farwell, an 
engineer for the Boston and Worcester Railroad, had his right hand crushed when 
another etnployee itnproperly threw a switch, causing an engine to tip over. 
Speaking for the unanitnous court, Shaw relied on the fellow-servant rule (first 
announced in Priestly v. Fowler) to find that the railroad could not be held liable 
for an injury to one employee caused by another employee. Shaw concluded that a 
person takes the risk of injury when working with others and that this is an 
78 Murray v. South Carolina Railroad, 1 McMullen 3 85 (South Carolina, 
1841 ). 
79Hall, Magic Mirror, 124. 
8° Farwell v. Boston and Worcester Railroad, 4 Metcalf 49 (Mass., 1842). 
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ordinary risk that the employee accepted. 81 Shaw explained that because the 
etnployer was retnoved frotn direct supervision of all etnployees, it was unfair to 
hold him liable for such injury.82 
As industrialization continued and workplace accidents increased, more 
etnployees sued their etnployers, which led to the developtnent of a body of 
precedent to govern workplace liability. The courts treated workplace injuries like 
any other harms or torts, but established a few specialized etnployer defenses. 
Injured etnployees sued their employers, claiming the etnployer was negligent and 
should therefore pay for all harms resulting frotn the etnployers' actions. At 
common law, the right to sue for negligence was considered a personal right and 
not transferable upon death. This litnitation created an appalling situation \vhereby 
it was less expensive for an employer to "kill" their employees than to injure thetn, 
because an injured etnployee could sue, but a dead etnployee's right to sue died 
with hiin. 83 This reality was hardly an incentive to provide a safe workplace. 
81 In Farwell, Shaw also explained why non-etnployees like passengers or 
bystanders could recover frotn injuries caused by the railroad. The Court found 
that although the passenger and the guest entrusted their safety to the care of 
others, the etnployee had not. The employee knew that for his own self-
preservation, he must exercise caution as the circutnstances required. Shaw found 
that the employee also had a duty to exert moral suasion and social pressure on his 
fellow servants. Richard A. Epstein, "The Historical Origins and Econotnic 
Structure of Workers' Cotnpensation Law," Georgia Law Review 16 (Sullliner 
1982): 775-819. 
82F or a tnore detailed discussion of early cases discussing etnployer liability 
for workplace injury see Tomlins, Law, Labor, and Ideology, 333-34 7. 
83 Weiss, "Etnployers' Liability," 567. 
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Negligence meant that liability was only assigned where fault could be established. 
If an etnployee could not show that his injury was the responsibility of his 
employer, he could not recover. Furthermore, the employee bore the burden of 
providing that the etnployer was negligent. 
In adjudicating a claitn for negligence, a court would hold employers to a 
"reasonable" standard of care. In reality, this meant that etnployers were required 
to cotnply with all statutes, laws, or codes enacted for the protection of 
etnployees. 84 Reasonable care also tneant that the etnployer had to supply the 
etnployee with a safe place to work, furnish him with safe tools and equiptnent, 
enforce rules of safe conduct, and issue warnings about dangers. 85 The etnployee 
not only had to show that the etnployer had done sotnething wrong or failed to 
exercise due care, but also had to detnonstrate that the negligence of the en1ployer 
was the proxitnate (or direct) cause of the injury. The required showing of 
proxitnate cause functioned as a heightened burden of proof on workers and often 
allowed etnployers to escape liability. 
If the employee overcame this initial obstacle by proving that the etnployer 
was negligent, and that this negligence was the proxitnate cause of the injury, the 
etnployer retained other cotntnon-law defenses to avoid liability. These defenses 
84Roy Lubove, "Worktnen' s Compensation and the Prerogatives of 
Voluntaristn," Labor History 8 (Fall 1967), 254-279. 
85Weiss, "Etnployers' Liability," 565. 
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were the assumption of risk doctrine, the fellow-servant rule, and contributory 
negligence. 
The assutnption of risk doctrine relieved an employer frotn liability if he 
could show that the employee knew of a dangerous condition but continued to 
work despite that condition.86 This defense was often used by etnployers in 
dangerous industries who could simply show that a certain risk was inherent in an 
industry. For instance, a railroad owner could allege that train deraihnent was a 
common risk of railroad employment and workers assutned injuries resulting fro1n 
this risk. The assumption of risk defense allowed etnployers to avoid 
cotnpensating injured workers even when the employer's safety violation caused 
the accident. 87 More often than not, this defense protected the very hann or danger 
causing the injury because it was so cotntnon. The defense ordinarily blocked the 
etnployee's cotnpensation for these "cotntnonplace" risks. 
The fellow-servant doctrine also protected etnployers fro1n liability. This 
defense applied when the employer could show that the actions of another 
etnployee, termed a "fellow servant" at cotnmon law, caused the cotnplaining 
86Cooley defines assumption of the risk as "by virtue of the contract of 
service, the servant assutnes the usual and ordinary risks incident to the 
employment; also such as are obvious and patent to a person of ordinary 
observation." Thotnas M. Cooley, A Treatise on the Law of Torts, ed. John Lewis 
(Chicago: Callaghan & Cotnpany, 1907), 528-529. 
87Weiss, "Etnployers' Liability," 566. 
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employee's injury.88 While the legal relationship between etnployer and employee 
was that of master and servant, the co Inmon la\¥ continued to view the servant as a 
tnere extension of a master. Because under common law a tnaster could not sue 
himself for injuries, a servant could not sue his tnaster as that situation also 
presented the master suing hhnself, a legal itnpossibility. 89 Still, the cotrunon law 
provided a course of action for the injured party: he could sue the fellow employee 
who caused the harm. This avenue was usually pointless however, because the 
negligent employee was hhnself a wage laborer, without the financial resources to 
pay a judgtnent. 
Under the common law, the defense of contributory negligence provided a 
final means for etnployers to avoid liability. An etnployer could allege 
contributory negligence if the injured party was at fault in any way. Once the 
employer alleged the employee was even partially at fault, the burden of proof to 
show that he was not negligent fell on the e1nployee.90 This burden was difficult 
for workers to meet. They were often at least partially at fault because of the risks 
88Cooley defines the fellow-servant rule as "[t]he rule which exetnpts the 
tnaster frotn responsibility for injuries to his servants, proceeding fro1n risks 
incidental to the etnployment, extends to cases where the injury results fron1 the 
negligence of other servants in the smne employment." Cooley, A Treatise on the 
Law ofTorts, 541. 
89The fellow-servant rule stood despite the doctrine of respondeat superior, 
which held an employer liable for dmnages done to a third party by an etnployee. 
For an explanation of respondeat superior, see Robert Catnpbell, The Law of 
Negligence (London: Stevens and Haynes, 1871 ), 5 5-61. 
9
°Cooley, The Law of Torts, 1457. 
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and dangers inherent in their job or the substandard tools provided thetn, yet even 
under the ·Inost hideous conditions, employers used this defense to avoid liability. 
If the employee failed to prove the absence of his own negligence, there could be 
no recovery. Even a small portion of etnployee blatne under the contributory 
negligence defense left the injured etnployee with no award. 
Assutnption of risk, the fellow-servant rule, and contributory negligence 
kept sytnpathetic plaintiffs away frotn kindhearted juries. Judges could, and often 
did, accept these defenses and distniss cases, leaving injured plaintiffs with little 
recourse because they lacked the resources to appeal. These cotntnon law defenses 
often left workers unable to prevail in workplace liability lawsuits, because the 
legal systetn chose to assign the costs of industrial accidents to etnployees and not 
etnployers.91 These defenses, their application, and the legal outcomes worked 
together to push industry ahead. Thanks to nineteenth-century judges and 
lawtnakers, industrial workers, especially railway workers, bore the cost of 
industrial accidents. 
Legal historians like Lawrence M. Friedtnan and Kern1it L. Hall believe 
that assigning liability was the courts' expression of where resources were best 
allocated. If a growing business were forced to pay for all hanns caused to 
etnployees, that business would not have the capital to grow. To encourage risk-
91 Hall, Magic Mirror, 125. 
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taking entrepreneurs, courts and legislatures redirected workplace liability. 92 Legal 
historians reason that if entrepreneurs bore the costs of compensating injured 
etnployees, there would have been less capital to protnote econotnic growth. If 
strict liability for workplace accidents had been adopted, tnany industries would 
have been drained of their economic blood. Lawtnakers and judges, recognizing 
the need for a healthy industrial tnarketplace, settled upon negligence as a 
standard. 93 
According to Morton J. Horwitz, the negligence standard helped to feed the 
growing economy for a nation that needed industrialization to fuel its expansion.94 
"Negligence ... was the doctrine of an etnerging entrepreneurial class that argued 
that there should be no liability for socially desirable activity that caused injury 
without carelessness."95 This principle allowed private law (such as tort law and 
employer liability law) to subsidize business. Judges and lawtnakers effectively 
reduced the cost of doing business and allowed businesses to retain all possible 
capital for growth, rather than detnand that they compensate injured etnployees. 
By assigning liability to workers, judges relieved risk-taking entrepreneurs and 
encouraged further investment and econotnic growth. The leading industry of the 
92Ibid., 123. 
93Friedman, History of American Law, 410. 
94Morton J. Horwitz, The Transformation of American Law 1870-1960: 
The Crisis of Legal Orthodoxy (New York: Oxford University Press, 1992), 123. 
95Ibid. 
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era, railroads, was particularly adept at exercising these defenses to reduce costs. 
They also received direct financial support from local communities, the federal and 
state governments, and individual workers in the fonn of subsidies, stock 
subscriptions, land grants, and tax exemptions. 
Legal scholars and judges like Richard A. Posner agree with the historians. 
Posner argues that the result of the negligence principle and the e1nployers' 
defenses was to shift the expense of industrialization frotn business to etnployees. 
Posner argues that, "[a]ccident costs were 'externalized' frotn the enterprises that 
caused them to work and other individuals injured as a byproduct of their 
activities."96 Posner goes on to state that judges upheld these defenses and placed 
the burden on employees because of their "desire to subsidize the infant 
industries. "97 Law (through judges and legislators) was used to keep business 
growing and allow industry to expand. Courts assigning liability for workplace 
accidents to workers, kept government at bay and allowed business to grow. 
While the cotnmon law was suited to a pre-industrial society, it was 
inefficient in an industrial one. The industrial accident rate outstripped the 
expectations of lawyers and judges. At the turn of the twentieth century, industrial 
accidents in the United States claimed about 35,000 lives and inflicted nearly 2 
96Posner, "A Theory ofNegligence," 15. 
97Ibid. 
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million injuries per year. 98 As early as the 1890s states began to revise e1nployers' 
liability, at first by modifying the e1nployers' defenses. Most state legislatures 
passed laws or embraced judicial trends that limited the employers' com1non law 
defenses well before the passage of workers' co1npensation regi1nes. 
According to Harry Weiss, legislation enacted prior to workinen' s 
co1npensation divides into three categories.99 First, some Progressive Era 
legislatures passed laws that denied employers the ability to enforce contracts 
against employees who had waived their right to hold e1nployers liable for 
workplace injuries. Second, 1nany states passed statutes that allowed e1nployees' 
heirs to sue employers. Third, state legislatures passed statutes eli1ninating or 
altering the employers' cominon-law defenses of assu1nption of risk, the fellow-
servant doctrine, and contributory negligence. Because all three defenses were 
created by judges, as part of the co min on law, they were subject to revision by the 
states' legislative bodies, which acted independently. 
By the 1890s, a handful of states had 1nodified the assu1nption of risk 
doctrine with statutes, stating that an employee's knowledge of safety violations 
would not bar recovery. Nearly twenty 1nore states by 1908 had restricted the 
98Friedman, Histo1y of American Law, 422. 
99Lubove, "Workinen' s Compensation and the Prerogatives of 
Voluntaris1n," 261. 
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scope of the assutnption of risk defense. 100 Most often, safety laws incorporated 
provisions that knowledge by etnployees of safety violations would not bar 
recovery for workplace injuries. 101 
Modification of the fellow-servant rule took two fonns: elitnination of the 
defense, and creation of exceptions tnaking the rule less harsh. By 1908 the 
fellow-servant defense had been cotnpletely eliminated in sixteen states. 102 Those 
states that did not elhninate the fellow-servant doctrine made significant changes, 
limiting the doctrine with the "vice principal" and "departlnental" rules. The "vice 
principal" rule held that employees in a superior position to the etnployee alleging 
harm were not fellow servants. The rationale behind this exception was that those 
employees in superior positions could help avoid hanns or tnake certain that 
etnployees under them followed all safety precautions. The courts utilizing this 
exception did not consider supervisors to be fellow servants. The "departtnental" 
rule limited the fellow servant defense to employees in the same departlnent. The 
rationale behind this exception was that as industry grew and cotnpanies becmne 
larger, etnployees in different departtnents had no control over one another and 
essentially functioned as though they worked for different cotnpanies. 
100Lubove, "Workmen's Cotnpensation and the Prerogatives of 
Voluntarism," 261. 
101 Weiss, "Employers' Liability and Workmen's Compensation," 569. 
102Ibid. These states were Arkansas, Florida, Georgia, Iowa, Kansas, 
Minnesota, Missouri, Montana, Nebraska, Nevada, North Carolina, North Dakota, 
Okalahotna, South Dakota, Texas, and Wisconsin. 
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State courts and legislatures also attacked the defense of contributory 
negligence. Changes to this defense catne in tenns of "cotnparative" or 
"proportional" negligence. In states adopting . "cotnparative negligence" 
legislation, injured plaintiffs would still receive patiial cotnpensation if the court 
found both the etnployee and employer negligent. After 1906, several states 
modified the contributory negligence defense to allow recovery under the la\v of 
"proportional" negligence. 103 States that adopted proportional negligence 
legislation awarded plaintiffs judgments reduced by the potiion of negligence 
attributed to thetn. Cotnparative and proportional negligence statutes allowed 
injured etnployees to collect some damages even if they were found partially 
negligent. Sotne states also limited the contributory negligence defense by placing 
the burden of proving the case on the defendant etnployer, not the worker. 104 
Switching the burden of proof to the defendant gave the advantage to the injured 
plaintiffs who would prevail if the defendant failed to overcome the burden. 
Etnployers protested these modifications to their available defenses because 
they no longer could rely on these defenses to evade liability. Etnployers 
frequently clahned that tnodifications to these defenses either violated due process 
103Lubove, "Worktnen's Cotnpensation and the Prerogatives of 
Voluntaristn," 261. 
104Weiss, "Employers' Liability and Workmens' Cotnpensation," 569. 
58 
or freedotn of contract. Employers argued that tnodifications to these defenses 
determined in advance who would be liable. In addition, etnployers were 
frustrated by laws that failed to uphold contracts as against public policy where 
employees agreed in writing to assutne the risk of accidents and the risk of 
negligence of fellow servants. Despite etnployers' attempts to overcotne these 
limitations, ahnost without exception, state courts upheld the changes to 
employers' liability laws as constitutionai. 105 
In exatnining the whittling away of etnployers' defenses, railroads deserve 
specialtnention. Railroads were one of the first industries attacked because of the 
frequency of accidents as well as the anti-railway sentiment of tnany 
legislatures. 106 Georgia and Iowa were atnong the first states to elhninate the 
fellow-servant defense, passing laws abrogating the fellow-servant defense for 
railroad accidents in 1856 and 1862, respectively. 107 By the tnid-1890s, six states 
had abolished the co-servant rule for railroad injuries, and the nutnber increased to 
sixteen by 1908. 108 Railroads were often criticized because of their cotnpetitive 
105Melvin I. Urofsky, "State Courts and Protective Legislation during the 
Progressive Era: A Reevaluation," Journal of American History 72 (June 1985): 
63-91. 
106Weiss, "Etnployers' Liability and Workmen's Cotnpensation," 567. 
107 Ibid. 
108Lubove, "Worktnen's Compensation and the Prerogatives of 
Voluntaristn," 261. 
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nature, treatment of local etnployees, and the robber-baron owners. This attention 
was well deserved, as the railway injury rate doubled between 1889 and 1906. 109 
Employers in general, and railroad entrepreneurs specifically, were not the 
only ones expressing concerns over the developtnent of employers' liability laws. 
Progressive refonners sought change as well, but in a different direction-to 
ilnprove conditions for workers. As business grew uninterrupted, injuries 
increased, yet the law failed to provide relief which made workers a sytnpathetic 
lot. New attention to social struggle, including attetnpts at changing the plight of 
the worker, interested progressive refonners. The Progressive Moven1ent 
"attempted to end corruption, oligarchical power, and social privilege in politics, 
and to curb the power of big business, but within the fratnework of a constitutional 
governtnent and capitalist econotny." 110 Progressives catnpaigned for several 
issues affecting industrial developtnent, like litniting working hours, ending child 
labor, protnoting factory safety, itnproving urban living conditions, and increasing 
pay. 
In the late nineteenth century new social, political, and economic views also 
influenced etnployer's liability law. Journalists were one part of the Progressive 
Movement that brought public attention to social problems, including the probletn 
109Friedtnan, History of American Law, 422. 
110Lawrence M. Friedtnan and Harry N. Scheiber, eds., A1nerican Law and 
the Constitutional Order (Catnbridge: Harvard University Press, 1978), 267. 
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of workplace injury. Crystal Eastrnan, in her exatnination of workplace accidents 
in Allegheny County, Pennsylvania in 1907-08, evaluated a year's worth of 
industrial fatalities and three months' worth of industrial injuries. 111 She analyzed 
the econotnic consequences and their itnpact on families to show the need for 
workplace accident liability refonn. Eastman also exatnined the reasons for these 
accidents and discovered productivity detnands, long hours, and fatigue often over-
exerted the workers and led to less focus on workplace safety. She concluded that 
most of the accidents were not caused by worktnan negligence. Even where 
human en·or was involved, it was often due to circutnstances beyond the worker's 
control. She argued that shifting responsibility to industry and away frotn the 
individual worker would itnprove workplace safety. 
As progressive reformers began to inspire changes in etnployer liability lavv, 
etnployers, workers, and unions alike took an interest in the alteration of 
Ill · Crystal Eastrnan, Workplace Accidents and the Law (New York, 1910). 
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workplace liability law. 112 With the increase of appeals and publicity frotn 
workplace injuries, juries began to favor injured employees. Jury awards varied in 
size and often depended on an employer's ability to pay, rather than the nature of 
the injury. 113 "Verdicts in favor of workers were becoming n1ore cotntnon and 
their amounts increased to $5,000, $10,000, and even $25,000." 114 As tnore 
employees filed lawsuits and more appealed adverse judgtnents, etnployers and 
their insurance companies could no longer count on higher courts reversing or 
reducing judgments against thetn. 115 Conversely, because employers' defenses 
existed in tnost states, workers, social refonners, and labor unions could not rely 
on courts holding etnployers liable. 
112In Missouri, "[ e ]tnployers, labor union representatives, and dan1age-suit 
attorneys exercised substantial influence over the entire adoption process. Each 
group offered its own bills to the Missouri General Assetnbly, lobbied legislators, 
fed thetn infonnation for the debates, and once the legislation was passed, used the 
referenda administrative process to subveti any legislative actions that were 
contrary to their interests." Shawn Everett Kantor and Price V. Fishback, 
"Coalition Formation and the Adoption of Workers' Cotnpensation: The Case of 
Missouri, 1911 to 1926," in The Regulated Economy: A Historical Approach to 
Political Econo1ny, ed. Claudia Goldin and Gary D. Libecap (Chicago: University 
of Chicago Press, 1994) 268. In Illinois, the passage of-vvorkers' con1pensation 
laws resulted frotn cooperation between labor, business, and refonners. 
Castrovinci' s study shows how business supported the passage of workers' 
cotnpensation "as a way to reduce instabilities engendered by the antiquated 
systetn of common-law liability and block the more fundatnental change sought by 
others." Joseph Castrovinci, "Prelude to Welfare Capitalism: The Role of 
Business in the Enacttnent of Workmen's Cotnpensation Legislation in Illinois, 
1905-12," Social Service Revie1v 50 (March 1976): 80-102, 81. 
113Castrovinci, "Prelude to Welfare," 87. 
114Ibid. 
115Ibid. 
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Accordingly, employers began to support sotne fonn of workers' 
compensation legislation. Despite the cotn1non law defenses available to the1n, 
1nany etnployers were dissatisfied with the co1nmon law because defending clain1s 
often 1neant expensive litigation and the uncertainty of the outcome. Furthennore, 
"[t]he 1narket value of the right to action was increasing by the early twentieth 
century because of statutory modifications of the cotntnon law which itnproved the 
employee's position." 116 Because sotne workplace liability statutes shifted fees to 
the etnployers, etnployees found it easy to find personal injury attorneys willing to 
take cases on a contingency fee basis. Also, etnployers began to notice the 
tendency of lower-court judges to favor plaintiffs, necessitating appeals, further 
litigation and 1nore expense. 117 
Specifically, businesstnen understood that workers' co1npensation, while 
bringing an acceptance of liability, would also bring fixed datnage awards for 
e1nployees that they could budget. 118 According to Shawn Everett Kantor and 
Price V. Fishback, etnployers supported such legislation anticipating that they 
116Lubove, "Workmen's Cotnpensation and the Prerogatives of 
Voluntarism," 260. 
117Ibid. 
118Some large corporations, such as United States Steel, supported voluntary 
workers' co1npensation plans. In 1910, U.S. Steel announced a plan to provide 
injured single workers 35 percent of weekly wages, 1narried workers 50 percent, 
and an additional 5 percent for each child. 
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would be able to pass the cost on to workers or consutners. These studies have 
shown that semiskilled and unskilled workers actually experienced wage 
reductions after the adoption of workers' compensation. 119 Statistics detnonstrate 
the willingness of businesses to support refonn. A 1910 survey by the National 
Association of Manufacturers (NAM) of 13,000 businesstnen showed that over 99 
percent favored automatic cotnpensation to reduce waste and put an end to the 
worker hostility created by the co1111non law. 120 
Employers also saw the hann in having employees so diatnetrically opposed 
to the interests of their employers. Under the cotrunon law, all disputes had to be 
settled in court or settled by the threat of court, tnaking the etnployer/etnployee 
relationship a potentially hostile one. Business leaders wanted to support a 
"harmony of interests with wage earners via a comtnon plan of social action" by 
discouraging organized labor from pursing radical unionistn and encouraging its 
f . . . 121 support o conservative untontsm. 
Along with etnployers, insurance cotnpantes favored the passage of 
workers' compensation legislation. Since the 1880s, sotne employers and trade 
119Everett and Fishback, "Coalition Fonnation," 266. 
12
°Castrovinci, "A Prelude to Welfare," 88. 
121Robert F. Wesser, "Conflict and Comprotnise: The Workmen's 
Cotnpensation Movement in New York, 1890s-1913," Labor History 12 (Sutntner 
1971): 341-372. 
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associations had maintained private etnployer-liability insurance. Often, 
employers passed the costs of accident insurance on to the etnployees, or 
etnployees would pay for accident insurance through their trade association. 
"Private insurance premiums rose frotn about $200,000 in 1887 to tnore than 
$35,000,000 by 1912."122 Insurance companies saw the potential business that 
mandatory workers' cotnpensation legislation would generate and lobbied for such 
legislation at the state and federal levels. 
Social reformers and labor unions also supported workers' cotnpensation 
legislation. While reformers agreed with employers on the need for workers' 
compensation, their reasons differed. Progressives and other social refonners saw 
the social costs of industrialization, and realized that workers bore the brunt of 
workplace injury. Under the cotnmon law, injured etnployees spent between 30 
and 60 percent of their damage awards on lawyers' fees, substantially reducing the 
atnount left to replace lost wages. 123 Furthennore, refonners were discouraged by 
the high cost of insuring against claims. In 1908, etnployers' insurance pren1iun1s 
totaled $22 tnillion nationally, yet only one quarter of that atnount actually reached 
injured workers. Insurance companies spent the remainder on adtninistrative costs, 
and tnarketing or retained those pretniutns as profits. 124 Because tnodif)ring or 
122Urofsky, "State Courts and Protective Legislation," 85-86. 
123Castrovinci, "Prelude to Welfare," 87. 
124Ibid. 
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eliminating the employer's defenses did not substantially change the cotntnon law 
or the need for etnployees to sue, refonners wanted tnore radical change. 
Labor unions joined with social reformers in the formation and passage of 
workers' cotnpensation laws, despite the unions' original resistance to codification 
of workers' compensation. 125 At first reluctant to participate because vveaker 
etnployers' defenses increased workers' awards, union members and leaders also 
believed big business controlled the governtnent compensation schetnes. 126 
Furthermore, labor union tnetnbers hesitated because "the union would be 
'deprived of its essentials of independence, self-direction and elastic adaptation to 
the needs of a forceful mass tnechanism. "'127 Basically union leaders feared that 
satisfaction on the pati of workers, even partial satisfaction, would reduce 
workers' loyalty to unions. 
In their initial disinclination to support workers' cotnpensation, organized 
labor lobbied state legislatures to continue to liberalize etnployers' liability lavvs. 128 
But as business began supporting workers' cotnpensation legislation, labor leaders 
realized change would cotne. Initially, labor unions called for full cotnpensation 
(lost wages), retention of the right to sue at cotrunon law before a jury, and 
125Wesser, Conflict and Compromise, 347. 
126Daniel M. Berman, Death on the Job: Occupational Health and Safety 
Struggles in the United States (New York: Monthly Review Press, 1978), 25; 
Weinstein, "Big Business," 159. 
127Ibid., 160. 
128Wesser, Conflict and Compromise, 347. 
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exclusive, state-owned insurance companies tnaintaining cotnpensation policies, 
but they were unable to secure this level of compensation. 129 In 1909, the National 
Civic Federation helped to convince American Federation of Labor President 
Samuel Gompers that industrial accident insurance and itnproved liability laws 
would solve workers' probletns. 130 Gotnpers and other labor leaders recognized 
that legislation was inevitable, and they wanted to participate in drafting the 
legislation to ensure the best outcotne for their tnetnbers. 
With support from such diverse groups, states began fashioning workers' 
cotnpensation laws in the early 1900s. Most of these early laws proved to be either 
too weak and ineffective or were too strong and deetned unconstitutional. 131 As 
early as 1898, a New York workers' compensation bill died in legislative 
cotnmittee. 132 In 1902, Maryland passed the first workers' cotnpensation law, but 
it was declared unconstitutional in 1904. 133 In 1906, Montana passed the first state 
cotnpulsory workers' cotnpensation law with a state co-operative insurance 
pool. 134 In 1908, Congress enacted a rather weak law granting certain etnployees 
129Bennan, Death on the Job , 26-27. 
130Wesser, Conflict and Compromise, 347. 
131 Weiss, "Employers' Liability and Worktnen's Cotnpensation," 572. 
132Ibid., 571. 
133Ibid. 
134Ibid., 571-572. 
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the right to receive coinpensation for InJunes sustained In the course of 
employment. 135 
Initial workers' cotnpensation laws were unable to solve the probletns of 
workplace accident liability. After early laws failed to adequately provide for 
workers, 1nany states fonned collllnissions to investigate the con1plications 
associated with workplace accidents and to suggest solutions. Forty cotntnissions 
in thirty-two jurisdictions were appointed between 1903 and 1919. 136 While 
varying from state to state, the cotrunissions gathered tnaterial, held public 
hearings, talked with injured workers, and nearly unanitnously recotntnended 
workers' cotnpensation legislation that would end etnployer itntnunity. 
The cotnmissions generally found that recovery was difficult and only a 
small portion of injured workers received cotnpensation. They also discovered 
that recovery was quite slow and etnployees could not reclai1n wages while their 
cases were in court or the appeals process. 137 Furthennore, 1nost state 
cotntnissions reported that the current system did not allocate resources well, with 
adtninistrative and legal costs substantially reducing the sutns paid by en1ployers. 
Finally, the cotnmissions reaffinned what tnost employers already knew, that the 
135
"This was passed after special emphasis was placed on it by President 
Theodore Roosevelt in his specialtnessage to Congress on January 31, 1908, p. 2, 
in which he tenned the position of federal e1nployees 'an outrage."' Ibid., 571; 3 5 
U.S. Statutes at Large 556, 1908, approved May 30. 
136Weiss, "Etnployers' Liability and Workmen's Cotnpensation," 572. 
137The appeals process sotnetimes took up to two years. 
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current syste1n led to a growing tension between employers and etnployees. 138 
Once the state com1nissions reported the problems of the existing workplace 
accident compensation systetn, legislatures passed tnore comprehensive and 
transforming legislation. 139 
In 1911 ten states (California, Illinois, Kansas, Massachusetts, Nevada, 
New Hampshire, New Jersey, Ohio, Washington, and Wisconsin) passed workers' 
cotnpensation laws. In 1912 and 1913, eleven more states passed con1pensation 
laws (Arizona, Connecticut, Iowa, Maryland, Michigan, Minnesota, Nebraska, 
Oregon, Rhode Island, Texas, and West Virginia). In 1915 and 1916, nine 
additional states and three territories enacted workers' cotnpensation laws 
(Colorado, Indiana, Kentucky, Maine, Montana, Oklahotna, Pennsylvania, 
Vermont, Wyoming, Alaska, Hawaii, and Puerto Rico). During 1917 and 1918, 
eight states plus Congress acting for the District of Colutnbia passed workers' 
cotnpensation laws (Alabatna, Delaware, Idaho, North Dakota, South Dakota, 
138Weiss, "Etnployers' Liability and Worlanen's Cotnpensation," 573. 
139In 1909 New York passed a state vvorlanen 's cotnpensation act, but it 
was struck down by the New York Court of Appeals in 1911. Urofsky, "State 
Courts," 86. The court found that holding etnployers strictly liable was a taking of 
property without due process of law. lves v. South Buffalo Ry. Co., 201 N.Y., 285 
(New York). Despite this ruling, other states upheld silnilar workers' 
cotnpensation laws. In 1915, in two cases, the New York Court of Appeals upheld 
a plan ahnost identical to the one struck down in the Ives decision. For tnore 
information on New York, see Robert Asher, "Failure and Fulfilhnent: Agitation 
for Employers' Liability Legislation and the Origins of Worlanen' s' Cotnpensation 
in New York State, 1876-191 0," Labor History 24 (Spring 1983): 198-222, 198. 
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Tennessee, Utah, Virginia, and District of Columbia). Frotn 1920 to 1932, only 
two states enacted workers' cotnpensation laws (Missouri and North Carolina) and 
by 1932 only four states did not have workers' cotnpensation lavvs (Arkansas, 
Mississippi, Florida, and South Carolina). 140 
Nevertheless, railroad cotnpantes and workers challenged the 
constitutionality of the new legislation. In 1917, the United States Supretne Court 
upheld tnost states' systetns of workers' cotnpensation (including cotnpulsory and 
elective laws) with an exclusive state fund. 141 By the end of the second decade of 
the twentieth century, tnost states had enacted cotnprehensive workers' 
cotnpensation laws that withstood constitutional challenges. 
Worktnen's cotnpensation represented a tnajor breakthrough In the 
Progressive agenda for welfare capitalistn. Workers received long needed aid. 
Workers' cotnpensation laws also united workers and refonners to secure 
progratns in the interest of both the workers and the railroads. Worktnen' s 
cotnpensation was a cotnprotnise systen1, in which each side gave a little, got a 
little. The injured worker got cotnpensation, whether the etnployer was negligent 
or not, and etnployers identified predictable costs for workplace liability. 
140Weiss, "Employers' Liability and Worktnen's Cotnpensation," 575- 577. 
141An exclusive state fund forced all the state's participating etnployers to 
use the state as their insurer. See New York Central Rail Co. v. White, 243 U.S. 
188 (1917); Mountain Timber Co. v. State ofWashington, 243 U.S. 219 (1917); 
and Hawkins v. Bleakly, 243 U.S. 210 (1917). 
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Historians point to the victory of Progressive Era refonns as predecessors to later 
refonn movetnents, such as the New Deal and the Great Society. 142 
142Castrovinci, "Prelude to Welfare Capitalistn," 99-100. 
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CHAPTER3 
INDIANA SUPREME COURT CASES 
Industrialization and growth of the railroad industry had an influence on 
Indiana similar to the national influence discussed in Chapter 2. The comtnon law 
of employers' liability worked nationally as well as in Indiana to protect 
employers. Late nineteenth century changes in etnployer-etnployee relationships 
brought on by industrialization led to changes in the Indiana law related to 
etnployer liability for workplace accidents. This chapter exmnines the legal reality 
of etnployers' (specifically railroads and interurbans) liability through an analysis 
of turn-of-the-century Indiana Supretne Court cases. 
According to Clifton Phillips in his history of industrial developtnent in 
Indiana, the period between 1880 and 1920 "encotnpasses tnost of the significant 
political, economic, and social changes" in Indiana's transition fron1 fanning to an 
industrial econotny. 143 In 1880, Indiana was largely agricultural. While Indiana 
143Clifton J. Phillips, Indiana In Transition: The E1nergence of an 
Industrial Commonwealth, 1180-1920 (Indianapolis: Indiana Historical Bureau, 
1968), v. 
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did not industrialize as rapidly as Illinois or Ohio, its industrialization, 
urbanization, mechanization of labor, and consolidation of transportation networks 
increased workplace accidents. 144 
Industrialization increased the number of skilled and unskilled wage earners 
within the total population and changed the nature of work. 145 Industrial working 
conditions in Indiana were characterized by ten-hour days, and six-day weeks; low 
wages; periodic pay reductions; high levels of unetnploytnent; and dangerous 
working conditions. 146 This environment led tnore injured workers to detnand 
post-accident cotnpensation. 
At the smne tiine, metnbers of both political parties called for governtnent 
solutions to social and econotnic problems caused by industrialization. Refonners 
in both parties advocated workers' compensation and child labor laws, regulation 
of monopolies and trusts, a state income tax, public health 1neasures, conservation 
of natural resources, wotnen's suffrage, and prohibition of the sale of alcohol. 147 
In tum-of-the-century Indiana, these changes were both visible and rapid, 
144Ibid.; James H. Madison, The Indiana Way: A State History 
(Indianapolis: Indiana University Press, 1990 [1986]), 163. 
145In 1890, 12 percent of workers were employed in the trade and 
transportation industries; in 1920, those figures jutnped to 24 percent. Phillips, 
Indiana in Transition, 323. 
146Ibid., 324-327. 
147Madison, The Indiana Way, 221. 
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especially for railroads and interurbans, which led reformers to seek itnproved 
working conditions. 148 
Indiana's cities were well connected by railroads by 1880, but by the turn of 
the century, most lines were owned by out-of-state companies like the 
Pennsylvania Railway and the New York Central. 149 Hoosiers wanted tnore and 
better rail service, but believed they were at the tnercy of these large corporations 
and catnpaigned against high usage fees. 150 In 1905, the General Assetnbly 
established the Indiana Railroad Commission with the power to regulate rates. 151 
The increasing nutnber of railroad accidents resulting in injuries and n1ultiple 
fatalities also brought public attention to the need for safety 1neasures. 152 
Interurban rail service cotnpletnented the interstate freight and passenger 
railroads. 153 First cotning to Indianapolis in 1900, these electric-powered cars 
designed for shoti-distance passenger transport united the countryside and city. 154 
148Ibid., 153. 
149Ibid., 155-56. 
15
°For tnore detailed infonnation on railroads in Indiana see Phillips, 
Indiana in Transition, 224-51. 
151 Madison, The Indiana Way, 157. 
152Phillips, Indiana in Transition, 259. 
153Ralph D. Gray, ed., Indiana History: A Book of Readings (Indianapolis: 
Indiana University Press, 1994 ), 213. 
154Madison, The Indiana Way, 157. 
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At the turn of the century, there were 678 miles of electric rail lines. 155 But in 
1910 alone, five head-on collisions on Indiana interurbans raised public awareness 
of the need for safety rneasures. 156 Most of the dangers associated with heavy 
freight service also plagued the lighter electric lines. While both rail systerns 
helped stirnulate Indiana's transition frorn a rural agricultural econorny to an 
industrialized urban society, they were also responsible for rnany of the rnost 
serious injuries and deaths in Indiana. 
Suits brought by injured ernployees against railroads found their way into 
Indiana courts, which were unable to develop a cornprehensive case law dealing 
fairly and quickly with injuries. Most ernployers did not provide any relief for 
injured workers, and the few that did, often passed the cost of insurance along to 
their employees in the form of association dues. When cotnpensation was not 
forthcorning after accidents, Progressives and others sought legislation to pay 
injured worker for rnedical care and lost wages. 
This chapter will analyze Indiana Suprerne Court cases frorn 1880 to 1915 
to show that tort law with respect to workplace injury failed to recognize the 
229. 
155Jerry Marlette, "Indiana's Interurban Systern," in Gray, Indiana History, 
156Phillips, Indiana in Transition, 260. 
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societal and economic needs of injured railroad tnen. 157 The san1e cotntnon law 
principles outlined in Chapter 2 applied in Indiana. Workplace injuries were 
treated like other torts, governed by the negligence standard that assigned liability 
only after a demonstration of fault. Furthermore, the smne trinity of defenses--
fellow-servant, assutnption of risk and contributory negligence--were available to 
Indiana employers accused of workplace negligence. 
This chapter examines whether, as tnany proponents of workers' 
cotnpensation contended, legislation was necessary to ensure the fair and 
consistent treatinent of injured railroad etnployees. Broadly, cases analyzed 
demonstrate the need for comprehensive workers' cotnpensation legislation and 
offer a snapshot of the legal environment that gave rise to the workers' 
cotnpensation movetnent in Indiana. 
157This chapter studies Indiana Supretne Court cases between 1880 and 
1915 where the party injured (and the party initially bringing the claitn at trial 
court) was a railroad or interurban etnployee suing his etnployer for negligence. 
Further, the railroad companies, in all cases selected, alleged that they were not 
liable based upon one of the three discussed defenses. Other cases concerning 
injuries of railroad passengers or workplace litigation not falling under the purview 
of employers' liability have not been considered. 
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However, cases frotn the Indiana Supreme Court represent only a fraction 
of the total claitns for workplace liability. First, only a stnall percentage of 
workplace injuries resulted in legal action. Many injured railroad workers 
accepted settletnents from the employers' insurance cotnpanies, often for less than 
their claitns tnight have brought in court. Wage laborers injured at work could not 
afford long legal battles, and they were quick to accept what their etnployers or the 
insurance companies offered. Because injured employees were often wage 
laborers and could not afford legal fees, they could not afford to sue their 
employers. Those who decided to sue for injuries sotnetitnes agreed to give a 
portion of any potential settletnent to their attorneys, reducing the etnployees' 
awards. Frotn the fraction of total incidents that went to court, even fewer were 
appealed to a higher court. 
Depending on the structure of the appeals process, parties had already 
argued in front of one or two courts by the titne they appeared before the Indiana 
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Supretne Court. 158 Because an appeal could take tnany years, few injured 
employees could afford to wait out the appeals process. Depending on the 
structure of the Indiana Supretne Court and the lower appellate courts, appeals 
often took three to five years, sotnetitnes longer. 
The railroad industry provides an efficient place to look at the developtnent 
of the etnployers' defenses as well as the need for worklnens' cotnpensation 
because of the frequency and tnagnitude of railroad accidents and its undeniable 
importance to the economy of the era. The analysis traces specific trends fron1 
158The Indiana legislature created various lower courts with the ability to 
appeal judgtnents to the Indiana Supreme Court based upon the population of the 
state and the workload of the Court. Generally, cases exmnined in this chapter had 
been in front of one court, and sotnetitnes two depending on the appellate 
structure. In 1881, the Indiana General Assetnbly created the five-tnetnber 
Supretne Court Cotnmission that assisted the judges in authoring opinions. Laws 
of the State of Indiana, 1881 (Indianapolis, 1881), chap. 17, 92. In 1885 the 
General Assetnbly did away with the comtnissioners because the docket 
congestion had cleared up. Laws of the State of Indiana, 1883 (Indianapolis, 
1883 ), chap. 60, 77. Only a few years later, the Court's docket again becmne 
overcrowded, but attempts at a constitutional mnendtnent to increase the nun1ber of 
judges failed. Easing the docket with cotn1nissioners presented political problen1s, 
and the legislature was unwilling to create a pennanent appellate court because of 
the cost. As a tetnporary solution, the General Assetnbly created a statutory 
appellate court in 1891. Charles W. Taylor, The Bench and Bar of Indiana 
(Indianapolis, 1895), 79; Laws of the State of Indiana, 1891 (Indianapolis, 1891 ), 
chap. 37, sees. 1-27, 39. The legislature gave this tetnporary court a tenn of six 
years, with all open cases after the six years turned back over to the Supretne 
Court. In 1897 and 1899, the legislature extended the life of this court. Robert H. 
Stanton and Gina M. Hicklin, "The History of the Court of Appeals of Indiana," 
Indiana Law Review 30 (1997): 203-231. In 1901 the legislature made the 
appellate court a penn anent court. Laws of the State of Indiana, 190 I 
(Indianapolis: W. B. Burford, 1901), chap. 247, sec. 19, 565-570. 
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1880 through 1915, when the Indiana General Assetnbly passed a cotnprehensive 
workers' compensation law. I have separated the analysis into categories for each 
etnployer' s defense: the fellow-servant rule, contributory negligence, and 
assutnption of risk. Unlike today, when we assutne etnployers provide a safe 
workplace, and we rely on worktnen's cotnpensation laws to protect injured 
etnployees, workers in the late nineteenth century faced a very different legal 
envirorunent. An injured railroad worker in 1880 received no cotnpensation for a 
workplace injury unless he sued his employer. Etnployers focused on high profits 
and increased productivity and profit by requiring long hours, itnpletnenting nevv 
(and dangerous) technologies to increase volutne, and providing few, if any, safety 
tneasures. The drive for profits, coupled with no legal duty to cotnpensate injured 
etnployees, left many employees with no option save filing suit against their 
etnployers. 
Once injured, etnployees who brought lawsuits against their e1nployers 
faced several legal obstacles. Etnployees claitned that their etnployers were 
negligent, and this negligence caused their injuries. Etnployers alleging no 
liability for injuries generally used one defense, but depending on the facts of the 
case, sometimes used multiple defenses. In response to cotnplaints, defendants 
were allowed to allege more than one or alternate defenses. In tnany of the cases 
analyzed, the Court discussed the fellow-servant defense in conjunction with either 
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the contributory negligence defense or the assumption of the risk defense, or all 
three defenses. 
For example, a worker tnight allege he was injured due to the employer's 
negligence, with the employer claiming no liability because the worker was 
hitnself negligent (defense of contributory negligence), or that the worker' s 
injuries resulted from a danger the worker knew existed (defense of assutnption of 
risk), or that another worker was responsible for the injury (defense of fellovv-
servant rule). The Court could then decide in favor of the etnployer based on any 
one or In ore of these defenses. Because each defense alone could decide a single 
case, this chapter exatnines each defense individually. 
The harshness of this regitne was sotnewhat mneliorated by early 
cotnpensation statutes, but the weakness of the 1893 statute forced injured workers 
to continue to try their luck in court. 159 Other statutes passed before the 1915 
cotnpensation law forced sytnpathetic judges at the trial or appellate level either to 
find for the worker or to uphold or reverse a case in favor of the worker. The 
statutes did not produce a consistent pattern of case law in favor of workers or 
etnployers, and thereby did not encourage workers to appeal losing verdicts or 
etnployers to offer fair settletnents. 
159See Appendices A, B, and C. 
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The Fellow-Servant Defense 
Ernployers used the fellow-servant defense to argue that another ernployee, 
at common law, a "fellow servant," caused the complaining worker's injury. Even 
if the employer only showed that the fellow servant was partially at fault, this 
defense would keep the injured ernployee frorn collecting darnages. Of course, the 
injured worker could sue the fellow worker who caused the hann. However, this 
strategy was usually fruitless because the negligent fellow ernployee was a wage 
laborer who rarely had the means to pay a judgment. 
Between 1880 and 1915, the Indiana Suprerne Court decided eighty-three 
cases where an employer used the fellow-servant defense. Of those cases thirty-
five (42%) were decided in favor of the worker and forty-eight (58%) for the 
defendant employer. 160 Over the period studied, the Indiana Suprerne Court 
becarne rnore likely to decide for the injured worker and less likely to find for the 
railroad cornpany. 
Between 1880 and 1911, the Court fairly consistently found that all railroad 
workers, even if they worked in different departrnents, were fellow servants. 
Sorne of the most egregious cases suggest a willingness of the Court to rnaintain a 
conservative attitude and keep out of railroad business. For example, as early as 
1885 in The Indianapolis and St. Louis Railway v. Johnson, the Court held that a 
160See Appendix A. 
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switchman who was injured while coupling cars when an engineer negligently 
backed the engine into the switchyard could not recover against the railroad 
cotnpany because the accident was the fault of the fellow-servant engineer. 161 
The Court continued, until 1915, to find that tnost railroad workers were 
considered fellow servants. In The Baltimore and Ohio and Chicago Railroad 
Company v. Paul, the Court held that a braketnan injured when an engineer 
allowed too many trains in the switchyard was denied recovery because the two 
workers were fellow servants. 162 The Court's rulings on sitnilar fact patterns 
remained consistent into the twentieth century, when, in 1907 the Court held again 
that a brakeman injured by the negligent acts of an engineer was barred frotn 
recovery because of the fellow-servant rule. 163 
Generally, when the Court ruled in favor of a worker it focused on a special 
fact pattern that differentiated the case frotn others. In 1888 deciding The 
Evansville and Terre Haute Railroad Company v. Guyton, the Court ruled that the 
railroad company was liable when a conductor of one train was injured when 
another train hit the train he was riding on. 164 The Court held that the railroad 
161 The Indianapolis and St. Louis Railway v. Johnson, 102 Ind. 352 ( 1885). 
162The Baltimore and Ohio and Chicago Railroad Co1npany v. Paul, 143 
Ind. 23 ( 1895). 
163 Southern Railway Company v. Elliott, 170 Ind. 273 ( 1907). 
164The Evansville and Terre Haute Railroad Co1npany v. Guyton, 115 Ind. 
450 (1888). 
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company was at fault because the conductor on the train causing the accident could 
not be a fellow servant, as he was new and had not been properly trained. 
Besides finding that fellow servants tnust have proper training in order to fit 
within the fellow-servant defense, the Court was also willing to find that the 
fellow-servant rule did not apply to injured workers when their injuries sten11ned 
fro1n faulty equipment. In The Cincinnati, Ha1nilton and Dayton Railroad 
Company v. McMullen, Admin., the Court found that the estate of a freight train 
conductor could recover against the railroad cotnpany when the handle of his 
appliance broke and he fell to his death fro1n the 1noving train. 165 Although the 
railroad cotnpany argued that the conductor's death was due to the negligence of 
the fellow-servant inspector, the Court held otherwise. 
The Court was also willing to find railroad co1npanies liable for worker 
injuries when the railroad cotnpany violated a safety ordinance. The Court 
sotnethnes placed the burden of safety and cotnpetent repairs on the etnployer and 
did not allow the etnployer to delegate this responsibility to a fellow servant. For 
exmnple, in Louisville, Evansville and St. Louis Railway Consolidated Railroad 
Company v. Miller, Admin., when a railroad cotnpany continued to run with 
broken ties so rotten that the spikes could not keep thetn stable, the Court ruled 
that the railroad company was liable for injuries to a freight conductor killed in an 
165The Cincinnati, Hamilton and Dayton Railroad Company v. McMullen, 
Admin., 117 Ind. 439 (1889). 
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accident caused by these defects. 166 Sitnilarly, the Court ruled in The Pittsburgh, 
Cincinnati, Chicago and St. Louis Railway Co. v. Sudhoff, Admin. that the estate of 
an engineer who was killed when a braketnan negligently left a switch open 
causing another train to disregard a safety signal could collect against his 
etnployer. 167 The Court found that the fellow-servant defense did not apply. 
While the cases discussed above show an occasional willingness to find for 
injured workers, the Court developed narrow exceptions to the harsh fellow-
servant rule that allowed sotne workers to recover by litniting the definition of 
fellow servant to include less than all other workers. However, the Court 
interpreted this exception narrowly, and railroad companies often successfully 
circutnvented it. 
As railroads grew in coverage and cotnplexity of operation the Court found 
that the fellow servant rule tnade less sense. Fewer workers perfonned 
cooperative tasks, and it thus became more difficult to hold one worker responsible 
for another worker's injury if they did not work directly with each other. Sotne 
workers at the satne location were actually e1nployed in different departlnents 
under the supervision of different 1nanagers. Furthermore, as tasks becmne tnore 
166Louisville, Evansville and St. Louis Railway Consolidated Railroad 
Company v. Miller, Admin., 140 Ind. 685 (1895). 
167The Pittsburgh, Cincinnati, Chicago and St. Louis Railway Co. v. 
Sudhoff, Admin., 173 Ind. 314 ( 191 0) 
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tnechanized and trains became faster and tnore dangerous, workers had less direct 
control over their own work. 
To acknowledge the continued responsibility of railroad tnanagetnent, the 
Court began to recognize an exception to the fellow-servant rule known as the 
"vice-principal exception" by which supervisors could be held as tnasters liable for 
negligent acts. The Court reasoned that a supervisor becatne the vice-principal or 
representative of the employer (or tnaster), and the action was therefore perfonned, 
for legal purposes, on behalf of the etnployer. 
The Court first introduced the vice-principal exception in 1894. In The 
Ohio and Mississippi Railway Company v. Stein, the Court held a railroad foren1an 
to be a vice principal. 168 In this case, a railroad braken1an was injured when a 
defective car loaded with heavy stone detached fro1n the tnain engine and hit 
another car, causing injury to the worker when one of the stones fell onto his foot. 
The Court held the railroad cotnpany liable for this act because the foretnan knew 
that the car was defective, and he stood in the shoes of the en1ployer. The Court 
explained that the test for determining whether an actor was a fellow servant or a 
vice principal was based on the actions, and the not the title, of the actor. For 
instance, this same foretnan could have been considered a fellow servant had he 
been working alongside the injured worker. However, because he was acting as a 
168The Ohio and Mississippi Railway Company v. Stein, 140 Ind. 61 (1894). 
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superior at the time, the Court found hitn to be a vice principal. While the vice-
principal exception helped chip away at the fellow-servant defense, because the 
determining factor was action and not title, room retnained for tnaneuvering by 
skilled railroad lawyers. 
Notwithstanding the Court's seetntng new willingness to hold railroad 
cotnpanies liable for workplace injury and limit the fellow-servant defense, the 
Court soon began limiting the vice-principal exception. In 1897, the Court found a 
railroad foreman to be a fellow servant of a railroad repainnan in Kerner, Ad1nin. 
v. The Baltimore and Ohio Southwestern Railway Company. 169 In Kerner, the 
railroad foretnan struck and killed the railroad repainnan while driving a large 
spring into an engine with a heavy iron. The Court held that the foretnan and the 
repainnan were fellow servants and precluded recovery on the part of the worker' s 
heirs. This decision partially closed the ostensibly open window created by the 
vice-principal exception. 
Between 1894 and 1915, railroads used this exception nine tiines. The 
railroad worker prevailed in only three (33%) of these cases. In Louisville, New 
Albany and Chicago Railway Co1npany v. Heck, Admin., two trains fro1n the same 
railroad company collided near where the plaintiff, a railroad firetnan, \¥as 
169 Kerner, Admin. v. The Baltimore and Ohio Southwestern Railway 
Company, 149 Ind. 21 (1897). 
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working, killing him. 170 In ruling for the estate, the Court held that the 
superintendent of the railroad crossing failed to exercise proper precautions and 
was responsible for the accident, finding the superintendent a vice principal, and 
not a fellow servant. In Chicago, Indianapolis & Louisville Railway Company v. 
Williams, Admin., the Court ruled that a railroad supervisor who backed an engine 
onto a track before the coupler gave notice he was ready caused the coupler' s 
death. 171 The supervisor here was a vice principal and not a fellow servant. The 
final vice principal case decided for the worker was Indiana Union Traction 
Company v. Long. 172 In this case, an interurban car jumped its tracks due to a 
defective track tie and the plaintiff was injured. The defendant argued that it was 
not liable because safety inspections had been delegated to a fellow servant. But 
the Court held that upholding safety standards could not be delegated to a fellow 
servant. 
Despite this s1nall indication of change, the Court's application of the vice-
principal exception was haphazard and proved not to tetnper the railroad 
cotnpanies' excesses. Of the nine cases discussing the vice-principal exception, 
170 Louisville, New Albany and Chicago Railway Company v. Heck, Ad1nin. , 
151 Ind. 229 ( 1898). 
171 Chicago, Indianapolis & Louisville Railway Company v. Williams, 
Admin.,168 Ind. 276 (1898). 
172Indiana Union Traction Company v. Long, 176 Ind. 532 (1911). 
172Robertson v. The Chicago and Erie Railroad Company, 146 Ind. 486 
(1896). 
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the defendant railroad companies prevailed in six ( 66%) of the1n. Only two years 
after first introducing the vice-principal exception to the fellow-servant defense, 
the Court began to liinit the exception. In Robertson v. The Chicago and Erie 
Railroad Company, the Court held that a supervisor in a railroad 1nachine shop 
was a fellow servant to a worker who was injured lifting a stemn chest on a 
loco1notive, despite the fact that the worker was following the orders of his 
supervisor. 173 
The Court 1nade a si1nilar ruling in Indianapolis Traction and Tenninal 
Company v. Kinney, by Next Friend, finding that a fore1nan of a section gang \vas 
a fellow servant to an injured worker. 174 Here the Court explained that the 
fore1nan could not be considered a vice principal because he was working with the 
plaintiff, despite the orders he gave to the plaintiff. As late as 1912, the Court 
continued to narrow the fellow-servant defense. In Vandalia Railroad Con1pany v. 
Parker, the Court held that a section laborer who fell off an overcrowded hand car 
operated by the railroad fore1nan could not recover for his injuries. 175 This Court 
173 Robertson v. The Chicago and Erie Railroad Company, 146 Ind. 486 
( 1896). 
174Indianapolis Traction and Terminal Company v. Kinney, by Next Friend, 
171 Ind. 612 (1908). 
175 Vandalia Railroad Company v. Parker, 178 Ind. 138 (1912). For 
additional cases finding for the defendant railroad companies despite an allegation 
that the party causing the hann was a vice principal rather than a fellow servant, 
see Southern Indiana Railway Company v. Harrell, 161 Ind. 689 (1903), and The 
Southern Indiana Railway Co1npany v. Martin, 160 Ind. 280 ( 1903 ). 
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reasoned that under the common law, a section foretnan employing and 
discharging men was a vice principal, but a section foretnan directing activities 
after the work day, as was the case here, was a fellow servant. 
While the vice-principal exception did not alter the landscape of etnployers ' 
liability law dratnatically, it did offer a glilnpse of things to cotne. The fellow-
servant defense provided railroad cotnpanies a way to litnit their liability, arguing 
that they should not be held liable for the negligent acts of one worker who injured 
another. The vice-principal exception tempered this situation. Under this 
exception, plaintiffs could argue that the parties causing their injuries were in fact 
in supervisory or tnaster-like positions, rather than fellow workers. Still, based on 
the Indiana Supreme Court cases, the vice-principal exception did little to itnprove 
the plight of the injured worker facing the fellow-servant defense. The application 
of the vice-principal rule proved to be another probletn in tnaintaining consistent 
etnployer's liability findings. Under the workers' cotnpensation laws later passed 
in Indiana, as discussed in Chapter 4, the vice-principal exception would soon 
become extinct. 
Contributory Negligence 
The contributory negligence defense provided another means for etnployers 
to avoid liability. Under this defense, an etnployer could allege contributory 
negligence if the injured etnployee was at fault in any way. Once the etnployer 
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alleged the worker was even partially at fault, the burden of proof fell on the 
worker to show that he was not negligent. 176 Workers were often partially at fault 
because of the circumstances of their jobs or the use of the tools provided thetn, 
and etnployers often succeeded with this defense regardless of unsafe working 
conditions. Proving the absence of their own negligence was expensive and 
therefore difficult, and workers attempting this strategy were often forced to 
protnise some of the potential settletnent to their attorneys. If the workers \Vere 
unable to prove that they were not negligent, the etnployers' contributory 
negligence defense served as a cotnplete bar to recovery. 
Between 1884 and 1915, the Indiana Supretne Court decided eighty cases 
where an employer alleged an etnployee was also negligent as a defense to the 
etnployee's general negligence allegation against the etnployer. Of those cases 
forty-six (58%) were decided in favor of the worker-plaintiff and thirty-four (42%) 
decided for the defendant railroad. 177 Unlike the fellow-servant defense, which 
the railroads used successfully, the Court was less willing to rule in favor of the 
railroad company based on the contributory negligence defense. More often than 
not, the plaintiff recovered in these cases. 
Like the fellow-servant defense, the contributory negligence defense was 
176Thotnas Cooley, A Treatise on the Law of Torts (Chicago: Callahan and 
Cotnpany, 1906), 1457. 
177See Appendix B. 
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often raised in cotnbination with other defenses. Generally, the Court was 
reluctant to decide cases based on allegations of contributory negligence and 
instead based its decision on either the fellow-servant defense or the assutnption of 
risk defense. Of the eighty cases where the contributory negligence defense was 
used (often along with other defenses), only twenty-two were decided solely on the 
basis of contributory negligence. Of course, the defenses of assutnption of risk 
and contributory negligence were often based on the satne facts, and the Court 
seems to have preferred finding that a worker assutned the risks of etnploytnent 
than to hold him (contributorily) negligent for continuing work despite an unsafe 
condition. 
In only nine cases was the Court willing to find for the railroad cotnpany 
based solely on the contributory negligence defense. These cases often involved 
an etnployee being provided with a safe work environtnent, yet choosing to do 
sotnething unsafe. In the industrial era when workers were often paid by the 
atnount of work they could cotnplete (e.g., nutnber of cars coupled, length of 
tracks laid, etc.), there were incentives to use the quickest tneans to finish a task. 
The Court consistently held employees contributorily negligent if they were 
provided with a safe work environtnent and chose to use unsafe tneans to complete 
a job. 
For example, in The Cincinnati, Indianapolis, St. Louis and Chicago 
Railway Company v. Long, the Court ruled that employees tnust act prudently with 
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respect to their own safety; failure to do so was considered contributory 
negligence. 178 In Long, the injured plaintiff was an experienced switch1nan who 
was hit by another train that was backing up. The Court found hitn contributorily 
negligent because, it reasoned, he could have seen the train cotning and averted the 
accident. Sitnilarly, in The Pennsylvania Company v. 0 'Shaughnessy, Admin. the 
Court held that a braketnan who took an unsafe path to the switchyard, when a 
safer but longer path existed, was contributorily negligent and was therefore barred 
from recovery. 179 
An etnployee's failure to follow accepted safety procedures ahnost always 
led to a victory for the defendant railroad company. In The Pennsylvania 
Company v. Finney, Ad1nin., the Court found a braketnan was contributorily 
negligent and barred from recovery when he descended frotn a ladder facing the 
train car rather than facing outward to take notice of any obstacles. 180 The Court 
held that the plaintiffs injuries would not have occurred if he had taken notice of 
his surroundings, and he could not now claitn that the tnaster was negligent. In 
The New York, Chicago and St. Louis Railroad Co1npany v. Ha1nlin , the Court 
held that a railroad switchtnan injured when his pant leg caught on a bolt sticking 
178The Cincinnati, Indianapolis, St. Louis and Chicago Railway Company v. 
Long, 112 Ind. 166 ( 1887). 
179The Pennsylvania Company v. O'Shaughnessy, Admin., 122 Ind. 588 
(1890). 
180The Pennsylvania Company v. Finney, Admin., 145 Ind. 551 ( 1896). 
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out of the car he was to couple was contributorily negligent because he could have 
noticed this defect had he looked before attetnpting to couple the cars. 181 The 
Court further declared that the plaintiff could have attetnpted to couple the cars in 
another safer, but more thne-consutning way, which would have avoided the 
accident. 
The Court was also willing to require injured plaintiffs to take notice of 
their surroundings and held failure to do so a bar to recovery because they were 
found to be contributorily negligent. In 0 'Neal v. The Chicago and Indiana 
Railway Company, a young and inexperienced brakeman was thrown fro1n a train 
because of the unevenness in the rails. 182 The Court held that, because the plaintiff 
had taken this same train before, and because the unevenness was open and 
obvious, the plaintiff was required to exercise due care to avoid injuries. Failure to 
exercise this due care made the plaintiff contributorily negligent. In one of the 
1nore egregious cases where the contributory negligence defense was allowed, The 
New York, Chicago and St. Louis Railroad Company v. Ostn1an, Ad1nin., the 
plaintiff, a fireman, was looking out the window, as was his duty, hit his head on a 
pole, and died. 183 The Court held that the plaintiff should have known of this 
181 The New York, Chicago and St. Louis Railroad Company v. Hamlin, 170 
Ind. 20 ( 1907). 
1820 'Neal v. The Chicago and Indiana Railway Company, 132 Ind. 110 
(1892). 
183 The New York, Chicago and St. Louis Railroad Company v. Ostman, 
Admin., 146 Ind. 452 ( 1896). 
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danger and taken measures to avoid it because others had been killed this satne 
way. The railroad cotnpany admitted it was a frequent occurrence and was able to 
evade liability. 
In contrast, the contributory negligence defense was unsuccessful in thirteen 
cases, and the railroad was therefore liable. Many of these cases arose when an 
employee was provided with defective tools. For exatnple, in The Cincinnati, 
Indianapolis, St. Louis and Chicago Railway Company v. Roesch, a track laborer 
was injured while raising the level of the track with gravel and tools provided by 
the railroad. 184 Here, the Court ruled that the etnployee could not be deetned 
contributorily negligent for continuing to work with a defective apparatus when it 
was the railroad's responsibility to provide suitable tools. 
This reasoning remained fairly consistent. As late as 1913, in Chicago and 
Erie Railroad Company et a!., v. Dinius, the Court declared that a railroad worker 
was not contributorily negligent when he fell into a hole and was hit by a train. 185 
The railroad alleged that because the hole was visible, the worker was negligent in 
stepping into it, but the Court did not agree, finding instead that the railroad had to 
provide a safe work environment. 
184The Cincinnati, Indianapolis, St. Louis and Chicago Railway Co1npany v. 
Roesch, 126 Ind. 445 (1891). 
185Chicago and Erie Railroad Company eta!., v. Dinius, 180 Ind. 596 
(1913). 
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In other cases where the Court found for the plaintiff, its reasoning \Vas 
often based on the fact that the injured plaintiff was unaware of the unsafe working 
conditions. For exatnple, in The Lake Erie and Western Railroad Company v. 
Mugg, Admin., the plaintiff was injured by a defective rail while coupling cars. 186 
Although the defendant railroad cotnpany alleged that the plaintiff was at fault 
because he continued to work despite this defect, the Court held the plaintiff \Vas 
unaware of it and would not have discovered it through nonnal inspection. 
Therefore, the employee could not be contributorily negligent. Sitnilarly, in The 
Terre Haute and Indianapolis Railroad Company v. Fowler, Ad1nin., the plaintiff 
was operating a train after a stonn, which had washed out sotne of the train tracks, 
causing the train to derail and injure the plaintiff. 187 The Court tnaintained that the 
defendant railroad company, knowing that the stonn tnight have datnaged the 
track, should have warned the plaintiff. Therefore the conductor could not be 
found contributorily negligent for continuing his duties. 
In judging whether the injured plaintiff acted prudently in response to a 
dangerous or unsafe situation, the Court used a "reasonable tnan" standard. In The 
Louisville and St. Louis Consolidated Railroad Co1npany et a!. v. Utz, Admin., the 
plaintiff brakeman was injured by jutnping from one moving car to another when a 
186The Lake Erie and Western Railroad Company v. Mugg, Ad1nin., 132 Ind. 
168 (1892). 
187 The Terre Haute and Indianapolis Railroad Company v. Fowler, Ad1nin., 
154 Ind. 682 (1900). 
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pin catne loose. 188 The defendant railroad cotnpany argued that the plaintiff was 
contributorily negligent because he was walking on top of a train that was 
traveling at a high rate of speed. However, the plaintiff successfully showed that 
an experienced railroad braketnan would not have known if there was a danger, so 
he could not be held negligent. The Court agreed. 
Regardless of a seetning favoritistn for railroad workers, several cases point 
to problems with the standards of proof for establishing contributory negligence 
and their interpretation. For exatnple, in 1886 The Pittsburgh, Cincinnati and St. 
Louis Railway Company v. Adams the Court decided that when a section hand who 
was asked to act as a brakeman fell and injured his leg causing a subsequent 
amputation, it was up to the injured plaintiff to prove that he was not contributorily 
negligent. 189 In The Louisville, New Albany and Chicago Railway Co1npany v. 
Sandford, Admin., the Court held that a baggage 1naster injured when a bridge 
collapsed was contributorily negligent because he continued to work when he 
knew of the danger. 190 
Railroad lawyers alleged the contributory negligence defense with litnited 
success. Defendant railroad companies won only when employees failed to follow 
188The Louisville and St. Louis Consolidated Railroad Company et al. v. 
Utz, Admin., 133 Ind. 265 (1892). 
189The Pittsburgh, Cincinnati and St. Louis Railway Con1pany v. Adams, 
105 Ind. 151 (1886). 
190The Louisville, New Albany and Chicago Railway Company v. Sandford, 
Admin., 117 Ind. 265 (1899). 
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accepted safety procedures, failed to take notice of dangerous sutToundings, 
continued to work despite known safety hazards, or chose to do their job in an 
unsafe manner when the etnployer provided a safe alternative. Injured plaintiffs, 
more often than not, recovered despite allegations of contributory negligence. 
Plaintiffs were most likely to recover when they were given defective tools, put to 
work in an unsafe environment, or were injured despite behaving as a reasonable 
1nan would. 
Assu1nption of Risk 
The assumption of the risk defense relieved etnployers fro1n liability if they 
could show that the etnployees knew their field or job was dangerous but 
continued to work despite hazardous conditions. This defense was particularly 
popular with employers in dangerous industries. Employers could allege this 
defense by simply showing that a certain risk was inherent to their industry. For 
instance, a railroad company could allege that train deraihnent was a cotntnon risk 
of railroad work and that workers assutned any injuries resulting fron1 deraihnent 
and therefore should not recover. More often than not, this defense worked to 
protect the very hann or danger causing the injury because it was so cotntnon. 
Assumption of the risk often proved to be such a strong defense that courts 
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relieved employers frotn cotnpensating injured workers even when a violation of 
safety law by the employer had caused the accident. 191 
Between 1885 and 1915, fifty-one Indiana Supren1e Court cases discussed 
the assumption of the risk defense. During this period, the Court found this 
defense applicable approximately one-half of the titne. Of the fifty-one cases 
decided between 1885 and 1915, twenty-seven (53%) were decided for the worker 
and twenty-four ( 4 7%) for the railroad companies. 192 
Exatnining the most cotntnon fact patterns for the twenty-seven cases 
decided for the worker, the Court usually held for the plaintiff when he was injured 
by a danger unknown to him which he had no means to discover. In early cases, 
like The Louisville, New Albany and Chicago Railway Company v. Frawley, a 
railroad coupler was injured when his conductor ordered hitn to couple two cars 
that had tnismatched hooks. 193 The Court stated that workers only assutned usual 
and ordinary risks, and this worker had no way to know or discover the irregular 
coupling hooks that caused his injury. Similarly, in Indiana, Illinois and Io-vva 
Railroad Company v. Bundy, the Court held that a braketnan injured in the dark by 
191Harry Weiss, "Etnployers' Liability and Workmen's Compensation," in 
John Rogers Commons et al., ed., History of Labour in the United States (New 
York: A.M. Kelley, 1966 [1935]), 566. 
192See Appendix C. 
193The Louisville, New Albany and Chicago Railway Company v. Fra1vley, 
110 Ind. 18 ( 1886). 
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unboxed wires did not assume that risk. 194 Later cases followed this smne trend. 
In Grand Trunk Western Railway Company v. Poole, a car coupler was injured 
when he fell into a hole, got stuck, and was injured by an oncotning train. 195 The 
Court found that the worker did not assume this risk because the defendant railroad 
cotnpany did not make this danger known to its workers. 
Furthermore, when raising the assutnption of risk defense defendant 
railroad companies were not likely to prevail if the injury was caused by a risk 
created by a master. In Taylor v. The Evansville and Terre Haute Railroad 
Company, a railroad tnechanic was severely injured when the railroad's tnaster 
mechanic dropped a heavy engine part. 196 The Court held that the injured 
etnployee did not assume this risk of injury because, while an etnployee assutned 
the risk incident to the service he provided, he did not assutne the risk created by 
the fault of his master. The Court later tnade stronger statetnents against the idea 
that a worker could assume the risk of a master's error in Pittsburgh, Cincinnati, 
Chicago & St. Louis Railway Company v. Lightheiser. 197 In this case the plaintiff 
was standing between two incotning cars when an engineer in control of one of the 
194Indiana, Illinois and Iowa Railroad Company v. Bundy, 152 Ind. 590 
(1899). 
195Grand Trunk Western Railway Companyv. Poole, 175 Ind. 567 (1910). 
196Taylor v. The Evansville and Terre Haute Railroad Co1npany, 121 Ind. 
124 (1889). 
197 Pittsburgh, Cincinnati, Chicago & St. Louis Railway Company v. 
Lightheiser, 163 Ind. 247 (1906). 
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cars backed his car up without a lookout and hit the plaintiff. The Court discussed 
the assumption of the risk defense specifically for railroads, and found that railroad 
employees could not be found to assurne the risk of fault on the part of signal of 
railway operations, including telegraph offices, switch yards, tnachine shops, 
round-houses, or the equipment. 
Later cases reaffirmed the Court's ruling in Lightheiser. In Evansville and 
Terre Haute Railroad Co1npany v. Lip king, Ad1nin., a railroad worker asked to 
couple cars was killed when the forernan allowed another train on the track. 198 
The railroad company argued that the worker assurned the risk of injury when 
accepting a job to couple cars. However, the Court held that the injured \vorker 
should recover because he could not assutne the risk that a foren1an would fail to 
exercise ordinary caution. 
If the defendant railroad cotnpany violated a legal duty, the Court was likely 
to rule in favor of the injured worker. Sotne legal duties were broadly construed 
by the Court, while other titnes the Court was reluctant to itnpose an expansive 
duty on the defendant railroad cornpany. For instance, in Indiana, Bloon1ington 
and Western Railway Company et a!. v. Barnhart, the Court found the railroad 
cotnpany liable for the plaintiffs injuries where a state law provided for a safe 
198Evansville and Terre Haute Railroad Company v. Lipking, Admin., 183 
Ind. 572 (1915). 
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railroad crossing and the railroad cotnpany did not comply. 199 The Court generally 
held, as it did in Barnhart, that employees could not assutne the risk of their 
employer's failure to follow the laws. 
The Court came to a sitnilar finding in The Baltimore and Ohio 
Southwestern Railway Company v. Peterson, Admin. of the Estate of Peterson.200 
Here, the Court held the railroad cotnpany liable for the worker's injuries when the 
defendant's train was running at a higher rate of speed within city litnits than was 
allowed by the city's ordinance. Thirteen years after Barnhart, the Court 
confirmed that workers could not be found to assutne a risk where their etnployer 
did not abide by city ordinances or codes. In The Wabash Railroad Co1npany v. 
Gretzinger, Admin., the Court held a worker did not assutne the risk when he was 
killed in a switch yard by a train that exceeded the speed set by a city ordinance. 201 
While specific trends discovered under both the fellow-servant defense and the 
contributory negligence defense seem inequitable toward workers, the Court tnore 
likely than not found for the injured worker if the etnployer did not obey the law. 
While the assumption of risk cases discussed above illustrate a progressive 
Court, other cases show a conservative one. When there was a clear duty itnposed 
199 Indiana, Bloomington and Western Railway Company et al. v. Barnhart, 
115 Ind. 399 (1888). 
200The Baltimore and Ohio Southwestern Railway Company v. Peterson, 
Admin. ofthe Estate of Peterson, 156 Ind. 364 (1901). 
201 The Wabash Railroad Company v. Gretzinger, Admin., 182 Ind. 155 
(1914). 
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on the railroad company to provide a safe workplace, it found for the plaintiff. 
The Court was tnore inclined to find in favor of the defendant railroad cotnpany if 
only a vague duty itnposed. 
Conversely, the Court also seemed to hold for the defendant when the 
plaintiff knew or reasonably could have known of the danger that caused his 
injury, but continued to work despite this knowledge. For exatnple, in The 
Indianapolis and St. Louis Railway Company v. Watson, a train yard night 
watchman was injured when he entered the train yard but was not given a lantern 
by his employer so that he could see dangerous obstacles.202 The Court found that 
the worker assumed the risk of injury when he continued to work, knowing he did 
not have a lantern. The Court refused to rule that the railroad had a duty to provide 
the worker with a lantern, the tnost basic of safety tools for a night watchtnan. 
More egregious than Watson, in Hollingsworth, Ad1nin., v. The Chicago, 
Indianapolis & Louisville Railway Company, a braketnan, who rode on the top of 
the train to operate the brake, died frotn hitting his head on a low bridge without 
working warning signals. 203 Introducing evidence of other workers who were 
injured in this same tnanner showed that the plaintiff was aware of the situation 
and nevertheless continued to work. Cases like Hollingsworth detnonstrate that 
202The Indianapolis and St. Louis Railway Company v. Watson, 114 Ind. 20 
(1887). 
203 Hollingsworth, Admin. v. The Chicago, Indianapolis & Louisville 
Railway Company, 160 Ind. 259 (1902). 
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the railroads refused to retnedy dangerous conditions that repeatedly injured their 
workers and got away with it. 
Subsequent cases show the same reluctance by the Court to hold railroad 
companies to high safety standards. In Cleveland, Cincinnati, Chicago and St. 
Louis Railway Company v. Morrey, Admin., a plaintiff braketnan injured in a dark 
switchyard was denied recovery.204 The Court held that there was no legal duty to 
have the switchyard lit and that the brakeman had assutned the risk of working in 
the dark. 
In addition, the Court was less likely to find for the injured plaintiff if the 
worker was injured during the regular course of business or injured by what the 
Court deetned to be ordinary risks of employtnent. The Court generally held for 
the railroad companies where injuries were the result of open and obvious dangers, 
rarely requiring the railroad cotnpanies to take responsibility. In tnany cases, the 
Court only required the defendant railroad cotnpany to show that the en1ployee, 
exercising ordinary care, could have discovered the danger and not that the injured 
plaintiff had actual knowledge of it. In The Louisville and Nashville Railroad 
Company v. Kemper, a railroad worker tnoving a train along the track slipped and 
204 Cleveland, Cincinnati, Chicago and St. Louis Railway Co1npany v. 
Morrey, Admin., 172 Ind. 513 ( 1909). 
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caught his foot on a damaged portion of the track.205 The Court held that the 
worker assutned the risk because the condition of the track was open and visible. 
Later cases show a similar tendency of the Court to find in favor of the 
defendant railroad company, despite dangerous working conditions, if the plaintiff 
knew of thetn. In Southern Railway Company et al. v. Howerton, a railroad 
worker, working at a new location, was injured by an explosion near the track.206 
The Court held that the employee could have discovered the presence of the 
explosives had he investigated his surroundings, and because he did not, he 
assutned the risk that sotnething would go wrong. The Court denied recovery for 
his injuries. 
Finally, In a few cases, the assutnption of the risk defense seetned 
intertwined with the other defenses. Railroad cotnpanies often used n1ore than one 
defense in response to a plaintiffs charge of negligence. Railroad con1panies also 
claimed the plaintiff could not recover because the etnployee causing the injury 
was a fellow servant and, in the alternative, that the plaintiff assutned the risk that 
the fellow servant might be negligent. These strategies often proved difficult for 
plaintiffs to overcotne. In Southern Indiana Railway Company v. Harrell, a 
railroad worker was injured by the negligence of his foretnan. 207 The Court denied 
205 The Louisville and Nashville Railroad Company v. Kemper, 147 Ind. 561 
(1897). 
206Southern Railway Co1npany et al. v. Howerton, 182 Ind. 208 (1914). 
207 Southern Indiana Railway Company v. Harrell, 161 Ind. 689 ( 1903 ). 
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recovery, finding not only that the foreman was a fellow servant to the injured 
plaintiff, but also that the injured plaintiff had assutned the risk that his fellovv 
servant would act negligently. The only way an employee could overcotne this 
ruling was to show negligence in hiring or selecting those negligent etnployees, 
which was quite difficult, titne consutning, and expensive. 
Railroad lawyers alleged the assutnption of risk defense with tnoderate 
success between 1880 and 1915 with ahnost half of the allegations bringing a 
favorable judgment. Defendant railroad cotnpanies won tnost often when 
plaintiffs knew of a risk (or could have known of a the risk through ordinary 
inspection) and continued work or when the injury occurred in the regular course 
of etnployment. Injured plaintiffs recovered a little over half of the titne when a 
defendant alleged the assumption of risk defense. Plaintiffs were tnost likely to 
recover when their injury was caused by the tnaster, if the railroad cotnpany did 
not comply with accepted safety standards, or if the worker had no knowledge of 
the danger inherent in his tasks. 
In eighty-three cases between 1880 and 1915, the railroads alleged the 
fellow-servant defense. The Court becatne more likely to decide for injured 
workers as the period progressed, finding for workers overall ahnost 60 percent of 
the time. Despite this proportion, etnployees could reasonably count on winning 
only when the injury resulted frotn a special fact pattern, for exatnple, when the 
etnployee was injured by a fellow servant given poor tools by the tnaster, or the 
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fellow servant clearly violated a safety ordinance. Other cases depended largely 
upon the plaintiffs individual circumstance, making consistent case la\v 
itnpossible to identify. Injured employees suing their etnployers experienced 
frustration in gauging their claitns because the case law was so unclear. The Court 
also carved out an exception to the fellow-servant defense by which etnployees 
could hold their masters liable if the hanns leading to their injuries were done by a 
vice principal (e.g., a supervisor or foreman). While the rationale behind this rule 
was to ameliorate the rule's harsh effects, the railroad cotnpanies won 66 percent 
of these claims when looking at the fellow-servant defense alone. 
Used slightly less often than the fellow-servant defense was the 
contributory negligence defense, alleged in eighty cases between 1880 and 1915. 
Like the fellow-servant defense, the Court failed to develop a coherent body of 
case law, finding for the injured plaintiff only 58 percent of the titne. Generally, 
railroad lawyers successfully used this defense only when etnployees failed to 
follow accepted safety procedures, failed to take notice of dangerous surroundings, 
continued to work despite known safety hazards, or chose to do their job in an 
unsafe manner, even though the employer provided a safe alternative. 
Alternatively, injured plaintiffs could count on consistent victories only when they 
could prove the master gave thetn defective tools, put them to work in an unsafe 
environment, or that they were injured, despite their reasonable precautions. 
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Because most cases did not fall within these strict fact patterns, injured etnployees 
could not realistically measure the potential success of their claitns. 
The assutnption of risk defense was used less than the fellow-servant or 
contributory negligence defenses, appearing in fifty-one cases during the period 
studied. Siinilar to the other defenses, injured plaintiffs were only moderately 
successful overcoming this defense, succeeding only 53 percent of the titne. Like 
the contributory negligence defense, etnployees could not estitnate their chances of 
recovery, outside of a few specific fact patterns. Plaintiffs were tnost likely to 
recover when the master caused the plaintiffs injury, the plaintiff had no 
knowledge of the danger, or if the railroad did not cotnply with accepted safety 
regulations. On the other hand, railroad cotnpanies were victorious when plaintiffs 
continued work despite known dangers, or when the injury occurred in the regular 
course of etnploytnent. 
Looking at all three defenses together, the cases analyzed den1onstrate the 
need for workers' cotnpensation legislation. Despite a finn cotntnon law tradition, 
parties were unable to predict the outcotne of potential litigation, leaving tnany 
injured workers without compensation. Between 1880 and 1915 injured 
etnployees succeeded more often than not at the highest state court level yet 
employers still managed to win a considerable nutnber of cases. This analysis 
provides a context for Chapter 4, which exmnines the development of Indiana's 
workers' compensation legislation. 
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In Indiana, the trinity of defenses (fellow-servant, contributory negligence, 
and assutnption of risk) denied tnany railroad etnployees cotnpensation for their 
work-related injuries. The success of the defenses also allowed railroads to 
maintain deplorable working conditions and shoddy safety standards. Discouraged 
from bringing suit, injured employees often accepted reduced settletnents. The 
Courts did not create a consistent body of case law to manage workplace injuries 
so reformers and other interested parties went to the legislature for a solution. 
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CHAPTER4 
THE INDIANA WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION LAW 
Prior to the passage of worker's cotnpensation legislation in Indiana, a 
tnember of the Indiana Commission to Study Worktnen' s Cotnpensation reported 
that one in twenty railroad workers were injured in Indiana each year.208 Still, the 
railroads refused to correct dangerous working conditions. The coutis also failed 
to retnedy many workers' injuries by accepting cotnmon law defenses that barred 
their recovery, including assutnption of risk, the fellow-servant rule, and 
contributory negligence. Furthennore, adjudicating workplace injury lawsuits in 
the court systetn discouraged many potential plaintiffs frotn suing their etnployers 
because of the cost and the delay in receiving any benefits. Most injured railroad 
workers were wage laborers with little savings. Hiring an attorney to file a claitn 
against their employer tneant spending money on a case that tnight prove fruitless 
or, at best, protnising a portion of their possible winnings as a contingency fee for 
their lawyer. 
The Indiana judicial branch proved unable to solve the probletns created by 
industrialization and unsafe working conditions. As illustrated in Chapter 3, the 
208Henry W. Bullock, "Workmen's Compensation" (paper presented at the 
Indiana Bar Association, Indianapolis, Indiana, July 10, 1913), Indiana State 
Library, Indianapolis, 2. 
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outcome of lawsuits depended a great deal on the individual circutnstances of each 
case, making it difficult for injured plaintiffs to be certain of recovery. Because 
recovery was uncertain and costly to pursue, injured workers remained a concern 
during the first few decades of the twentieth century. Progressive refonners 
continued to push for change. This chapter exatnines Indiana's struggle for a 
legislative solution, looking at early employers' liability laws, interest groups that 
supported comprehensive workers' cotnpensation legislation, and the success of 
Indiana's 1915 Workmen's Cotnpensation Act. 
Indiana legislators noticed even before the turn of the century, that the 
comtnon law employers' liability defenses (i.e., fellow-servant, contributory 
negligence, and assutnption of risk) blocked 1nost workers fro1n collecting 
reasonable damages for workplace injuries. They attempted to retnedy the 
situation. Prior to the passage of the 1915 Worklnen' s Cotnpensation Act, the 
Indiana General Assembly enacted a few weaker statutes altering the con1n1on law 
of etnployers' liability. While these acts did not curb the use of the three 
etnployers' liability defenses, they did lay the groundwork for cotnprehensive 
workers' cotnpensation legislation. 
The first of these acts was passed in 1893. Until then, injured etnployees 
relied exclusively on the com1non law of negligence, rather than the violation of a 
specific statute, for recovery. On March 4, 1893, the Indiana General Assetnbly 
approved the first etnployers' liability statute in Indiana. The language of this 
110 
statute specifically applied to railroads: "regulating liability of railroads and other 
corporations, except tnunicipal, for personal injury to persons etnployed by 
them. "209 While this act applied to tnanufacturers, coal mines, factories, etc. , the 
General Assembly specifically included railroads. 
The 1893 act established four skeletal fact patterns where etnployers would 
be held liable for employee injuries assutning those etnployees were exercising due 
care and diligence. First, etnployers were liable when defective work conditions, 
tools, or tnachinery caused injury, provided that those conditions were the result of 
negligence on the part of the etnployer. Second, etnployees could recover if their 
injuries resulted frotn the negligence of a superior etnployee. Third, the statute 
applied when the worker was hurt by an act or otnission of another etnployee 
provided that the etnployee was acting under instructions of his supervisor or 
under any rule, regulation, or by-law of the cotnpany. Finally, en1ployers were 
responsible when the injury was caused by the negligence of another etnployee 
who was in charge of a "signal, telegraph office, switch yard, shop, round-house, 
locotnotive engine, or train upon a railway."210 
The act also stated that injured employees could not collect if they knew 
their job was dangerous or if the fellow servant who caused their accident was 
209Laws ofthe State of Indiana, 1893 (Indianapolis, 1893), chap. 130, sec. 1, 
294. 
210Ibid., 294-95. 
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incompetent, or if they could have discovered this incornpetence. 211 The 
legislature maintained that darnages should be coffilnensurate with injuries.212 
The final section declared that contracts in which ernployees waived their right to 
sue were held void. 
Only srnall changes were rnade to the 1893 act prior to 1915. In 1899, the 
General Assernbly made the contributory negligence defense harder for etnployers 
to prove. The 1899 act stated that plaintiffs were no longer required to prove the 
negligence of the employee to avoid liability.213 In 1911 the General Assetnbly 
again made changes to the existing laws. The 1911 act restated rnuch of the I 893 
legislation and placed a greater burden of proof upon defendants, further whittling 
away at the common law defenses. Specifically, this act rnandated that etnployers 
could not succeed on an assutnption of risk defense if an ernployer or the 
employer's agent breached a duty, violated an ordinance or a statue, or provided 
unsafe tools. 214 The 1911 Act also provided sotne lirnitations on injured 
employees' recovery, rnaintaining that employers could not be held liable for n1ore 
than $10,000 and setting forth a two-year statute oflirnitations.215 
58. 
211 Ibid., 295. 
212Ibid. 
213 Laws of the State of Indiana, 1899 (Indianapolis, 1899), chap. 41, sec. 1, 
214Laws of the State of Indiana, 1911 (Indianapolis, 1911 ), chap. 88, sees. 1-
12, 145-48. 
215Ibid., 148. 
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Despite continued legislative attempts to modify employers' liability, 
problems retnained. As the case charts in the Appendix and the discussion in 
Chapter 3 detnonstrate, the 1893 Employer's Liability Act and the subsequent 
changes thereto, provided injured workers little predictability or consistent 
recovery. 
Several groups, including attorneys, insurance cotnpantes, and organized 
labor, noticed that legislation had failed to solve the probletn. These groups began 
to take an active interest in developing new and cotnprehensive workers' 
legislation. The developtnent of cotnpulsory legislation was a concerted effort 
between those groups representing workers and businesstnen or etnployers, as well 
as other interested parties, such as attorneys and insurance cotnpanies. 
Attorneys represented the interests of their clients, and not all attorneys 
agreed on the value of workers' cotnpensation legislation. Personal injury 
attorneys as well as insurance defense attorneys relied on the incotne frotn 
workplace accident litigation. As attorneys represent the interests of their clients, 
not all attorneys agreed on their desires for cotnpensation legislation. The forn1er 
favored elitninating or weakening the etnployer' s defenses so plaintiffs would have 
a greater chance at success, while the latter and railroad attorneys favored 
strengthening those defenses to protect their client's interests. 
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At the 1911 meeting of the Indiana Bar Association, tnembers requested 
that the association's Cotnmittee on Jurisprudence and Law Refonn,216 along with 
a newly created Bar Association Special Legislative Cotnmittee,217 investigate and 
recotnmend possible compensation legislation. While neither cotntnittee had the 
power to propose this legislation to the Indiana General Assetnbly, the State Bar 
Association lobbied members of the Assen1bly as well as boasted severaltnetnbers 
who served in the General Assembly. Their suggestions, while not fonnal bills, 
represent the opinions of the Indiana lawyers and arguably influenced the eventual 
workers' compensation schetne. 
The Cotntnittee on Jurisprudence and Law Refonn suggested no tnaJor 
changes in the law as it existed in 1911, but proposed tnodel legislation which 
provided for accident insurance. Their proposal suggested that: ( 1) etnployers and 
etnployees be pennitted to agree upon cotnpensation prior to accidents or injuries 
received during the course of etnploytnent, provided that cotnpensation in case of 
death did not fall below a tninitnutn state-established threshold; (2) etnployers be 
permitted to obtain insurance to cover such claiins; and (3) the legislature be 
216 The members included John T. Dye, Dan W. Siins, Charles S. Baker, 
Marcellus A. Chipman, and Samuel Parker. Indiana Bar Association, "Employers' 
Liability: Reports of Cotmnittee on Jurisprudence and Law Refonn, and of the 
Special Legislative Committee" (paper presented at the Indiana Bar Association, 
Indianapolis, July 11, 1911), Indiana State Library, Indianapolis, 3. 
217The five metnbers of the cotmnittee were Addison C. Harris, John T. 
Dye, Evan B. Stotsenburg, John T. Rupe, and Joseph N. Rabb. Ibid., 2. 
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required to create an Industrial Coffilnission to carry out the provisions of any new 
acts? 18 However, this suggestion did not statutorily dispose of the etnployers' 
cotnmon law defenses, stating sitnply that "insurance shall etnbrace and cover all 
injuries received by the etnploye [sic] in the course of etnployment, whether 
caused by negligence or not; except such injuries as are the result of willful acts of 
the employe [sic] with the intention of causing the injury, or in disobedience of the 
orders or rules of the company, of which the etnploye [sic] has been duly 
notified. "219 
Furthermore, the proposal safeguarded the interest of plaintiffs lawyers. It 
tnaintained a provision that either party could submit the tnatter to the county court 
and that court would have exclusive jurisdiction, saving the appeals process if the 
insured did not agree with the finding of liability or the recovery decided by the 
Industrial Board.220 The statute also gave a court the power to give attoney's fees 
to the winning party, thus encouraging plaintiffs to appeal the decision of the 
Industrial Board. 221 
In its report to the Bar Association, the Special Legislative Cotntnittee 
discussed constitutional blocks to a state mandated workers' cotnpensation 
scheme, some of which other states had faced in attetnpting to pass their own 
218Ibid., 3-12. 
219Ibid., 5. 
220Ibid., 11-12. 
221 Ibid., 12. 
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workers' compensation legislation?22 First, the committee retninded the Bar 
Association that the U.S. Bill of Rights enutnerated the right to a jury trial.223 
Legislation that required either an employer or employee to pay or accept 
compensation based upon statute without a jury trial tnight violate the United 
States Constitution. Second, under the Fourteenth Alnendtnent to the U.S. 
Constitution, no person could be deprived of property without due process of law. 
An employer could not be tnade to pay cotnpensation against his consent without 
first having the right to due process.224 A final legal (but not constitutional) 
stumbling block was the idea of forced payment without an acknowledgetnent of 
fault, which went against established legal precedent and attitude of the day. 225 
Therefore, the coffilnittee recotrunended that the etnployer and etnployee be given 
222See Jves v. South Buffalo Ry. Co., where the New York Court of Appeals 
held a compulsory worker's cotnpensation act unconstitutional. 94 N.E. 431 
(1908). 
223The Seventh Amendment to the United States Constitution reads in 
pertinent part: "[i]n suits at cotntnon law, where the value in controversy shall 
exceed twenty dollars, the right of trial by jury shall be preserved." The Fifth 
Amendtnent to the United States Constitution provides a right to a jury trial in 
criminal cases only. 
224The Fourteenth Alnendment to the United States Constitution reads in 
pertinent part: "No State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the 
privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any State 
deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor 
deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws." 
Reformers argued that workers' compensation would deprive the business owner 
of property (money paid to an injured worker) without a finding of fault or due 
process of law. 
225Indiana Bar Association, "Employers' Liability," 1-2. 
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the opportunity to decide whether to participate in the systetn (thereby waiving 
their fundamental rights) or not participate. 226 
The cotnmittee also recommended sample legislation tnuch more litnited in 
scope than the earlier bills. It suggested that cotnpensation legislation include only 
manual and mechanical laborers whose work was extra-hazardous and dangerous, 
like employees working on or with railroads, gunpowder, detnolition, elevators, 
scaffolding, mines, tunnels, as well as all workplaces using steatn, electricity, or 
other mechanical power.227 The committee suggested the iinpletnentation of 
paytnent schedules and provisions for taking care of widows and dependant 
children. It also recominended that employers be given the right to require injured 
employees making a claitn to subtnit to a tnedical exatnination to detennine the 
extent of their injuries. Finally, like the other Bar Association cotrunittee, this 
group suggested a provision to protect the interest of lawyers, stating that disputes 
which could not be settled either by agreetnent of the parties or subtnission to a 
labor arbitration board, could be brought to court. Dmnages would, of course, 
include attorney's fees, or in the alternative, a contingency fee of up to 25 percent 
of the judgment. 228 
226Ibid., 14. 
227Ibid., 16-17. 
228Ibid., 26-27. 
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While the Indiana General Assembly did not pass legislation substantially 
similar to either committee's recollllnendations, the proposals of the Indiana Bar 
Association shed light upon the struggle surrounding workers' cornpensation and 
offer insight as to the temper of the Indiana legal cornrnunity. 
The State Bar Association was not the only interest group discussing change 
to employers' liability law. Other organizations and groups also lobbied to ensure 
their interests were represented in any workers' compensation legislation. 
Insurance companies offering industrial insurance229 supported the passage of 
compulsory workers' compensation legislation. 230 Prior to the passage of 
obligatory statutes, insurance cornpanies sold their products directly to industrial 
corporations or individuals. But industrial corporations were unlikely to purchase 
insurance plans because the expense cut into their profit rnargin. Alternatively, if 
the corporations elected to pass the cost along to the workers by reducing wages, 
they would cease to offer competitive pay. Individuals were rarely able to 
229Industrial insurance included life insurance, what we would today tenn 
disability insurance, burial insurance, or rnedical insurance to pay for injuries. 
Employees could carry one of these policies or rnore than one. 
23
°Charles Richtnond Henderson, Industrial Insurance in the United States 
(Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1909), 162-67. 
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purchase cotnprehensive policies because they were too expensive. 231 For these 
reasons, few people carried industrial insurance policies. 
A compulsory workers' cotnpensation law, forcing all etnployers to 
maintain accident insurance, would tnean a captive and lucrative tnarket for 
insurance companies. Still, tnost insurance cotnpanies lobbied for a national 
workers' cotnpensation plan. Individual states had been reluctant to be the first to 
pass compulsory workers' compensation insurance laws "since the tnanufacturers 
and traders of each state [were] in competition with those of all other states. "232 
Insurance companies could also decrease their sales force by selling and 
maintaining plans of larger cotnpanies rather than individual etnployees. 
Workers also supported cotnprehensive cotnpensation legislation, yet 
individual workers lacked the power available to the Indiana Bar Association or 
the insurance lobby. Workers did, however, increase their power by joining 
unions. Union support for workers' cotnpensation legislation was not strong in the 
early twentieth century but quickly gained motnentutn nationally.233 Earlier 
attetnpts at comprehensive workers' insurance were generally tnet with resistance 
231 Studies frotn several states done in 1901 show that tnost fatnilies of 
industrial laborers lived with a "narrow margin between incotne and subsistence." 
It took only "a few weeks of sickness or incapacity through accidents, and the 
major reserve is consumed, and the fatnily faces want and dependence on charity; 
for little savings and feeble credit on honor or pawn will not go far." Henderson, 
Industrial Insurance, 46-4 7. 
232Ibid., 59. 
233Ibid., 61. 
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as unions viewed these efforts as "attempts to cotnpel the worktnen to pay an 
excessive share of the premiutns, to break the power of the union and alienate its 
members. "234 
By the tum of the century, Indiana was one of the stronger union states, and 
workers had campaigned and obtained hnprovetnents pritnarily due to strong 
skilled trade unions.235 However the power of Indiana's unions dwindled during 
the first two decades of the twentieth century, as etnployers and businesstnen 
began an antiunion campaign which lessened the power of the union lobby.236 
Union metnbers and those representing their interests opposed earlier attetnpts at 
limiting employers' liability because early proposals 1nodified the cotnn1on law 
defenses (i.e., fellow-servant, contributory negligence, and assutnption of risk) 
rather than changing the systetn. 237 
Business and labor alike saw the need for workers' cotnpensation 
legislation. The previous etnployers' liability acts failed to provide consistent and 
fair relief. Other states, as well as other countries, faced sitnilar diletntnas as the 
industrial workplace became tnore dangerous and tnore workers were injured. 
234Ibid. 
235Jatnes H. Madison, The Indiana Way: A State History (Indianapolis: 
Indiana University Press, 1986), 166. For more infonnation on Indiana's unions, 
see Clifton J. Phillips, Indiana in Transition: The Emergence of an Industrial 
Commonwealth (Indianapolis: Indiana Historical Bureau and Indiana Historical 
Society, 1968), 323-60. 
236Madison, The Indiana Way, 166. 
237Indiana Bar Association, "Etnployers' Liability," 14. 
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Some states and nations had already passed workers' cotnpensation legislation. 
With this growing problem on many different agendas, the Indiana General 
Assembly on March 15, 1913, responded by creating a cotrunission to investigate 
the state's need for workers' cotnpensation legislation. The sarne year, the General 
Assembly addressed other progressive refonns like a state inheritance tax, the 
creation of a public utilities commission, and a broad primary election law. 238 
The Indiana Worktnen' s Compensation Collllnission was designed to 
examine the "comparative efficiency, cost, justice, tnerits and defects of the laws 
of other industrial states and countries. "239 The legislature directed the governor to 
appoint five cotnmissioners, one of whom was required to be an etnployer of labor 
and at least one who had to be an industrial laborer. Governor Satnuel Ralston 
appointed Henry W. Bullock, an Indianapolis attorney, as chainnan; Williatn 
Greene, a union In ember frotn Indianapolis; John E. Frederick, a Kokotno steel 
executive; Alfred M. Ogle, a Terre Haute coal executive; and Charles Fox, a union 
member from Terre Haute, to the cotnmission.240 The General Assetnbly and 
Ralston hoped to develop a workers' cotnpensation bill that would represent the 
interests of both union members and business executives. 
238Phillips, Indiana in Transition, 120. 
239 Laws of the State of Indiana, 1913 (Indianapolis, 1913 ), 897. 
240Bullock, "Workmen's Cotnpensation," i. 
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In addition to their study of legislation from other states and countries, the 
Workmen's Compensation Cotrunission tnet with labor and etnployer 
representatives, and studied several types of cotnpensation systems. Chainnan 
Bullock described that the cotnmission's initial report stated that both etnployers 
and etnployees were eager to adopt a fair cotnpensation law. 241 He reported that 
the commission favored state-sponsored insurance plans coupled with a state 
board, rather than allowing private insurers or etnployers to distribute 
compensation, fearing adjusters interested in profits would not be itnpartial in the 
settlement of claiins. He stated that the state board was necessary to prevent an 
adjuster telling an injured worker, "[t]ake this stnall mnount in full settlen1ent or 
quit your job. "242 The commission recotnmended that a single state body be in 
charge of workplace inspections, as well as gathering labor statistics and tnanaging 
compensation review. However, he aclmowledged that industrial and insurance 
lobbies had defeated previous attempts in Indiana to create such a body.243 Instead 
Bullock and his fellow cotntnissioners supported a law siinilar to those in New 
York, West Virginia, Ohio, California, Washington, and Oregon, where all 
241 Ibid., 1-4. The first report of the Indiana Worktnen's Compensation 
Commission apparently no longer exists. The report could not be found with other 
materials cited herein at the Indiana State Library, the Indiana State Archives, the 
Indiana Historical Society, or the current state agency that oversees 1nodern 
workers' cotnpensation claims. Bullock's report is used as a substitute since he 
presented the commission's findings. 
242Ibid., 2. 
243Phillips, Indiana in Transition, 336-337. 
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adjustments were made by a state compensation board and employers could choose 
to take part in a state-sponsored fund or maintain private insurance. However, the 
commission knew that excluding the option for private insurance would alienate 
the powerful insurance lobby and lessen the bill's viability. 
The commission also argued that worker's cotnpensation legislation was 
needed because insurance companies and attorneys were collecting nearly half of 
all the amounts employers paid to insure against workplace accidents. The 
cotnmission believed that 1nost of these tnonies should be paid to injured workers. 
On behalf of the commission, Bullock stated that "employers pay a dollar to 
insurance companies to every fifty cents that the workmen receive, and then 
innutnerable swarms of ambulance-chasing adjusters and lawyers have cotne forth 
to fleece the workmen by soliciting their cases."244 The solution was workers ' 
cotnpensation legislation. 
Bullock gave a speech regarding the cotntnission's findings to the Indiana 
Bar Association in July, 1913 ?45 His recotnmendations differed fron1 the 1911 
Bar Association's Committee Reports discussed above. He asked for the Bar 
Association's assistance in securing workers' compensation legislation. The 
commission needed the association's support because so tnany mef!lbers of the 
Indiana Bar were either legislators or tnade a significant part of their living 
244Bullock, "Workmen's Compensation," 3. 
245Ibid. 
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litigating or defending personal injury cases anstng frotn workplace injury. 
Bullock's address, as the chairman of the Workmen's Compensation Cotn1nission, 
to the Indiana Bar Association stands as one of the few docutnented reports frotn 
the cotnmission and sheds a great deal of light upon their findings and 
recommendations which eventually became the basis for the 1915 Workn1en ' s 
Compensation Act. 
According to Bullock's speech, the cotmnission put forth several reasons 
why Indiana should move to a bureaucratic cotnpensation systetn based upon 
social and economic conditions rather than continue to adjudicate individuals ' 
cases under a liability system based on fault. First, the cotntnission argued that 
only a small number of workers received substantial cotnpensation, which lowered 
the standard of living for those uncotnpensated. Second, the cotntnission believed 
the current systetn wasted resources because Indiana had to tnaintain courts that 
were flooded with employer's liability claims. Third, plaintiffs awarded 
compensation sacrificed a portion, sotnetimes a very large portion, to their 
attorneys. Fourth, the commission maintained that the cutTent systetn was slow to 
bring relief to the injured plaintiffs who were forced into lengthy settletnent 
negotiations or crowded court dockets when most of them needed itrunediate 
relief. Fifth, the liability systetn based on fault bred antagonism between etnployer 
and etnployee. Finally, the cotmnission reasoned that the fault-based systetn 
placed the burden of suffering upon the injured worker and upon the society that 
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had to care for him, rather than dividing the burden between etnployee and 
etnployer. 246 
Bullock explained that the cotrunission also shared the concerns of the Bar 
Association that a compulsory workers' compensation law tnight not pass 
constitutional muster. Bullock, speaking on behalf of the cotntnission, argued that 
"[p ]rivate wrongs or torts are personal; but the injuries occurring frotn the inherent 
hazards of industry are not personal, and should be charged against the industry as 
a whole, and not against the individual etnployer. "247 The cotntnission wanted the 
Bar Association's members to view workers' cotnpensation laws as guarding 
against injury to an industry, rather than as penalizing individual etnployers \Vho 
would be forced to pay without the opportunity for a trial. 
Bullock also pointed out that the legislature was free to tnodify the legal 
concepts of the fellow-servant rule, assumption of risk, and contributory 
negligence. He illustrated the various ways other states had used their police 
power to allocate resources. 248 Bullock explained that the Workn1en' s 
Compensation Commission attempted to secure support for their findings by 
eliminating constitutional concerns by characterizing their recotnmendations as 
social insurance rather than a penalty for business owners. Finally, Bullock 
246Ibid. 
247Ibid., 4. 
248Ibid. 
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suggested that the cost of caring for injured workers could be tacked on to the cost 
of production and passed along to the consumer?49 
The commission had met and tnade its recotnmendations, a sutntnary of 
which are in Bullock's speech to the Indiana Bar Association, in 1913 and hoped 
to make progress at the next General Assetnbly session in 1915. After speeches 
like the one Bullock gave to the Indiana Bar Association, as well as sirnilar 
speeches to union leaders and business executives, the time for workers' 
cotnpensation legislation had arrived. 
Bringing the commission's findings to fruition, Representative Williatn I-I. 
Sare proposed a workers' cotnpensation bill on January 26, 1915.250 In only two 
1nonths the measure moved quickly through both the Indiana House and Senate 
with little opposition. Governor Satnuel M. Ralston signed the bill into law on 
March 8, 1915, and the act took effect on September 1, 1915.251 The relative ease 
and speed with which the workers' compensation bill progressed through the 
General Assembly demonstrates the growing support for such legislation. 
The Workmen's Compensation Act of 1915 created an Industrial Board of 
three full-time metnbers appointed by the governor to oversee and enforce the 
249Ibid., 6. 
250/ndiana House Journal, 1915 (Indianapolis: WM. B. Burford, 1915), 
236. 
251 Ibid., 1641. 
126 
act.252 The Industrial Board absorbed the powers and duties of the State Bureau of 
Inspection, which included the inspection of buildings, factories, workshops, 
boilers, and 1nines, along with the powers and duties of the Labor Co1nn1ission. 253 
The Industrial Board was granted the power to 1nake rules to enforce the 1915 
act. 254 It could "subpoena witnesses, adtninister or cause to have adtninistered 
oaths, and to examine or cause to have examined such parts of the books and 
records of the parties to a proceeding as relate to questions in dispute. "255 The 
board was also responsible for collecting information for accident reports. 256 
The structure of the 1915 act reflected the Commission's findings and 
recotntnendations. The 1915 act stated that all employees and etnployers, other 
than those involved in interstate commerce (i.e., transporting goods and services 
across state lines), were included, unless either the employee or the employer opted 
out In ore than thirty days before an accident. 257 The 1915 act also provided that 
notice of opting out of the legislation had to be in writing, posted conspicuously in 
the workplace, and filed with the Industrial Board. Procedures to opt out of the act 
252 Laws of the State of Indiana, 1915 (Indianapolis, 1915), chap. 106, sec. 
50, 406-7. 
253Ibid., sees. 50-54, 407-8. 
254Ibid., sec. 54, 408. 
255Ibid., sec. 55. 
256Ibid., sec. 56, 409. 
257Ibid., sees. 2-3, 19, 392, 396. Interstate comtnerce is governed by federal 
law, which falls outside the scope of this paper. For more infonnation on federal 
railroad law, see Jatnes W. Ely, Jr., Railroads and A1nerican Law (Lawrence: 
University Press of Kansas, 2001 ). 
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were closely monitored so that employers did not pressure etnployees to give up 
the rights created by the new legislation. Furthennore, certain classes of 
etnployees (e.g., casual laborers, farm or agricultural laborers, and dotnestic 
employees) were excluded frotn the act's jurisdiction altogether.258 
In Indiana workers' compensation was now the exclusive retnedy: 
participating injured employees could no longer make cotntnon law claitns of 
negligence against their etnployers.259 If an etnployer (or the etnployer and 
etnployee in concert) elected not to participate in workers' cotnpensation, the 
employer was denied the coffilnon law defenses of contributory negligence, the 
fellow-servant rule, or assumption ofrisk.260 However, if the etnployee wished not 
to participate, the employer was then allowed to use the cotnmon law defenses.261 
The employee could take his chance if he desired, but he could not take advantage 
of the new legislation that did away with the employers' defenses. 
The 1915 act contained additional provisions that protected etnployers. The 
legislature provided that self-inflicted injuries would not be cotnpensated. 
Specifically, the 1915 act stated that etnployees would be denied recovery if "an 
injury or death [was] due to the employe's [sic] willful misconduct, including 
258 Laws of the State of Indiana, 1915 (Indianapolis, 1915), chap. 106, sec. 
11, 394-95. 
259Ibid., sec. 6, 393. 
260Ibid., sees. 10-12, 394-95. 
261 Ibid., sec. 11. 
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intentional self-inflicted injury, intoxication, and willful failure or refusal to use a 
safety appliance or perform a duty required by statute. "262 The legislature placed 
the burden of proving the employee's culpability finnly on the defendant 
employer.263 In addition, if sotneone other than an employer caused the injury, the 
harmed employee could still collect under worker's cotnpensation. The 1915 act 
created a right for employers to recover against third parties, like sub-contractors, 
if the employer could prove the third party was negligent. 264 
The 1915 act also laid out the requirements for tnaintaining insurance and 
reporting accidents. The legislature tnandated that every etnployer falling under 
the purview of the statute must either hold workers' cotnpensation insurance 
through a state-approved insurance company or maintain a financial reserve to pay 
compensation directly to injured etnployees. 265 The 1915 act further required that 
employers keep thorough records of all injuries and report these injuries to the 
Industrial Board in a timely manner?66 Employers who refused to cotnply were 
subject to harsh financial penalties. Compulsory insurance as well as detailed 
report forms were a drastic deviation from pre-workers' compensation legislation. 
Employers gave up their autonotny for the reliability of fixed insurance costs. 
262Ibid., sec. 8, 394. 
263Ibid. 
264Ibid., sec. 13-14, 395-96. 
265Ibid., sees. 69-75,413-15. 
266Ibid., sec. 67, 412. 
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The 1915 act set strict payment parameters. Unlike the cotntnon law 
system, employees no longer negotiated their benefits. The act stated that the 
employer was responsible for the employee's medical bills resulting fro1n the 
accident and expenses based upon the typical cotnmunity standards for treating the 
employee's injury.267 Furthermore, during the etnployee's resulting disability, the 
Industrial Board required the employee to subtnit to 1nedical testing. 268 Prior to the 
1915 act's passage, injured employees paid for any medical expenses, which they 
could include in claims against their etnployers, provided they could detnonstrate 
negligence and overcome the employers' common law defenses. In reality, this 
requirement often meant that the injured went without proper 1nedical care because 
of the cost. Securing itrunediate 1nedical benefits for workplace injuries was a 
major victory for workers. 
Despite immediate coverage of tnedical bills an injured etnployee could not 
collect lost wages or other cotnpensation for the first fourteen calendar days of his 
disability.269 Legislators likely included a two-week waiting period to respond to 
the concerns of many etnployers and business owners who felt that workers ' 
compensation would encourage malingering. The two-week waiting period 
encouraged workers to return to work because few of thetn could afford to be 
267Ibid., sees. 25-27, 398-99. 
268Ibid., sec. 27, 399. 
269Ibid., sec. 28, 399-400. 
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without pay. Malingering was further discouraged because etnployees received 
less under workers' compensation than they earned when working. Most wage 
laborers need to work and could not afford the waiting period because they held 
low paying jobs, had little opportunity to save, and could not support their fatnilies 
on partial pay, or their children and wives were forced to work if they were not 
already working. 
The 1915 act also set forth paytnent schedules for those injured etnployees 
who could no longer work to their full capacity. An etnployee who was partially 
disabled by an accident was entitled to weekly cotnpensation equal to one-half of 
the difference between his previous weekly wages and his weekly wages after his 
injury for no In ore than three hundred weeks. 270 This calculation tneant that 
injured employees earned less than they did prior to their injury. If an etnployee 
refused to accept other suitable etnploytnent, he collected nothing. 271 An 
etnployee deetned totally disabled (tneaning he could no longer work) was entitled 
to only 55 percent of his average weekly wage for up to five hundred weeks. 272 
While those fixed amounts ensured sotne cotnpensation, 1nost wage laborers could 
not afford even a slight reduction in pay, let alone cutting their incotne in half. 
270Ibid., sec. 30, 400, 404. The act also established that average weekly 
wages for any injured employee would be no more than twenty-four dollars and no 
less than ten dollars. 
271 Ibid., sec. 32, 401. 
272Ibid., sec. 31, 400. 
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The 1915 act also determined the duration of compensation for each type of 
injury?73 Employees who lost either a thumb or one or two fingers were given 
fifteen weeks of compensation at 55 percent of their weekly compensation, while 
more than two fingers yielded thirty weeks of compensation at 55 percent of their 
weekly compensation. A worker whose injury resulted in pennanent and 
irrecoverable loss of sight earned one hundred weeks of cotnpensation at 55 
percent of their usual weekly pay, whereas cotnplete loss of hearing tneant partial 
pay for seventy-five weeks. An employee who lost a hand at or above the wrist 
was awarded 55 percent of his pay for one hundred and fifty weeks, while a leg at 
or above the knee joint provided one hundred and seventy-five weeks of partial 
compensation. All other cases of pennanent partial disability were detennined by 
the Industrial Board.274 Distnetnbennents and pennanent injuries also tneant that 
etnployees' future employment would be limited, which ahnost always 
substantially reduced subsequent earnings. 
The 1915 act also made provisions for dependents of deceased workers. 
Upon the death of an employee, their spouse and children were con1pensated based 
upon their level of dependence. If death from a workplace injury resulted within 
three hundred weeks of that injury, workers' cotnpensation insurance paid the 
burial expenses up to one hundred dollars and paid the etnployee's dependents 55 
273Ibid., 400-01. 
274Ibid., 401. 
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percent of the deceased employee's wages for the remainder of the three hundred 
week period. 275 If the dependents were deerned only partially reliant on the 
decedent's earnings, compensation was based on how much the decedent 
contributed to the household incorne?76 While this provision afforded irnrnediate 
and certain relief to dependents of those killed in workplace injuries, the relief was 
often not enough to support the decedent's farnily. 
The 1915 act represented a milestone for workers. It finally meant the end 
of the common law employers' defenses and guaranteed injured ernployees 
iffilnediate and certain relief. The 1915 act also rneant positive changes for 
employers. Ernployers could now plan for accident costs and purchase fixed cost 
insurance to pay for injuries, making their business costs rnuch rnore detenninable 
than under the cornmon law of ernployers' liability. 
While the 1915 act proved a great victory for progressives, workers, and 
rnany employers, it was not perfect. In 1917, the Indiana General Assetnbly tnade 
tninor changes to the Indiana Workmen's Cornpensation Act. 277 The changes can 
be characterized as generally favorable to ernployees. They closed sotne 
275Ibid., sec. 3 8, 402-3. 
276Ibid., sees. 37-38. The act defined a wife who lived with her husband at 
the tirne of his death as wholly dependent (up to the titne she remarried). The act 
defined a husband who lived with his wife and was incapable of self-support, a 
rnale child under the age of 18, a fernale child under the age of 18 and living at 
home, and physically or mentally incapacitated children as totally dependent. 
277Laws of the State of Indiana, 1917 (Indianapolis, 1917), chap. 63, sees. 
1-4, 154-56; chap. 81, sees. 1-3, 226-28; chap. 99, sees 1-4, 313-37. 
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procedural loopholes that had caused delays in payments to injured employees and 
their dependents. 278 These mnendments also sped up the appeals process, 
shortening times for filing briefs and adding penalties to awards that were held up 
in court by employers?79 Indiana legislators recognized the difficult situation 
employees faced if they lost two full weeks of pay and thus shortened the waiting 
period from fourteen days to seven. 280 They also tnade changes in the rules for 
etnployers' insurance policies, requiring etnployers to hold tnore funds in reserve 
or increase their insurance coverage. 281 
In 1919, the Indiana General Assetnbly also tnade significant changes to the 
Industrial Board. Board membership was increased from three to five seats, and 
the term was extended to four years?82 The legislature further required that two of 
the members be attorneys. 283 In 1929, the General Assetnbly consolidated the 
1915 Act and amendments into a new statute, approved March 14, 1929.284 
In December of 1915, Satnuel R. Artman, a tnetnber of the newly created 
Industrial Board, addressed the annual convention of the Indiana Manufacturers 
168. 
68. 
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280Ibid., chap. 81, sees. 1-3, 226-27. 
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Association on the success of the new workers' cotnpensation lavv.285 Artman's 
address shows the initial success of the workers' compensation law and sheds light 
on the foundations of the act. He reported that despite the impressions of many, 
the Indiana Workmen's Compensation Act was a response to labor and to 
employers alike. According to Artman, etnployers supported the legislation; their 
attitudes and actions after the legislature passed the act confinn that idea. 
Artman attributed part of the success of the act to the etnployers' ability to 
opt out of the act, although relatively few employers had done so. 286 Artlnan stated 
that overall employers were pleased with the law and its administration, explaining 
"[t]he number of employers that have manifested an obstinate and antagonistic 
attitude may easily be counted on the fingers of the two hands. "287 Artinan 
conceded that some employers had neither opted out nor tnade a showing of 
insurance as required by the act, but believed they were not the 1najority. 
Employers chose to purchase workers' cotnpensation insurance to benefit fro1n 
fixed costs and the absence of attorney's fees characteristic of an adjudicating 
285Samuel R. Artman, "Co-operation of Etnployers with the Industrial 
Board of Indiana on Compensation and Accident Prevention" (paper presented at 
the Second Annual Convention of the Indiana Manufacturers Association, 
Claypool Hotel, Indianapolis, December 8, 1915), Indiana State Library, 
Indianapolis. 
2860nly 2,503 of the state's etnployers exetnpted thetnselves fro1n the act 
because of the relatively low accident rates in their trades. These were tnostly 
stnall employers, employing largely professionaltnen and barbers. Ibid., 3-4. 
287Ibid., 4. 
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regtme. Lower costs for cotnpensation insurance appealed to many business1nen 
who could pass some of their savings along to consurners and still earn a greater 
profit. 288 And workers' compensation created better relationships between 
employees and employers. Artman noted that all parties were satisfied: "the 
systern has produced a condition of hannony and a spirit of fraternity between 
ernployer and the employe [sic], and that strained relations have disappeared."289 
Aside from speeches like Artn1an' s, state reports also show the success of 
the 1915 legislation. Beginning in 1917, two years after the act's passage, the 
Industrial Board issued a yearly report to the governor, which was reprinted in the 
Indiana Yearbook. During the first year of statutory workers' cornpensation, 
36,176 workers made claims for cornpensation totaling $893,433.28.290 During the 
second year the Industrial Board reported, 42,253 workers rnade clain1s for 
compensation totaling $1,282,297.40.291 The report also indicated that injured 
workers and employers were relatively satisfied with the new systern as only 2.1 
percent of the claims for cornpensation resulted in court contests. 292 
288Ibid., 8. 
289Ibid., 9. 
290Jndiana Yearbook, 1917, 389-90. 
291 Ibid. The Industrial Board attributed the rise in the number of accidents 
from one year to the next to an increase in the number of young unskilled workers 
and the increase in industrial pressure as the nation stepped up production for 
World War I. 
292Ibid. 
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In the 1918 Indiana Yearbook, the Industrial Board conveyed that "[ w ]e are 
gratified to report that the basic principles of adtninistration, as expressed in the 
Indiana Workmen's Compensation Law have been proven sound. "293 The Board 
found that injured workers were paid benefits without delay, conflicts and contests 
over payment were quickly resolved, and the number of industrial accidents 
(proportionate to population and industry) was declining.294 In 1917, there were 
37,520 accidents. 
The 1919 Indiana Yearbook also claitned that industrial accidents were 
declining because prevention had become a priority under the workers' 
compensation system?95 In 1918, 35,232 accidents were recorded; 745 involved 
dismetnbennent and 268 resulted in death.296 The railroads reported 3,915 
injuries--25 dismemberments and 29 fatalities?97 In 1919, there were 42,994 
accidents, 919 of which were distnetnberments and 291 fatalities. 298 In 1920, there 
were 34,369 accidents reported, 617 of which were distnetnbennents and 263 
fatalities. 299 Of those 34,369 accidents, 3,041 were in the railroad industry, 18 of 
which were fatalities. 300 
293Indiana Yearbook, 1918, 453. 
294Ibid. 
295 Indiana Yearbook, 1919, 262. 
296Ibid. 
297Ibid. Railroads reported specific information for the first titne in 1919. 
298Indiana Yearbook, 1920, 670. 
299Indiana Yearbook, 1921, 456. 
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The 1915 act brought significant changes to employers' liability law. Prior 
to its passage, injured workers were forced to turn to the court systetn for redress, 
despite the early attetnpts at offering workers some relief passed in 1893, 1899, 
and 1911. After the enactment of comprehensive legislation, workers could rely 
on iminediate and certain relief for workplace injuries. The systetn established by 
the General Assembly in 1915 ignored any detennination of fault and sitnply paid 
workers for all workplace injuries. 
This transfonnation also significantly changed the relationship between 
etnployer and employee, making it less confrontational but also more paternal. For 
exmnple, a poster from a Fort Wayne company, S.F. Bowser & Cotnpany, urged 
employees to do all they could to prevent accidents: 
"We can't put a guard on YOU-personal care is YOUR guard. Put 
it on and keep it on. It pays more than the law will pay . . . . BE 
CAREFUL! You owe it to yourself, to your fatnily, to your cotnpany 
and to society in general. Let's get into this fight against injury-
and win. We want to help you and want you to help us. "30 1 
Workers also gave up the possibility of larger verdicts for stnaller paytnents for 
injuries while employers accepted and budgeted for the cost of workplace injury. 
301 Artman, "Co-operation of Employers with the Industrial Board of 
Indiana," 11. 
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Worker's compensation proved not to be the end of struggle for 1nost wage 
laborers but it represented significant itnprovement in the status of tnost workers. 
Indiana's attempts at strong employers' liability defenses prior to the passage of 
the 1915 act were weak at best. The 1893 act, along with 1899 and 1911 
modifications, were not able to address the problematic uncertainty of legal 
adjudication of workplace accident claims. These acts, while offering statutory 
support to the common law of negligence, did nothing to end or substantially curb 
the use of the employers' defenses of fellow-servant, contributory negligence, and 
assumption of risk. 
Indiana refonners and legislators saw that other states and nations were 
adopting no fault cotnprehensive workers' cotnpensation systetns and began to 
consider supporting similar legislation. Support for change was widespread and 
included attorneys, insurance cotnpanies, workers, and unions. Only two years 
after the Indiana Workmen's Compensation Cominission presented their ideas, the 
legislature passed a thorough workers' cotnpensation statue. This statute 
transformed and modernized the way injured workers were treated in Indiana. 
After the passage of the 1915 act, employees received reliable and 
itntnediate compensation for all workplace injuries. Injured etnployees were paid a 
set amount for a pre-detennined time span based upon their specific injury and 
level of disability. All employers were required to participate, so paytnent for 
workplace injuries became considered a fixed business expense and business 
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owners no longer spent countless dollars in court defending claims of negligence. 
Businesses were required by the 1915 Statute to carry insurance to compensation, 
which allowed them to know their workplace injury budget in advance so they 
could build it into the cost of their goods and services. The Indiana Worklnen' s 
Compensation Act did what the courts and the legislature in Indiana had 
previously been unable to do, bring continuity to employers' liability law. 
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CONCLUSION 
Indiana's move frotn common law employers' liability to a no fault 
compensation system was not an easy transition, despite the speed with which the 
Worktnen' s Compensation Act passed. At the end of the nineteenth century, 
Indiana was a primarily rural community with a preindustrial econotny. Most 
Hoosiers were either self-employed farmers or craftstnen working at hotne or in 
stnall shops. When work-related injuries occurred, workers relied on their 
families, friends, and community until they could return to work. 
Industrialization transformed the workplace, as the self-etnployed artisan 
gave way to the wage laborer. It also changed traditional notions of work, 
production, community, and the relationship between etnployer and etnployee. 
Industrialization also produced tnore workplace injuries than ever before. Injured 
workers turned to the legal system for redress, and judges turned to the cotntnon 
law for answers. The com1non law stated that etnployers were only liable for 
harms done to employees if the etnployer was negligent. Absent a showing of 
fault on the part of an employer, an employee could not recover. The common law 
also afforded etnployers three defenses to help overcotne work-related personal 
injury claims: the fellow-servant defense, contributory negligence defense, and 
assumption of risk defense. 
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Through the examination of Indiana Supretne Court decisions this study 
shows that the employers' liability defenses and the negligence standard itself 
worked to transfer the cost of industrialization to the worker. Injured etnployees 
had to sue their employers to claitn any datnages at all. Etnployees often failed to 
file negligence suits against their employers because work was often in short 
supply and they did not want to damage their chances of returning to the srune jobs 
after their recovery. Even in some of the tnost egregious cases where etnployees 
were clearly placed in the path of danger or given substandard tools to cotnplete 
their jobs, the courts ruled in favor of the defendant etnployers. 
Broadly, this thesis builds upon the conclusions of legal historians like 
Lawrence M. Friedman, Morton J. Horwitz, and Kennit L. Hall finding that law 
and society are intertwined. Still, Indiana's experience with workers' 
cotnpensation law both challenges and agrees with their conclusions. Friedtnan 
contends that tort law and the railroads grew up together. In a sense this is true, 
however while the railroads and tort law may have grown frotn infancy to 
adolescence at the same time, in Indiana, the railroads continued to tnature while 
tort law (as it related to railroad injures) retnained stagnant throughout tnost of the 
period studied. Horwitz sees workers' compensation largely as a conspiracy of big 
business to keep workplace injury costs down at the expense of laborers and 
consutners. However, this study shows that laborers experienced the satne 
uncertainty as business in the Indiana court system and likely supported 
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compensation legislation. This study agrees most with Hall, concluding that 
workers' compensation was a 1neans for the legislature to distribute the cost of 
accidents. 
The adoption of workers' cotnpensation In Indiana also represents a 
struggle between the state courts and the legislature. Both bodies tnake law and 
while they often work with one another to provide consistent laws, workers ' 
compensation did not follow this pattern. Throughout the period studied the 
Indiana Supreme Court remained conservative and rarely swayed by progressive 
thought. The Court remained laissez-faire because their decisions affinned, rather 
than challenged, the existing colllinon law. This thesis shows that the Indiana 
Supreme Court remained an observer, rather than an actor, in the struggle between 
workers and railroads. In the period studied, the Cou11 failed to develop a 
cotnprehensive body of case law that either equitably or reliably distributed the 
cost of industrial accidents. A railroad worker injured in 1880 and one injured in 
1914 faced the same uncertainty of recovery despite the sweeping developtnents in 
the economy and political philosophy. The Court was laissez-faire in the truest 
sense of the word--it did nothing. 
The General Assembly, while initially reluctant to challenge the status quo, 
eventually passed progressive legislation in only a few years. The legislation 
passed before 1915 represented the same acceptance of the status quo that the 
Court demonstrated in its body of case law. Injured workers could rely no tnore on 
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the pre-1915 acts to estimate their success before the bench than on the Court's 
atnbivalent body of case law. Finally, the 1915 act drarnatically changed the 
adjudication of workplace accidents and shifted the cost of injuries firn1ly to 
businesses. This action removed the detennination of liability from the courts 
altogether and established a non-judicial Industrial Board to oversee workers' 
compensation. The General Assernbly acted to redistribute the cost of workplace 
accidents because the Court did not. 
Indiana's experience provides an interesting example of the transition of a 
state's employers' liability laws because Indiana was not atnong the first or last 
states to pass workers' compensation legislation. Therefore, Indiana benefited 
from the early atternpts of other states, such as New York, that failed on 
constitutional grounds. Indiana passed cornpensation legislation that quickly 
gained acceptance and avoided the constitutional challenges faced by other states. 
Also, in Indiana, as in most of the nation, the railroads (and to a lesser extent 
interubrans) were the consurnrnate symbol of industrialization. Railroads were a 
vital part of Indiana's econorny as they rneant the ability to quickly transport raw 
materials and finished goods. Because there were so many miles of railroad tracks, 
ample Indiana Supreme Court cases involving railroad employee injuries are 
available for study. Yet, because Indiana did not have as large of a case load as 
other states, like New York, it was feasible to analyze several decades. 
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Looking at railroad-worker injury cases decided by the Indiana Supretne 
Court between 1880 and 1915 reveals little consistency. This exmnination also 
shows the failure of the Court to develop a body of case law to effectively n1anage 
workplace injury claims. Generally, cotnrnon law evolves over time to tneet the 
demands of society, but that did not happen in Indiana. As railroads becan1e In ore 
secure and the effects of industrialization became tnore apparent, the Indiana 
Supreme Court failed to change the common law of employers' liability. 
Often two cases with very similar fact patterns had cotnpletely different 
outcomes and few clues in the cases explaining why. This ambiguity gave injured 
workers and their employers little guidance as to the strength of potential cases, 
and possibly discouraged injured employees from seeking dmnages. Furthennore, 
sending a message that all claims would be judged on a case-by-case basis, without 
true adherence to precedent, encouraged railroads to litigate claiins rather than 
offer settlements. Finally, the lack of continuity in judgments gave etnployers like 
the railroads exatnined in Chapter 3 no real incentive to provide safer work 
enviromnents. 
Specifically, Chapter 3 and the Appendixes illustrate the unpredictability 
injured plaintiffs would face in determining whether to sue their etnployers. Of the 
three available defenses--fellow-servant, contributory negligence, and assumption 
of risk--the fellow-servant concept proved to be the tnost effective for railroad 
defendants. The Court found for the railroads based on the fellow-servant defense 
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almost 60 percent of the time. The Court did attempt to ameliorate the effects of 
this by developing an exception, the "vice-principal" rule, which held etnployers 
responsible for injuries caused by supervisors. However, this litnited exception 
was narrowly interpreted and proved not to tetnper the use of the fellow-servant 
defense by the railroads. 
As government curtailed other benefits (e.g., tax exetnptions, land grants, 
state, federal and local funding) that had protnoted railroad developtnent, the 
employers' liability defenses tnade less sense. By the late nineteenth century, 
railroads and industries sytnbolized wealth and power while uncotnpensated 
railroad workers sytnbolized the evils of industrialization. Yet so long as the legal 
system allowed the defenses, industrialists continued to use thetn. 
Indiana's experience was similar to that of other states, and this survey 
broadly supports state studies on the adoption of workers' cotnpensation. While 
no other inquiries exist specifically on state supreme court decisions, scholars 
characterize workers' cotnpensation as a cooperative tneasure between business 
and labor created by state legislatures. As economists Shawn Everett Kantor and 
Price V. Fishback show in their exmnination Missouri also benefited frotn diverse 
support for workers' compensation frotn etnployers, labor unions, and bar 
associations. 
Furthermore, Indiana and Washington shared sitnilarities. Joseph Tripp's 
study of the Washington lumber industry shows that lutnber etnployers, facing the 
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rising cost of litigation began to support compensation legislation only after they 
realized that they could no longer rely on consistent judgments. Indiana railroad 
executives, like the lurnber industry executives, likely came to support 
cornpensation legislation when court adjudication proved unpredictable. 
This thesis also shows that Indiana followed the early states passtng 
compensation legislation, like New York. Robert F. Wesser's study of New York 
shows that the legislature passed a law supported by of business and labor alike. 
Robert Asher's analysis ofNew York workers' cornpensation legislation shows the 
important influence of progressive reformers in New York. In Indiana workers' 
compensation legislation passed arnidst the wave of progressive refonns accepted 
by the Indiana General Assembly between 1913 and 1915. 
While this thesis does not examine Indiana's Progressive movernent tn 
depth, the speed with which the Indiana Workmen's Compensation Act passed 
through the General Assernbly stands as proof of the influence of the Progressive 
Movernent. While the Indiana Suprerne Court apparently ren1ained itnmune to the 
widespread changes brought about by the Progressive Movement, the Indiana 
General Assembly did not. Only two years after the formation of the Workrnen's 
Compensation Commission, the General Assembly passed cornprehensive 
legislation removing forever the adjudication of workplace injury disputes frorn 
the courts. The 1915 Workmen's Compensation Act still serves as the basic 
underpinning of the present Indiana Workers' Cornpensation system. 
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CASE 
Turner v. City of 
Indianapolis 
(96 Ind. 51) 
The Terre Haute 
and Indianapolis 
Railroad Company 
v. McMurray (98 
Ind. 358) 
The Indiana Car 
Company v. 
Parker 
( 100 Ind. 181) 
The Atlas Engine 
Works v. Randall 
(100 Ind. 293) 
APPENDIX A 
THE FELLOW-SERVANT DEFENSE 
1880-1915 
YEAR I WINNER 
1883 
18 84 1 Affirmed for 
Plaintiff 
1885 I Affirmed for 
Plaintiff 
1885 1 Reversed for 
Defendant 
(with costs) 
INFORMATION 
Not a railroad case. 
The Plaintiff, a braketnan, had his foot crushed and needed iinmediate 
surgical attention. The train conductor retained a surgeon and the 
Defendant (RR cotnpany) did not want to pay but trial court ruled the 
railroad was responsible. Generally, train conductors cannot 1nake 
contracts with surgeons, but this case was an exception. The Court 
ruled that the facts of each case can affect who is held to be a fellow 
servant. 
The Plaintiff was injured (fingers cut off and hand paralyzed) by 
running a cut-off saw (circular) on a grooved table when the rope that 
held the saw back broke. The foreman knew of the problem with the 
rope. The Court ruled the Defendant was negligent for purchasing and 
maintaining faulty machinery and directing employee to work on it. 
The court ruled that the fellow-servant defense cannot be used to 
delegate safety enforcement. 
Not a railroad employee 
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CASE 
The Indianapolis 
and St. Louis 
Railway Company 
v.Johnson 
(102 Ind. 352) 
The Pittsburgh, 
Cincinnati and St. 
Louis Railway 
Company v. Kirk 
(1 02 Ind. 399) 
The Indianapolis 
and St. Louis 
Railway Company 
v. Johnson 
(102 Ind. 352) 
The Lake Shore 
and Michigan 
Southern Railway 
Company v. 
Stupak 
(108 Ind. 1) 
The Indiana, 
Bloomington and 
Western Railway 
Cotnpany v. 
Dailey 
(110 Ind 75) 
YEAR I WINNER 
1885 1 Reversed for 
Defendant 
1885 1 Affinned for 
Plaintiff 
1885 I Petition for 
rehearing by 
Plaintiff denied 
18 86 I Reversed for 
Defendant 
1887 I Reversed for 
Defendant 
INFORMATION 
The Plaintiff, a switchman, caught his foot in the rails while coupling 
cars and an engine backed up injuring him. The Court found the 
complaint failed to allege anyone other than a fellow servant caused the 
injury. The Court firmly holds that if a fellow servant causes an injury, 
the master is not liable. 
Not a fellow servant case. 
The Plaintiff failed to show that the fellow servant was really a master. 
The Plaintiff was a braketnan who also occasionally loaded cars. The 
Court ruled that, in determining whether an employee is a fellow 
servant or stands in the shoes of the master, his title does not 1natter, 
only actions. 
The Plaintiff was injured by the actions of another employee who was 
negligently hired and retained. The Court found that the two 
employees were fellow servants and no recovery was available for the 
Plaintiff. However, the employee failed to allege he had no knowledge 
of the fellow servant's incompetence and may have therefore assutned 
the risk by his continued employment. 
The Plaintiff, a brakeman, was injured when an engineer brought a train 
onto the tracks without warning and because of a bad coupling pin in 
the tracks, the train ran into the Plaintiffs train. The Court found that 
the engineer and brakeman were fellow servants. 
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CASE YEAR WINNER INFORMATION 
Krueger, Adtnin. 1887 Reversed for If a 1naster delegates a duty to another employee, and an injury results 
v. The Louisville, Plaintiff from that action, the master cannot claitn the fellow-servant defense. 
New Albany and This negligent act remains one of a master and not a fellow servant. 
Chicago Railroad 
Company 
( 111 Ind. 51) 
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CASE 
The Indianapolis 
and St. Louis 
Railway Company 
v. Watson 
(114 Ind. 20) 
YEAR I WINNER 
1887 1 Reversed for 
Defendant 
INFORMATION 
The Plaintiff, a night watchman, was injured when he fell into a hole 
and was injured because he did not have the light he requested. The 
Court touched on the fellow-servant defense in that the Defendant 
argued that the employee who failed to provide a lantern to the night 
watchtnan and the night watchman were fellow servants and the 
Defendant was not responsible for the injuries; however, the Court 
relied more heavily on other defenses. The Defendant also argued that 
the night watchman assumed the risks of employtnent when he 
continued to work after a defect is known. The Plaintiff was a night 
watchman and the Court ruled the employee should have a light to do 
duties but the railroad did not provide one, promised to but had not yet 
done so, and was injured because of this. In looking at the evidence the 
jury evaluated, the Court did not interpret a protnise because the other 
employee told he would be lucky to get a lantern in a month. The 
Court stated "[i]t is the application of the rule as made by the appellee, 
and the principle it asserts, that we deny." The Court found that it 
cannot be contributory negligence to continue to work without the 
lantern. Court is reluctant to make this decision but does. Employee 
assumed risk and was contributory negligence where he worked in the 
rail yard without a lantern. Although he informed the Defendant that he 
needed a lantern, it was unreasonable for him to continue working for 
the RR because of the immediate and great threat of harm. 
151 
CASE 
The Evansville 
and Terre Haute 
Railroad Cotnpany 
v. Guyton 
(115 Ind. 450) 
The Louisville, 
New Albany and 
Chicago Railway 
Cotnpany v. 
Sandford, Admin. 
(117 Ind. 265) 
The Cincinnati, 
Hamilton and 
Dayton Railroad 
Cotnpany v. 
McMullen 
Admin. 
(117 Ind. 439) 
YEAR 
1888 
1889 
1889 
WINNER 
Affirmed for 
Plaintiff 
Reversed for 
Defendant 
(petition for 
rehearing 
denied) 
Affirmed for 
Plaintiff (with 
costs) 
INFORMATION 
A conductor ran a train off schedule leading to the Plaintiffs injuries. 
The Defendant (RR company) argued that the conductor and the 
Plaintiff were fellow servants but this Court held that the Plaintiff 
should recover. The Court was persuaded by the fact that the conductor 
was recently promoted and 1nay not have been trained properly. A 
unique exception to the fellow-servant defense. 
The Plaintiff, a baggage tnaster, was injured when a bridge collapsed. 
The Defendant first argued that the fellow-servant defense applied 
because the baggage master Plaintiff was a fellow servant to the 
employee in charge of bridge safety. The Court ruled in favor of the 
Defendant but based its ruling in part on the other defenses. The 
Defendant railroad company argued that the Plaintiff assutned the risk 
of etnployment because he knew the bridge was in disrepair but 
continued to work. The Defendant also argued that the Plaintiff was 
contributorily negligent because he continued to work, despite 
dangerous conditions. 
The Plaintiff, a conductor of a railroad freight train, died while doing 
job when the handle of appliance broke causing him to lose balance and 
fall between the moving cars. The Defendant (RR company) contended 
that the death was due to the negligence of the inspector and that meant 
the fellow-servant defense would apply. The Court held that the 
fellow-servant defense did not apply. The Court found that the 
Defendant cannot delegate safety monitoring and claim a fellow-
servant defense when an injury occurs. 
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CASE 
The Cincinnati, 
Indianapolis, St. 
Louis and Chicago 
Railway Company 
v. Lang, Admin. 
(118 Ind. 579) 
Taylor v. The 
Evansville and 
Terre Haute 
Railroad Company 
(121 Ind. 124) 
The Lake Shore 
and Michigan 
Southern Railway 
Company v. 
Stupak 
(123 Ind. 210) 
Nail, Admin. v. 
The Louisville, 
New Albany and 
Chicago Railway 
Company 
(129 Ind. 268) 
YEAR 
1889 
1890 
1891 
WINNER 
Reversed for 
Defendant 
Reversed for 
Plaintiff 
Reversed for 
Defendant 
Affinned for 
Plaintiff 
INFORMATION 
The fellow-servant defense was available when one employee did not 
follow prescribed safety rules and that resulted in the injury of another 
employee. The Defendant (RR company) was liable for its own 
negligence, but not that of employees, where it established safety rules. 
This case also discussed contributory negligence. 
The Defendant's master mechanic, with sole charge of the railroad 
department where the Plaintiff worked, was considered a vice principal 
and not a fellow servant. The Court held that the two etnployees were 
not fellow servants because the master tnechanic controlled the 
department, and assigned the specific task from which injury resulted 
and employee had a duty to obey. 
The Plaintiff fell between two railroad cars and was permanently 
disabled when an engineer put an engine on the track without warning 
the Plaintiff. Although generally the tnaster is not liable for servant 
injury by a fellow servant, the master was liable for negligently 
retaining a careless or negligent servant. The Plaintiff argued that the 
Defendant (RR company) was negligent because it must hire competent 
workers. The Court found that the engineer and the Plaintiff were 
fellow servants. Not a great case because it was a question of how 
much jury knew and could know. 
The Court held that a vice principal continued to stand in the shoes of a 
master, and did not become a fellow servant when he ordered a servant 
to perform a specific task he does usually performed. 
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CASE I YEAR I WINNER 
Justice v. The 11892 I Affirmed for 
Pennsylvania Defendant 
Company 
(130 Ind. 321) 
Rush v. The Coal 11892 
Bluff Mining 
Company 
(131 Ind. 135) 
The Louisville, 1892 Affirmed for 
Evansville and St. Plaintiff with 
Louis costs 
Consolidated 
Railway Company 
v. Hanning, 
Admin. 
(131 Ind. 528) 
INFORMATION 
The Plaintiff, a railroad etnployee, was injured when he fell off a 
handcar operated by a section foreman while riding hotne at the end of 
the day. The Plaintiff argued that the fellow-servant rule did not apply 
because a section foreman was a vice principal to the Plaintiff. The 
Court disagreed and found that when employing and discharging 
servants, the section foretnan was a vice principal but the employees 
were fellow servants when out of his control and after their 
employment at the end of the day. The Court held that the section 
foreman was a fellow servant and the Plaintiff was precluded from 
recovery. 
Not a railroad case 
Plaintiff, a car repairer, was repairing a car on a side track underneath 
the car and was crushed by an approaching car that he did not see. The 
Plaintiff claimed that the Defendant (RR company) was negligent 
because it did not place signal flags at entrance to side track as was 
customary. Further, the Plaintiff argued that he did not usually repair 
on side tracks but rather in the warehouse so he was outside of normal 
scope of duties. The Defendant railroad company argued that the 
person in charge of placing signal flags was a fellow servant to the 
injured Plaintiff. The Court however held that the master had a duty to 
provide a safe workplace and cannot delegate that responsibility to a 
fellow servant. Also, the Court held that the Plaintiff did not assume 
the risk of injury. 
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CASE YEAR WINNER INFORMATION 
The Wabash and 1892 Affirmed for Mostly a case on procedure and jury instructions. Master bound to use 
Western Railway Plaintiff care, skills and prudence in selecting and maintaining tnachinery. 
Company v. 
Morgan 
( 132 Ind. 430) 
Clarke v. The 1892 Affirmed for The Plaintiff, a railroad etnployee, was injured when his supervisor 
Pennsylvania Defendant overtook him on a train causing the Plaintiff to fall off train and he was 
Company then hit by moving train. The Plaintiff argued that the fellow servant 
(132 Ind. 199) rule does not apply because it was his supervisor that caused the 
injuries. However, the Court found that the two etnployees were fellow 
servants because they were doing the same work and the Defendant 
prevailed. The Court also found that an action when done in response 
to itnminent danger was not contributorily negligent because different 
circumstances apply. 
Hoosier Stone 1892 Reversed for Not a railroad case 
Company v. Defendant and 
McCain, Admin. new trial 
(133 Ind. 231) 
Cleveland, 1893 Affirmed for Passenger, not an employee. 
Cincinnati, Plaintiff 
Chicago and St. 
Louis Railway 
Company v. 
Ketchatn 
(133 Ind. 346) 
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CASE 
The Evansville & 
Terre Haute 
Railroad Co. v. 
Duel 
(134 Ind. 156) 
The Cincinnati, 
Hamilton and 
Indianapolis RR 
Co. v. Madden 
(134 Ind. 462) 
The New York, 
Chicago and St. 
Louis Railroad 
Company v. 
Perriguey 
(138 Ind. 414) 
YEAR I WINNER 
1893 1 Reversed for 
Defendant 
1893 I Affirmed for 
Plaintiff 
1893 1 Reversed for 
Defendant 
INFORMATION 
The Plaintiff was repairing a train when the throttle valve which let in 
and cut off steam from the cylinders of the engine did not open and the 
engine tnoved suddenly. The Defendant (RR company) argued that the 
Plaintiff could not recover because it was a fellow servant who left the 
defective throttle on the engine. The Court found for the Defendant, 
but states that part of the reason was a flaw in the Plaintiffs complaint 
as he did not allege that his master knew of the danger. 
The Plaintiff, a track hand who cared for a section of track by cutting 
weeds, tamping ballasts, watching for and removing dangers from 
track, was asked to unload steel rails frotn the construction train, which 
was something different than traditionally he did. An engineer (known 
to be incotnpetent by the Defendant) jerked the train forward and the 
Plaintiff was injured and had to have legs amputated. The Defendant 
argued that the Plaintiff and the engineer were fellow servants and that 
the Plaintiff was contributorily negligent. The Court found for the 
Plaintiff because he was not contributorily negligent in following orders 
unless the danger and peril to life and limb in the new service into 
which Plaintiff was ordered was so glaring that no prudent man would 
have entered into it. Generally rule is that servant accepts all ordinary 
dangers but does not fit when Plaintiff is asked to step out of ordinary 
role and do something else. 
The Plaintiff, an engineer, was hit and injured by another train whose 
engineer was conducting his train without a headlight. The Plaintiff 
argued that the Defendant (RR company) was liable because the other 
engineer, an employee of the Defendant's company, was negligently 
operating his train without a headlight. Still, the Court found that the 
injury was caused by a fellow servant and therefore bars recovery. 
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CASE 
The Louisville, 
New Albany and 
Chicago Railway 
Company v. 
Berkey, Admin. 
(136 Ind. 181) 
The Ohio and 
Mississippi 
Railway Company 
v. Dunn 
(138 Ind. 18) 
YEAR I WINNER 
1893 1 Affinned for 
Plaintiff 
18 94 1 Reversed for 
Defendant 
INFORMATION 
The Plaintiff, a front braketnan, was thrown off a train and killed when 
a bad coupling pin caused a train to derail. The Defendant (RR 
cotnpany) claimed that there were rules in place that the Plaintiff did 
not follow but evidence showed Plaintiff did not know of rules. The 
evidence also showed that master must have known about bad pin or 
must have with reasonable diligence and attention to business been able 
to know. The Court stated that, "[t]he rule appears to be that when it is 
shown that the master or his agent has placed a defective appliance in 
the hands of his servant, which occasioned his injury while in the 
exercise of due care and caution, the burden shifts, and the master is 
then required to show that he exercised due care in their selection or 
manufacture." The Court held that the fellow servant rule does not 
apply. 
The Plaintiff, a car coupler, was injured when an engineer negligently 
allowed a car onto the tracks. Further, the person acting as a switchtnan 
was actually a firetnan, who had occasionally served as engineer in a 
switch yard. The Plaintiff argued that putting the fireman in the role of 
engineer meant that the Defendant (RR company) was negligent 
because they knew the fireman did not have proper training but the 
Court does not agree. The Defendant argued that the fireman (turned 
engineer) was a fellow servant of the coupler and that this precluded 
recovery. The Court held that the Plaintiff and the fireman were fellow 
servants and ruled in favor of the Defendant. The Court found that a 
negligent employee is not the fault of the railroad company. 
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CASE 
The Evansville 
and Richmond 
Railroad Company 
v. Barnes 
(137 Ind. 306) 
The New York, 
Chicago and St. 
Louis Railroad 
Company v. 
Perriguey 
(138 Ind. 414) 
YEAR I WINNER 
1894 1 Reversed for 
Defendant 
1894 I Reversed for 
Defendant 
INFORMATION 
The Plaintiff, a railroad repair tnan, was injured while riding on a 
construction train when the train derailed frotn an incotnplete track. 
The Defendant (RR company) argued that the Plaintiff knew that the 
track was not all the way done and rode the train anyway and that the 
Plaintiff was a fellow servant with the engineer of the train. The Court 
agreed with the Defendant, finding the fellow-servant defense as well 
as the assumption of risk defense barred the Plaintiff's recovery. 
The Plaintiff, a brakeman, was injured when he went to the front of a 
train to relight a defective lantern and was thrown from the train. The 
Defendant's train had defective lantern and when the wind blows out 
the light, the brakeman was left in darkness and had to relight the 
lantern. The Court found that Plaintiff cannot recover against the 
Defendant (RR company) because it was the conductor's responsibility 
to make sure the light was lit properly. The Court held that the 
conductor and the braketnan were fellow servants and the Defendant 
was not liable for the injuries. 
Concur- Howard. Finds the fellow servant defense argument good but 
does not agree that contributory negligence on the part of an etnployee 
voids negligence on the part of the etnployer. 
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CASE 
The Pennsylvania 
Company v. 
McCaffrey, 
Admin. 
(139 Ind. 430) 
N ewtz v. Jackson 
Hill Coal and 
Colke Cotnpany 
(139Ind.411) 
Sheets, Admin., 
etc., v. Chicago 
and Indiana Coal 
Railway Company 
(139 Ind. 682) 
N eutz v. Jackson 
Hill Coal and 
Coke Company 
(139 Ind. 411) 
YEAR I WINNER 
18 94 1 Affinned for 
Plaintiff 
18 94 I Affirmed for 
Defendant 
1894 I Affirmed for 
Defendant 
1894 I Petition 
overruled 
INFORMATION 
Plaintiff, a railroad employee, was killed when he was attempting to get 
out of the way of an oncoming hand car and fell. The Plaintiff alleged 
the railroad company was negligent because they operated the hand car 
with only a firetnan and a brakeman so they were liable for the resulting 
injuries. The Defendant alleged that the brakemen operating the hand 
car were fellow servants of the Plaintiff. The Court agreed with the 
Plaintiff, finding that when a railroad cotnpany violates a safety rule, 
causing an accident, they must accept responsibility for all resulting 
InJunes. 
Not a railroad employee. 
The Plaintiff, a braketnan, was killed when his foot was caught in an 
open block and a train ran over him. The Defendant (RR company) 
argued that the engineer who ran over the Plaintiff and the Plaintiff 
were fellow servants and this Court agreed. The Court also states that 
the brakeman was experienced and should have known better. 
Petition finds that if a farmer takes hogs to a railway for shipment in the 
cotnpany's car, it is reasonable and the theory plausible that he should 
not be required, at the hazard of liability, to inspect the car for the 
protection of his servant who aids him in loading the truck. Not a 
railroad case 
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CASE I YEAR 
The Ohio and I 1894 
Mississippi 
Railway Company 
v. Stein 
(140 Ind. 61) 
Louisville, I 1895 
Evansville and St. 
Louis 
Consolidated 
Railroad Company 
v. Miller, Admin. 
(140 Ind. 685) 
WINNER 
Affirmed for 
Plaintiff 
Affirmed for 
Plaintiff 
INFORMATION 
The Plaintiff, a braketnan, was injured when a defective engine loaded 
with heavy stone detached from engine without working brakes causing 
one car to hit another and the heavy stone fell on the Plaintiff. The 
Plaintiff showed that notice had been given to the foreman of the 
railroad company that the company's machines were bad and the Court 
held this to be good notice to the company. The Court found that if the 
master appoints someone to do his duties, this person is not a fellow 
servant. The foreman of the machine shop may be both a fellow 
servant and a vice principal and this determination is tnade based on 
what they were doing at the titne of the injury. Here, the Court held the 
foreman to be a fellow servant to the Plaintiff. 
The Plaintiff, a freight conductor, was killed when his railroad car came 
off the tracks because the track was in disrepair. The facts show that 
the railroad was in a state of disrepair- there were no ballasts in the 
roadbed, many ties were broken, and the ties were so rotten that they 
could not hold the spikes driven into them. The Court found that the 
Defendant (RR company) must have known or certainly had 
opportunity to know (the opportunity for discovery) of these defects. 
The Defendant argued that the company's repair man should have fixed 
the railroad tracks and that the repair man was a fellow servant to the 
freight conductor but the Court did not agree. The Court held that the 
duties of repair rested on the tnaster and cannot be delegated to a fellow 
servant. 
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CASE 
The Pittsburgh, 
Cincinnati, 
Chicago and St. 
Louis Railway 
Company v. 
Sullivan 
(141 Ind. 83) 
The Baltimore and 
Ohio and Chicago 
Railroad Cotnpany 
v. Paul 
(143 Ind. 23) 
Evansville and 
Terre Haute 
Railroad Co. v. 
Tohill, Admin., 
etc. 
(143 Ind. 49) 
Evansville and 
Terre Haute 
Railroad Co. v. 
Tohill, Admin., 
etc 
(143 Ind. 49) 
YEAR I WINNER 
18 9 5 1 Reversed for 
Defendant with 
costs 
18 9 5 1 Reversed for 
Defendant 
18 9 5 1 Reversed for 
Defendant 
1895 I Petition for 
new hearing 
granted 
INFORMATION 
The Plaintiff, a braketnan, was injured by a train. The Plaintiffs 
supervisor called in surgeon and Plaintiff told his supervisor that he did 
not want his arm amputated and the surgeon agrees but then it becomes 
1nedically necessary to amputate it. The Court found that the 
Defendant (RR company) was not liable because they did not have a 
better choice. Fellow-servant rule applies here because the Plaintiff and 
the Plaintiffs supervisor are considered co-servants for this claim. 
The Plaintiff, a brakeman, was injured when he was hit by a train. The 
Plaintiff claitned that his tools, provided by the Defendant, were 
defective and that the engineer operating the train was negligent. The 
Court found that fellow-servant rule precluded recovery here because 
the Plaintiff was a fellow servant to the engineer. 
The Plaintiff, an engineer, was killed while waiting on a side track 
when a train dispatcher let a train go ahead of schedule (against the 
Defendant company's rules). The Court found the train dispatcher to 
be a fellow servant of the engineer which barred recover against the 
Defendant (RR cotnpany). 
See other case above. 
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CASE 
The Terre Haute 
and Indianapolis 
Railroad Co. v. 
Becker, Admin. 
(146 Ind. 202) 
Louisville, New 
Albany and 
Chicago Railway 
Company v. Bates, 
Admin. 
(146 Ind. 564) 
Robertson v. The 
Chicago & Erie 
Railroad Company 
(146 Ind. 486) 
YEAR 
1896 
1896 
1896 
WINNER 
Reversed for 
Defendant 
Reversed for 
Defendant 
Affirmed for 
Defendant 
INFORMATION 
The Defendant railroad company operated a single-track road. The 
Plaintiff, an employee of this railroad, was killed by a railroad car and 
the Court held that the engineer was a fellow servant of the injured 
Plaintiff and barred recovery. 
The Plaintiff, a brakeman, was killed while coupling cars. The Plaintiff 
alleged that the track was unsafe. The Court, however, ruled for the 
Defendant (RR company) holding that while railroads must generally 
provide safe cars, they need not always provide absolutely safe cars and 
they are not the insurer. Further the Court agreed that railroad 
companies, like the Defendant here, were not required to have 
inspectors which are sufficiently skilled and competent. The fellow 
servant rule applies here because the person in charge of keeping the 
track safe was a fellow servant to the Plaintiff. 
The Plaintiff, a railroad machine repair shop employee, was injured 
while lifting a steam chest on a locomotive because the other employee 
who pro1nised to help, did not. The Plaintiff was discharged and could 
not obtain work. The Court held, "[t]he rule in this State, now finnly 
settled, is that a difference in rank or the power to control and direct or 
to discharge from service is not the test as to whether one is a fellow 
servant or a vice principal. The controlling inquiry must be as to 
whether the act or o1nission resulting in injury involved a duty owing 
by the master to the injured servant." The Court found that because the 
other employee was working alongside the Plaintiff they were fellow 
servants and the Plaintiff could not recover for damages. 
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CASE 
Kerner, Admin. v. 
The Baltitnore and 
Ohio 
Southwestern 
Railway Company 
(149 Ind. 21) 
YEAR 
1897 
The Baltimore and 1 1897 
Ohio 
Southwestern 
Railway Cotnpany 
v. Little, Adtnin. 
(149 Ind. 167) 
Louisville, New I 1898 
Albany and 
Chicago Railway 
Cotnpany v. Heck, 
Admin 
(151 Ind. 292) 
WINNER 
Affirmed for 
Defendant 
Reversed for 
Defendant 
Affinned for 
Plaintiff 
INFORMATION 
The Plaintiff, a railway employee charged with holding a driving spring 
in an engine while another employee hammered it in, was struck with a 
heavy iron and killed. The Defendant (RR cotnpany) argued that the 
Plaintiff could not recover against the Defendant because the injury was 
done by a fellow servant, and the Court agreed. The Court found that 
the Defendant (RR company) was not liable because the company 
foreman, even though operating the large hammer, was acting as a 
fellow servant and not a vice principal at the time of the injury. 
The Court found that the common law fellow servant rule applied and 
not the Employer's Liability Act of 1893 because the Act was not 
meant to tnake corporations liable where a servant does an act or otnits 
an action in obedience to the cotnmand of the corporation based on a 
rule, regulation or by-law or through a person delegated with authority. 
The Court reasoned that the fellow servant rule applies here, and found 
that the Plaintiff could not collect for injuries caused by the negligence 
of the switchman because he was considered a fellow-servant. 
The Plaintiff, a firetnan, was killed when his train collided with a 
freight train. Both trains were moving under direction of the Defendant 
(RR company) and neither train knew of the other. The Court finds that 
the Defendant's negligence was the proximate cause of the death of the 
Plaintiff, although the train's conductor may have violated a rule 
requiring there to be a footman before and behind the train with danger 
signals at certain distances. The Court found that the injured Plaintiff 
should recover because supervision of the entire railroad business by 
the Defendant's Superintendent was considered the action of a vice 
principal and not a fellow servant. The train dispatcher is not 
considered a fellow servant. 
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CASE YEAR I WINNER 
Hodges v. 
Standard Wheel 
Company 
1898 I Affinned for 
( 152 Ind. 680) 
The Pittsburgh, I 1899 
Cincinnati, 
Chicago and St. 
Louis Railway 
Company v. 
Hosea, Admin. 
(152 Ind. 412) 
Louisville, New I 1899 
Albany and 
Chicago Railway 
Company v. 
Wagner 
(153 Ind. 420) 
City ofFort I 1901 
Wayne v. Christie, 
Admin. 
(156 Ind. 172) 
Defendant 
Affinned for 
Plaintiff 
Affirmed for 
Plaintiff 
Affirmed for 
Plaintiff 
INFORMATION 
Not a railroad case. 
The Plaintiff entered into contract for acceptance of benefits for any 
injury or death resulting frotn his etnploytnent but this does not operate 
as a release of all claitns under the Employer's Liability Acts. Even 
though the Plaintiffs widow may be barred, child of decedent is not. 
Not really a fellow servant case. 
The Plaintiffs arm was crushed while loading a heavy truck onto a flat 
car. The Plaintiffs foretnan was coordinating the effort and gave an 
order to let the truck go without warning the Plaintiff, causing the 
injury. The Defendant argued that the Plaintiff was barred from 
recovery because the Plaintiff and the foreman were fellow servants but 
this Court disagreed. The Court holds the Defendant liable but does not 
give good reasoning to back it up with the fellow servant defense. 
Not a railroad employee. 
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CASE YEAR 
The Balti1nore and 1901 
Ohio 
Southwestern 
Railway Company 
v. Peterson, 
Admin. 
(156 Ind. 364) 
Indianapolis 1901 
Union Railway 
Company v. 
Houlihan 
(157 Ind. 494) 
Thacker v. I 1902 
Chicago, 
Indianapolis and 
Louisville 
Railway Co1npany 
(159 Ind. 82) 
WINNER 
Affinned for 
Plaintiff 
Reversed for 
Defendant 
Reversed for 
Defendant 
INFORMATION 
The Plaintiff was repairing and cleaning the railroad tracks in switch 
yard when he was pushed and kicked backward on the track and was 
killed by a car. The Defendant (railroad co1npany) argued that the 
Plaintiff was barred fro1n recovery under the fellow-servant defense 
because the engineer driving the train and the Plaintiff were fellow 
servants but the Court did not agree. The Court finds that the engineer 
was not a fellow servant of the Plaintiffs, and the Plaintiff therefore 
recovers. 
The Plaintiff, a telegraph operator at a railway crossing charged with 
monitoring coining and going trains, crossed the track to get to work. 
The Plaintiff did not see the oncoming train because of posts and 
overgrown weeds in the rail yard, and was struck and injured by the 
train. The Court held that the responsibility to cut down posts and 
overgrown weeds belonged to a fellow servant of the Plaintiff so the 
Defendant (RR company) was not liable. 
The Plaintiff, a section hand, was injured when the car he was riding on 
suddenly stopped, throwing him from the train. The section foreman 
was driving the hand car and made the sudden stop which caused the 
Plaintiffs injury. The Court found that the Defendant (RR company) 
was not liable for the injury of an e1nployee resulting from the act of a 
fellow servant, despite the fact that a foreman caused the injury. The 
Court reasoned that holding the Defendant liable goes against reason 
because the order to stop the car at a crossing was proper, but it was 
executed in a negligent 1nanner by a fellow servant. 
165 
CASE YEAR WINNER INFORMATION 
The Baltimore and 1902 Reversed for Employer's liability does not apply because injury occurred in another 
Ohio Defendant state. 
Southwestern 
Railway Company 
v. Reed 
(158 Ind. 25) 
The Baltimore and 1902 Reversed for The Plaintiff, a locomotive engineer running a passenger train, was 
Ohio Defendant injured when his train collided with another train. The Court finds that 
Southwestern the injury was caused by a fellow servant so under cotnmon law, the 
Railway Company Plaintiff recovers nothing. 
v. Jones 
(158 Ind. 87) 
Pittsburgh, 1903 Reversed for A widow, the Plaintiff, was the beneficiary of railroad relief fund 1 
Cincinnati, Defendant certificate and when her husband died she cashed it, accepted the 
Chicago and St. amount, signed a receipt and a release of all claims for damages against 
Louis Railway the RR company. The receipt is offered in this case as a prima facie bar 
Company v. Gipe, against claims from the widow and claims from the children of the 
Admin. deceased. The Court finds that, under these circumstances, the injury 
(160 Ind. 360) was caused by the negligence of a fellow servant so the Plaintiff 
recovers nothing. 
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CASE YEAR WINNER INFORMATION 
The Southern 1903 Reversed for The Plaintiff was injured while unloading and hauling stone on train. 
Indiana Railway Defendant The Defendant argued that they were not responsible for the Plaintiffs 
Cotnpany v. injury because a fellow servant had caused the injury and the Court 
Martin agreed. The Court found that the person directing the Plaintiff was not 
(160 Ind. 280) his usual foreman but a fellow servant. The Court reasoned that the 
master may delegate the duties of a foretnan with no responsibility to 
his other servants and that the only duty imposed on the master is not to 
retain an incompetent or negligent foretnan. 
Lake Erie & 1903 Reversed for The Plaintiff, a switchman, was killed while fastening broken cars 
Western Railroad Defendant together with a chain under the orders of his yardmaster when another 
Company et al. v. etnployee backed an engine against the cars the Plaintiff was coupling. 
Charman, Admin. The Court found that the yardmaster was negligent but also that the 
(161 Ind. 95) yardmaster was a fellow servant to the switchman so the Plaintiff 
receives no recovery. 
American Rolling 1903 Reversed for Not a railroad case. 
Mill Company v. Defendant 
Hullinger 
(161 Ind. 673) 
- -- ---·----- --
167 
CASE 
Southern Indiana 
Railway Company 
v. Harrell 
(161 Ind. 689) 
Indianapolis & 
Greenfield Transit 
Company v. 
Foretnan 
(162 Ind. 85) 
YEAR I WINNER 
1903 I Reversed for 
Defendant 
1904 I Reversed for 
Defendant 
INFORMATION 
The Plaintiff was injured while building bridge for the Defendant 
railroad company. While taking a break, the Plaintiff was sitting on a 
projecting board and was hit by lifted stone. The Court found that 
because the Plaintiff was not doing something foreman or supervisor 
told hi1n to do, and he was thus not working, his claim of negligence 
will not stand. Also, the Defendant company cannot be held liable for 
the action of etnployees while on break. Here, an etnployee assumed 
the risk of negligence of a fellow servant and can overcome that only 
by showing negligence in hiring or selection of those employees, which 
is not done here. If a supervisor works alongside the etnployees he is 
still considered a fellow servant. 
The Plaintiff, an interurban employee, was considered a fellow servant 
with employees in charge of the passenger car that transported him to 
work. The Plaintiff was injured while on passenger car by the 
negligence of person in charge of said car so no recovery at common 
law. The Court found for the Defendant because they did not show 
that the fellow servant was incompetent, or incompetent to the point 
that the Defendant (interurban company) knew or could have 
reasonably discovered. 
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CASE 
Pittsburgh, 
Cincinnati, 
Chicago & St. 
Louis Railway 
Company v. 
Lightheiser 
(163 Ind. 247) 
Dill v. Marmon 
(164 Ind. 507) 
City of 
Indianapolis et al. 
v. Cauley 
(164 Ind. 304) 
Chicago Tenninal 
Transfer Railroad 
Company v. 
Vandenberg et al. 
(164 Ind. 470) 
YEAR I WINNER 
1904 I Reversed for 
Defendant 
1905 1 Reversed for 
Defendant 
1905 1 Affirmed for 
Plaintiff 
1905 I Affinned for 
Plaintiff 
INFORMATION 
The Plaintiff was knocked down and injured by a 1nail car that was 
running backwards in rail yard. The Court found the Defendant was 
not at fault because the Plaintiff did not show a duty to have someone 
posed on both ends of train, lights, etc. The Court explained that the 
Plaintiff, in order to recover, must not only allege duty but tnust show 
facts. Under the common law, the Plaintiffs complaint must show 
affirmatively that the servant whose negligent act caused such injury 
was not a fellow servant, and the duty broken was one owing by the 
master. 
Not at railroad case. 
The Plaintiff, an interurban repairman, was injured when a construction 
worker took a car on a weak bridge and the bridge fell. The Court 
found that a negligent construction worker cannot be found to be a 
fellow servant of the injured Plaintiff. The Court maintained that the 
Plaintiff could not avoid the injury and because the cotnpany knew 
bridge in disrepair and used anyway, they should have warned the 
Plaintiff. The fellow-servant defense was not the deciding principle in 
this case. 
The Plaintiff was injured while hauling trains on a track that the 
Defendant (RR cotnpany) had contracted to use when the negligence of 
an etnployee of the contracted company caused the hann. The Court 
found that employees of one railroad are not fellow servants of the 
other so the Plaintiff recovered. 
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CASE 
Louisville & 
Nashville Railroad 
Company v. 
Gillen 
(166 Ind. 321) 
Pittsburgh, 
Cincinnati, 
Chicago & St. 
Louis Railway 
Company v. 
Lightheiser 
(168 Ind. 438) 
Chicago & Erie 
Railroad Company 
v. Lawrence, 
Admin. 
(169 Ind. 319) 
YEAR WINNER 
1905 Reversed for 
Defendant 
Affinned for 
Plaintiff 
1906 Affirmed for 
Plaintiff 
INFORMATION 
The Plaintiff lost an eye when another etnployee used a defective 
hatnmer. The Court found that Plaintiff cannot recover because the 
employee operating the ha1nmer was a fellow servant of the Plaintiff. 
The Court further explained that a Plaintiff must allege in his complaint 
and show that he was in the line of duty when injured. 
The Plaintiff was hit by a railroad car while standing between two 
incoming cars for the purpose of directing those cars on the sidetrack. 
The Court found that the engineer in control of one of the cars was 
negligent because backed it up without a person stationed on the rear of 
the cab as required by safety regulations. The Court ruled that the 
fellow-servant defense does not apply in this circumstance because one 
employee cannot assume that another fellow servant will fail to follow 
safety precautions. 
The Plaintiff, a switchman, was riding on the back of a train carrying a 
lantern, as he was required to, when another train without back up 
lights hit his train. The Plaintiff fell off the train and was killed by the 
other train. The Defendant (RR co1npany) alleged that the engineer 
driving the train without a light was a fellow servant of the Plaintiffs 
and that the Defendant was not liable for the Plaintiffs injuries but the 
Court did not agree. The Court also found that the Plaintiff was not 
contributorily negligent because did not know of position of other car. 
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CASE YEAR WINNER INFORMATION 
Chicago, 1906 Affirmed for The Plaintiff, a car coupler, was crushed and killed when his supervisor 
Indianapolis & Plaintiff allowed an engineer to back up a train before Plaintiff gave his ready 
Louisville signal. The Court finds that the Defendant (RR company) is liable for 
Railway Cotnpany the negligence of their vice-principals and in this case, the supervisor is 
v. Williatns, not found to be a fellow servant to the Plaintiff, but rather, to stand in 
Admin. the shoes of the master. The Defendant is held liable for the Plaintiffs 
(168 Ind. 276) InJury. 
Bedford Quarries 1907 Reversed for Not a railroad employee 
Company v. Defendant 
Bough 
(168 Ind. 671) 
Indianapolis Street 1907 Affirmed for The Plaintiff was ordered by a foreman to fix the track on a bridge and 
Railway Company Plaintiff while propping up the foot bridge for traffic a large timber fell on the 
v. Kane Plaintiff. The Court found that the Plaintiff showed negligence on the 
(169 Ind. 25) part of the Defendant (RR company) and the fellow servant defense 
does not apply because the foreman was acting on behalf of the tnaster. 
Perry, Matthews, 1907 Reversed for Not a railroad case. 
Buskirk Stone Defendant 
Company v. 
Fletcher, Admin. 
(168 Ind. 348) 
Ft. Wayne & 1907 Reversed for The Plaintiff, a motonnan, was overworked and had not slept, but the 
Wabash Valley Defendant Defendant put him in charge of an interurban car. The Plaintiffs car 
Traction Company collided with another car and caused the Plaintiffs injury. The Court 
v. Crosbie found that the Defendant (Interurban) was not liable because the 
(169 Ind. 281) collision was between two fellow servants. 
---- - - -- - - - --------- - --- - ---- --
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CASE 
Southern Railway 
Company v. 
Elliott 
(170 Ind. 273) 
Chicago, 
Indianapolis & 
Louisville 
Railway Company 
v. Barker, Admin. 
(169 Ind. 670) 
Haskell & Barker 
Car Company v. 
Przezdziankowksi 
(170Ind.1) 
Wabash Railroad 
Cotnpany v. 
Hassett, Admin. 
(170 Ind. 370) 
YEAR I WINNER 
1907 1 Reversed for 
Defendant 
1908 I Reversed for 
Defendant 
1908 I Reversed for 
Defendant 
1908 I Reversed for 
Defendant 
INFORMATION 
The Court finds that at comtnon law, the locotnotive engineer and the 
brakeman of a train are fellow servants. Here, a brakeman is injured 
due to the negligence of an engineer and the Court finds no recovery. 
The Court held that all persons engaged by the tnaster in carrying on 
the com1non enterprise are fellow servants of each other. The 
Defendant (RR company) left a switch open and the Plaintiff (engineer) 
was killed when a freight train hits another car. Although handling the 
switch was operated by one of RR company's highest officials, the 
Court found that this was the work of a fellow servant and awarded the 
Plaintiff no recovery. Also track repairer was considered a fellow 
servant because keeping track in repair would not be a master's duty. 
The Defendant (RR company) used a railroad type track 1n a 
manufacturing plant and the Court finds that this operation does not 
constitute a railroad for purposes of this negligence claitn. The Plaintiff 
was injured by an empty truck left too near track causing a wreck but 
the Court barred recovery. This case also discusses the assutnption of 
risk defense and found that workers assume the negligence of their 
fellow workers-thus the fellow-servant rule applies. 
The Court finds that the conductor of one freight train and the 
locomotive engineer of another train are fellow servants. In this case, 
no liability found against the Defendant (RR company) when their 
conductor was killed by engineer's negligence. 
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CASE 
Indianapolis 
Traction & 
Terminal 
Company v. 
Kinney, by Next 
Friend 
(171 Inc. 612) 
Cleveland, 
Cincinnati, 
Chicago and St. 
Louis Railway 
Company et al. v. 
Gossett, Adtnin. 
(172 Ind. 525) 
Fort Wayne and 
Wabash Valley 
Traction Cotnpany 
v. Roudebush, 
Admin. 
(173 Ind. 57) 
YEAR I WINNER 
190 8 1 Reversed for 
Defendant 
1909 1 Affirmed for 
Plaintiff 
1909 I Affirmed for 
Plaintiff 
INFORMATION 
The Plaintiff, a metnber of an interurban construction crew, was injured 
while unloading rails from a flat street car as the Defendant's foretnan 
had ordered. The Defendant argued that the foretnan was a fellow 
servant and that the Plaintiff should be barred from recovery. The 
Defendant further argued that, despite the fact that the foretnan was 
authorized to give orders, he continued to be a fellow servant while 
working alongside the other employees and stands in the master's shoes 
(and accepts liability) only when in the performance of the master's 
duties. The Court agrees with the Defendant and bars recovery for the 
Plaintiff. 
This case involves two employees from different companies who were 
working together, when one was injured. The Court rules that an 
employee of one company is not a fellow servant to an employee of the 
second cotnpany so the injured Plaintiff 1nay recover. The Court 
further states that it is the duty of the master to protect his servants 
against his own negligence, and against all unusual and unexpected 
dangers known to the master and unknown to the servant. 
The Plaintiff, an interurban employee, was killed in a collision. A 
motorman etnployed by the Defendant (interurban) started a second car 
moving without making sure the first car had stopped, causing the two 
cars to collide. The Defendant argued that the Plaintiff should not 
recover because the injury resulted from the negligence of a fellow 
servant but he Court disagreed. The Court here finds that interurban 
railroad company whose negligence coincides with that of a servant in 
producing a harm is liable. This case also discusses the assutnption of 
risk defense. 
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CASE 
Pittsburgh, 
Cincinnati, 
Chicago & St. 
Louis Railway Co. 
v. Sudhoff, 
Admin. 
(173 Ind. 314) 
Cleveland, 
Cincinnati, 
Chicago and St. 
Louis Railway 
Cotnpany v. 
Foland 
(174 Ind. 411) 
Oolitic Stone 
Company of 
Indiana v. Ridge 
(174 Ind. 558) 
Cleveland, 
Cincinnati, 
Chicago and St. 
Louis Rail way 
Company v. 
Foland 
(174 Ind. 411) 
YEAR I WINNER 
191 0 1 Affinned for 
Plaintiff 
1910 
1910 
Reversed for 
Defendant 
Affirmed for 
Plaintiff 
INFORMATION 
The Plaintiff was killed by a train while working in the rail yard. The 
train hit the Plaintiff because the engineer driving it disregarded the 
safety signals and ran on to a side track at full speed. The Defendant 
(RR company) argued that the Plaintiff should not recover because his 
injury resulted frotn the negligent act of another employee, a fellow-
servant, but the Court does not agree. The Court finds that the engineer 
and the Plaintiff are not fellow-servants. 
The Plaintiff was struck with timbers and injured while constructing a 
bridge for Defendant (RR cotnpany) under the direction of the 
railroad's foreman. The foreman ordered stays removed and Plaintiff 
struck and injured by timbers. The Plaintiffs injury resulted when the 
foreman ordered stays removed which caused the timbers to fall on the 
Plaintiff. The Defendant argued that the Plaintiff should not recover 
because his injuries were the result of a fellow servant's negligence and 
the Court agreed and barred the Plaintiffs recovery. 
Not a railroad case. 
1910 Defendant (RR) I Petition denied so not an Indiana Supretne Court ruling. 
petitions for 
rehearing & it 
was denied 
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CASE 
Richey v. 
Cleveland, 
Cincinnati, 
Chicago and St. 
Louis Railway 
Company 
(176 Ind. 542) 
YEAR I WINNER 
1911 I Affirmed for 
Defendant 
Indiana Union 11911 Affirmed for 
Plaintiff Traction Cotnpany 
v.Long 
(176 Ind. 532) 
INFORMATION 
The Plaintiff was injured when the Defendant's railroad foreman 
ordered him to load shovels, picks and other tools upon a hand-car and 
to go to a certain spot and tnake repairs. The foreman negligently set 
brakes which caused the Plaintiffs injury. The Defendant (RR 
company) argued that the Plaintiff and the foreman were fellow 
servants and the Court agreed. 
Dissent - Morris, J. dissents fro1n the opinion as that it holds that the 
plaintiffs injury was not one arising from the hazards of operating a 
railroad. 
The Plaintiff, an interurban employee, was injured when a car jutnped 
tracks due to defective railroad tie. The Defendant argued that the 
Plaintiff has no case because another employee of the Defendant 
(interurban) did not keep the track in good condition and the fellow-
servant defense applies. The Court found that an agent to whotn a 
tnaster has delegated the performance of a material duty (like keeping 
the track in good condition) is a vice-principal and not a fellow servant, 
so the Plaintiff may recover. The Court explained that this 
determination depends on what employee does and not his rank, so the 
Defendant can't say they delegated safety compliance to a fellow 
employee and use the fellow servant defense to avoid liability for 
resulting injures. This case also discusses the contributory negligence 
defense. 
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CASE 
Indianapolis 
Traction and 
Terminal 
Company v. 
Matthews 
(177 Ind. 88) 
Vandalia RR Co. 
v. Parker 
(178Ind.138) 
YEAR I WINNER 
1912 1 Reversed for 
Defendant 
1912 1 Reversed for 
Defendant 
INFORMATION 
The Plaintiff, an interurban employee, was injured while backing a car 
out from the Defendant's (RR company) shop because he collided with 
another car. The Defendant claimed that the driver of the second car is 
a fellow servant of the Plaintiff so the Plaintiff may not recover. The 
Court agreed, finding that an employer is bound to exercise ordinary 
care to furnish his employee a safe place to work and keep it safe, but is 
not liable to an employee for negligence of fellow servants in the 
details of the work or in failing properly to use appliances furnished. 
Negligent actor was a fellow servant so no recovery. The Court also 
discussed the assumption of risk defense. 
The Plaintiff, a section laborer, was injured when he fell from an over-
crowded hand car operated by his foretnan. The Defendant (RR 
company) argued that it was not responsible for the Plaintiff's injury 
because the injury resulted from the negligence of a fellow servant, the 
foreman. The Court agrees and found that under the cotnmon law a 
section foreman while etnploying and discharging men is a vice-
principal, but in directing them, after their etnployment, is considered a 
fellow servant. In this case, the Court found that the foreman was a 
fellow servant and the fellow-servant defense applies. The Defendant 
(RR cotnpany) was not held liable for the Plaintiff's injuries. 
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CASE 
Chicago & Erie 
RR Co. v. Lain 
(181 Ind. 386) 
Vandalia Railroad 
Company v. 
Stillwell 
(181 Ind. 267) 
Southern Railroad 
Company et al. v. 
Howerton 
( 182 Ind. 208) 
YEAR 
1914 
1914 
1914 
WINNER 
Affirmed for 
Plaintiff 
Affirmed for 
Plaintiff 
Reversed for 
Defendant (RR) 
INFORMATION 
The Plaintiff was crushed between two cars while pushing a car on a 
track as directed by foretnan. The injury occurred because the foretnan 
allowed another car on the satne tracks where the Plaintiff was working 
and that car pushed the cars the Plaintiff was repairing. The Defendant 
(RR cotnpany) clailns that foreman is responsible for the Plaintiffs 
injury and, as he was a fellow-servant, the railroad was not liable. The 
Court disagrees with the Defendant finding that the foretnan and the 
injured Plaintiff were not fellow servants. This case also discusses the 
assumption of risk defense. 
The Plaintiff, a freight brakeman, was thrown frotn a moving train car 
and injured when another car hit his. The Defendant (RR company) 
argued that the injury resulted from the negligence of the engineer 
driving the second train and because the engineer is a fellow servant of 
the Plainitff, he cannot recover. The Court, however, disagreed with 
the Defendant. 
The Plaintiff, a railroad laborer charged with moving rails from one 
location to another rode a train over a signal torpedo that exploded and 
injured the Plaintiff. The Defendant (RR company) claims that the 
Plaintiffs fellow employee negligently placed the torpedoes on the 
track and did not tell the Plaintiff so the Defendant was not liable and 
the Court agreed. The Plaintiff cannot claim against his employer when 
his injury resulted from the negligence of a fellow-servant. This case 
also discusses the assutnption of risk defense. 
177 
CASE 
Vandalia Railroad 
Company v. 
Stringer 
(182 Ind. 676) 
Evansville & 
Terre Haute 
Railroad 
Comapnay V. 
Lipking, Admin. 
(183 Ind. 572) 
Chicago & Erie 
Railroad Company 
v. Mitchell, 
Admin. 
(184 Ind. 383) 
YEAR 
1914 
1915 
1915 
WINNER 
Affirmed for 
Plaintiff 
Affinned for 
Plaintiff 
Affirmed for 
Plaintiff 
INFORMATION 
The Plaintiff, a braketnan, jumped from a moving train car because he 
believed that he was in danger and was injured. The Plaintiff jutnped 
because a loud bootn from buildup in the steam engine made hitn 
believe the boiler was going to explode. The Defendant (RR company) 
argued that the Plaintiff was barred from recover because a fellow 
servant had failed to clear the steam engine, causing the blow that 
frightened the Plaintiff. The Court finds that the fellow-servant defense 
does not apply in this case because the Plaintiff acted as a person of 
ordinary prudence would. 
The Plaintiff, a car coupler and switchman, was injured while walking 
between two cars he was attempting to couple to get a part and was hit 
by another car, ordered onto the track by the railroad foreman. The 
Defendant (RR company) argued that they were not liable because the 
injury resulted from the negligence of a fellow servant but the Court 
does not agree. This case also discusses the assumption of risk and 
contributory negligence defense. 
The Plaintiff, a railroad car repairer, was under car on sidetrack when 
another engineer ran a car upon track without warning him and Plaintiff 
was killed. Defendant (RR company) claims that the railroad employee 
responsible for placing the signal flags did not do his job and the 
fellow-servant rule would preclude recovery but the Court did not 
agree. The case also discusses the contributory negligence defense. 
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CASE YEAR WINNER INFORMATION 
Chicago & Erie 1915 Affirmed for The Court affirms that the com1non law is no longer in force because of 
Railroad Co1npany Plaintiff the new workers' compensation rule so the fellow-servant defense, the 
v. Mitchell, contributory negligence defense, and the assu1nption of risk defense are 
Admin. ( 184 Ind. no longer available. Plaintiff, a car repairer, was killed when passing 
588) between two cars to reach the bolt house to obtain his tools. Defendant 
(RR company) was held to be responsible for the Plaintiffs injuries. 
179 
CASE YEAR 
The Louisville 1883 
and Nashville 
Railroad 
Company v. Kelly 
(92 Ind. 371) 
The Terre Haute 1884 
and Indianapolis 
Railroad 
Company v. 
McMurray 
(98 Ind. 358) 
APPENDIXB 
THE CONTRIBUTORY NEGLIGENCE DEFENSE 
1880-1915 
WINNER INFORMATION 
Affinned for Passenger hanned. 
Plaintiff 
Affirmed for The Plaintiff, a brakeman, needed immediate surgical attention when 
Plaintiff his foot was crushed by train. The train conductor engaged a surgeon 
and the Defendant railroad cotnpany does not want to pay. Trial court 
ruled they are responsible. Generally, train conductors cannot tnake 
contracts with surgeons but this case is different because the facts can 
broaden an employer's responsibility. 
Dissenting judge, Zollars, disagrees on the ground that it is not 
sufficiently shown that the conductor had authority to bind the railroad 
company by his contract with appellee. 
180 
CASE 
The Indiana Car 
Company v. 
Parker 
(100 Ind. 181) 
The Atlas Engine 
Works v. Randall 
(100 Ind. 293) 
The Baltimore 
and Ohio and 
Chicago Railroad 
Company v. 
Rowan 
(104 Ind. 88) 
The Pittsburgh, 
Cincinnati and St. 
Louis Railway 
Company v. 
Adatns 
(105 Ind. 151) 
YEAR 
1885 
1885 
1885 
1886 
WINNER 
Affinned for 
Plaintiff 
Reversed for 
Defendant 
(with costs) 
Affirmed for 
Plaintiff (with 
costs) 
Reversed for 
Defendant 
(with a motion 
to tnake 
complaint more 
specific) 
INFORMATION 
The Plaintiff was running a saw in a grooved table and the rope that 
held the saw back broke and Plaintiff's fingers were severed. The 
Plaintiff argued that the Defendant's (railroad company) foretnan knew 
of the rope problem and that the company was negligent for purchasing 
and maintaining faulty machinery and directing employees to work on 
it. The Court agreed. The Plaintiff was free frotn negligence. 
Not a railroad employee. 
The Plaintiff, a brakeman, was injured when he was riding on the top of 
a train and hit a low bridge. The Plaintiff argued that the Defendant 
(railroad company) was liable because the Defendant knew of the low 
bridge and the brakeman did not. The Court agreed, stating "[i]t seems 
to us that a railroad company is, and ought to be, required to construct 
and tnaintain its roadway and appendages, and its overhead structures, 
in such manner and condition that its employee or servant can do and 
perform all the labors and duties required of him, with reasonable 
safety." 
The Plaintiff, a young section hand, was ordered to go on a construction 
train and perfonn odd jobs. Once on the train, the Plaintiff was asked to 
perform the duties of a brakeman, and while doing so, his pants caught 
and his foot was crushed. The Defendant argued the Plaintiff failed to 
show he did not know or could not have discovered the defective rail so 
the Defendant may not be held liable. The Court agrees, finding for the 
Defendant. 
181 
CASE YEAR WINNER INFORMATION 
The Cincinnati, 1887 Reversed for Railroad passenger not employee 
Hamilton and Defendant 
Indianapolis 
railroad Co. v. 
Carper 
(112 Ind. 26) 
The Cincinnati, 1887 Reversed for The Plaintiff, an experienced switchtnan and brakeman, was hit by a 
Indianapolis, St. Defendant train backing up when he stood in the conductor's blind spot. The 
Louis and (with costs) Defendant argued the Plaintiff was negligent in the performance of his 
Chicago Railway duties and the Court agreed. The Defendant (railroad cotnpany) argued 
Companyv. they have the right to assume all their etnployees will act prudently. In 
Long, Adtnin. the absence of any special circutnstances, an experienced switchman, 
(112 Ind. 166) who is proceeding with his customary duties between two tracks, where 
the observance of care will enable him to perfonn such duties in safety, 
can not be said to be so absorbed in his duty as to exempt hitn frotn the 
necessity of exercising care for his own safety, and his failure to do so 
constitutes contributory negligence. Court finds facts do not present a 
case for negligence against the Defendant (railroad company). 
Concurrence by Elliott - "I concur in the conclusion that there was no 
negligence on the part of the appellant, but dissent from the conclusion 
--------
that the appellee's intestate was guilty of contributory negligence." 
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CASE 
The Louisville, 
New Albany and 
Chicago Railway 
Company v. 
Wood 
(113 Ind. 544) 
YEAR 
1887 
The Indianapolis I 1887 
and St. Louis 
Railway Company 
v. Watson 
(114 Ind. 20) 
The Louisville, I 1889 
New Albany and 
Chicago Railway 
Company v. 
Buck, Admin. 
(116 Ind. 566) 
The Louisville, I 1889 
New Albany and 
Chicago Railway 
Company v. 
Sandford, Adtnin. 
(117 Ind. 265) 
WINNER 
Affinned for 
Plaintiff 
Reversed for 
Defendant 
Affirmed for 
Plaintiff (with 
costs) 
Reversed for 
Defendant 
(petition for 
rehearing 
denied) 
INFORMATION 
Not an employee. 
The Plaintiff, a night watchman, was injured while walking in a dark 
train yard. The Plaintiff asked for a light and was protnised one but the 
company failed to provide it. The Defendant argued the Plaintiff was 
negligent for continuing work without a lantern and despite the Court's 
reluctance to find for the Defendant, they do. This case also discusses 
the assumption of risk defense. 
The Plaintiff, a brakeman, was fatally injured while coupling and 
uncoupling cars because of defective machinery provided by the 
cotnpany. The Defendant claimed that the Plaintiff was negligent 
because he continued to work with defective tools. The Plaintiff did not 
know habits of engineer who had control of the train. The Court 
basically sounds a little sympathetic to the Defendant but says that the 
jury had sufficient evidence to find the way they did. Affinned for 
Plaintiff. 
The Plaintiff, a baggage master, worked on a track that he knew to be 
dangerous and was injured. The Defendant (railroad company) alleged 
that because he knew of the danger and continued working, he was 
negligent. The Court does not agree. This case also discusses the 
assumption of risk defense. 
183 
CASE 
The Cincinnati, 
Hamilton and 
Dayton Railroad 
Company v. 
McMullen, 
Admin. 
(117 Ind. 439) 
The Brazil Block 
Coal Company v. 
Young 
(117 Ind. 520) 
The Brazil Block 
Coal Company v. 
Gaffney 
(119 Ind. 455) 
The Pennsylvania 
Cotnpany v. 
0' Shaughnessy, 
Admin. 
(122 Ind. 588) 
YEAR 
1889 
1889 
1889 
1890 
WINNER 
Affirmed for 
Plaintiff (with 
costs) 
Reversed for 
Plaintiff 
(complaint is 
insufficient) 
Affirmed for 
Plaintiff (with 
costs) 
Reversed for 
Defendant 
(award a new 
trial) 
INFORMATION 
The Plaintiff, a freight train conductor, died when a handle of an 
appliance broke and he lost his balance and fell between tnoving cars. 
The Defendant (railroad company) contended the Plaintiff was 
contributorily negligent and that his death was due to negligence of the 
inspector, which tneans the fellow servant defense applies but the Court 
does not agree with either defense and the Plaintiff prevails. 
16 year old was to keep and maintain entrances, avenues, passages and 
roadways in tnine. Plaintiff pennitted roof to become insecure. Not a 
railroad case. 
The Plaintiff, a 10 year old, worked for a coal company that used a 
railroad to transport coal. The Plaintiff was assigned to grease bank-
cars when elevated out of mine, which was very dangerous. The 
Defendant argued that the Plaintiff was negligent in his duties, but the 
Court ruled that when a company employs a child, they are responsible, 
even if the child knows in advance that work was dangerous. 
Plaintiff, a brakeman, was going to switch cars and took an unsafe path 
back, when a safe one was available, and was injured. The Defendant 
(railroad company) argued the Plaintiff was negligent because he 
disregarded company policy and took an unsafe path. The Court 
agrees. The Defendant also showed the Plaintiff was aware of the 
safety policy. The Plaintiffs lack of care was negligent 
184 
CASE 
The Cincinnati, 
Indianapolis, St. 
Louis and 
Chicago Railway 
Company v. 
Roesch 
(126 Ind. 445) 
N all, Admin v. 
The Louisville, 
New Albany and 
Chicago Railway 
Company 
(129 Ind. 260) 
N all, Admin. v. 
The Louisville, 
New Albany and 
Chicago Railway 
Company 
(129 Ind. 268) 
YEAR WINNER 
1891 Affirmed for 
Plaintiff with 
costs 
1891 Reversed for 
Plaintiff 
1891 Affirmed for 
Plaintiff 
(petition for 
rehearing 
denied) 
INFORMATION 
The Plaintiff, a trackman, was injured while raising level of track with 
gravel with tools supplied by the Defendant (railroad company). The 
tools were faulty and the Court deems this to be the cause of the injury. 
The Defendant argued the Plaintiff was negligent in using these tools 
but the Court found that an employer must generally provide good tools 
- the railroad company is not the insurer of all bad, but generally good 
tools may be assutned. Jury found tools were good and Court did not 
reverse. 
Same facts as below. Here the Court stated that when an employer 
orders an employee to do something which involves encountering a risk 
not contemplated in his employment, although the risk is equally open 
to the observation of both, it does not necessarily follow that the 
employee either assutned the increased risk, or is negligent in obeying 
the order. This case talks tnore about the fellow-servant defense. 
The Plaintiff was ordered to go collect some driftwood by his 
supervisor and was injured in the process. The Defendant (railroad 
cotnpany) argued that the Plaintiff was negligent but the Court did not 
agree. This case also discusses the fellow-servant defense. 
185 
CASE 
The Pennsylvania 
Company v. 
McCormack, 
Admin. 
(131 Ind. 250) 
The Louisville, 
Evansville and St. 
Louis 
Consolidated 
Railway Cotnpany 
v. Hanning, 
Admin. 
(131 Ind. 528) 
··Bier v. The 
Jeffersonville, 
Madison and 
Indianapolis 
railroad Co. 
(132 Ind. 78) 
YEAR 
1892 
1892 
1892 
WINNER 
Affirmed for 
Plaintiff with 
costs 
Affirmed for 
Plaintiff with 
costs 
Affirmed for 
Defendant 
INFORMATION 
The Plaintiff, a brakeman, was riding on a ladder (attached to trains so 
brakeman can descend on train and couple and uncouple cars) and 
giving signals. He was killed when a railroad conductor did not tum the 
switch and the Plaintiff was thrown from the train. The Defendant 
alleged the Plaintiff was negligent, but the Court did not agree. There 
was evidence that showed a problem with the construction of the side 
track. The Court ruled the Plaintiff was not negligent because he had 
the right to assume his employer made his workplace safe, unless he 
had the opportunity to notice the danger, and he did not here. 
Plaintiff, a car repairer who normally worked in a warehouse, was 
killed while attempting to repair a car on the sidetracks. The 
Defendant argued that the Plaintiff was negligent because he was trying 
to repair cars on the side tracks without signal flags. The Plaintiff 
claimed he was not negligent because he usually repaired cars in a 
warehouse where signal flags were not necessary. The Court agreed 
that the Plaintiff was outside his normal duties, he was not negligent. 
This case also discussed the assumption of risk defense. 
Dissent- Coffey- no written opinion. 
The Plaintiff, a stone mason, was injured by a negligent bridge 
carpenter. The Defendant (railroad company) alleged that the Plaintiff 
was also negligent and should not recover. The Court agreed and 
permitted the Defendant to evade liability using the fellow-servant 
defense. 
186 
CASE I YEAR 
The Lake Erie and 1 1892 
Western railroad 
Co. v. Mugg, 
Admin. 
(132 Ind. 168) 
O'Neal v. The 11892 
Chicago and 
Indiana Coal 
Railway Company 
(132 Ind. 110) 
Clarke v. The 11892 
Pennsylvania 
Company 
(132 Ind. 199) 
The Ohio and I 1892 
Mississippi 
Railway Company 
v. Stansberry 
(132 Ind. 533) 
WINNER 
Affirmed for 
Plaintiff 
Affirmed for 
Defendant 
Affirmed for 
Defendant 
Affirmed for 
Plaintiff 
INFORMATION 
Plaintiff, a car coupler, was injured while coupling two cars because of 
a defective rail. The Defendant (railroad cotnpany) argued that the 
Plaintiff was negligent in failing to see the defective part. The Court 
did not agree. The Court held that for the Defendant to prevail in a case 
like this, it must show that the Plaintiff either knew or should have 
known about the defective part. 
Dissent- Coffey- no written opinion. 
Plaintiff, a young brakeman, was thrown frotn the train because of its 
unevenness. The Defendant alleged the Plaintiff did not exercise due 
care to ensure that he did not fall off the tnoving train and he was 
therefore contributorily negligent. The Court agreed because the 
Plaintiff had ridden that same train before and knew of the 
circumstances. The condition of the train was open and obvious so the 
Plaintiff was contributorily negligent. 
!he Plaintiff was injured when a fellow etnployee (who was his boss) 
overtook him on his train and the Plaintiff jumped. The Plaintiff 
alleged that he jumped in response to an imminent danger. The Court 
ruled that the Plaintiff was not contributory negligence because 
different standards apply when sotneone reacts to an imminent danger. 
Passenger not an employee . 
187 
CASE 
The Louisville, 
Evansville & St. 
Louis 
Consolidated 
railroad Co. et al 
v. Utz, Admin. 
(133 Ind. 265) 
The Evansville & 
Terre Haute 
Railroad Co. V. 
Duel 
(134 Ind. 156) 
The Pennsylvania 
Company v. Sears 
(136 Ind. 460) 
YEAR I WINNER 
1892 I Affirmed for 
Plaintiff 
1893 I Reversed for 
Defendant 
1893 I Affirmed for 
Plaintiff 
INFORMATION 
The Plaintiff, a brakernan, was jumping from one car to another when a 
pin came loose and he fell off and was killed. The Defendant alleged 
that the Plaintiffs actions were negligent, but the Court found that just 
became he attempted something dangerous, he is not negligent. The 
Plaintiff successfully showed that an experienced railroad brakernan 
would not have known if there was a danger, so he could not be held 
negligent. The Defendant (railroad company) also argued the Plaintiff 
was negligent because he was walking on top of a train at a high rate of 
speed. However, the Court held that was his job, so he cannot be held 
contributorily negligent. 
The Plaintiff, an engine repairman, opened a train throttle valve which 
cut off steam from the cylinders and the engine moved suddenly 
injuring him. The Court ruled that the Plaintiff did not show all the 
elements of negligence and did not sufficiently allege that the master 
knew of the danger. The Defendant also alleged that the Plaintiff 
assumed the risk. The Court held that because the employee knew 
about danger and continued with employment, he accepted the danger. 
Plaintiff, a brakeman, was riding on top of a train car and was injured 
when he hit his head on a low bridge. The Defendant (railroad 
company) claimed that the Plaintiff was contributorily negligent and 
that his injury was a danger incident to service. The Court did not 
agree. The Court also noted there were no warning or lights on bridge. 
188 
CASE 
The Cincinnati, 
Hatnilton and 
Indianapolis 
railroad Co. v. 
Madden 
(134 Ind. 462) 
The New York, 
Chicago and St. 
Louis Railroad 
Company v. 
Perriguey 
(138 Ind. 414) 
YEAR 
1893 
1893 
WINNER 
Affirmed for 
Plaintiff 
Reversed for 
Defendant 
INFORMATION 
The Plaintiff, a track hand who cared for track by cutting weeds, 
tamping ballasts, and watching for and retnoving dangers from track, 
was asked to unload steel rails frotn a construction train. Another 
engineer (whom the Defendant knew to be incompetent) jerked his train 
forward, hitting the Plaintiff, who ended up having to have his legs 
amputated. The Defendant alleged that the Plaintiff should not have 
followed the orders of his superior, knowing that the engineer driving 
the train was incompetent. The Court found that the Plaintiff was not 
negligent. The Court stated that unless the danger and peril to life and 
limb in the new service into which Plaintiff was ordered was so glaring 
that no prudent man would have entered into it, the employee will not 
be held negligent. General rule is that servant accepts all ordinary 
dangers, but this does not fit when Plaintiff is asked to step out of 
ordinary role and do something else. 
The Plaintiff, a railroad employee, is injured when he is hit by a train 
without a headlight. The engineer conducting the train that hit the 
Plaintiff was supposed to light the hand lamps and did not do so. 
Despite this, the Court found that the Plaintiff cannot recover because 
the evidence presented did not establish proxitnate cause. This case is 
also decided based upon the fellow-servant defense. 
189 
CASE 
The Louisville, 
New Albany and 
Chicago Railway 
Cotnpany v. 
Berkey, Admin. 
(136 Ind. 181) 
The Louisville, 
New Albany and 
Chicago ~Railway 
Company v. 
Kendall 
(138 Ind. 313) 
The Ohio and 
Mississippi 
Railway Company 
v. Dunn 
(138 Ind. 18) 
YEAR 
1893 
1894 
1894 
WINNER 
Affirmed for 
Plaintiff 
Reversed for 
Plaintiff 
Reversed for 
Defendant 
INFORMATION 
The Plaintiff, a front brakeman, was killed when he was thrown frotn 
the train because of a bad coupling pin. The Defendant (railroad 
company) claitned that Plaintiff did not follow the rules, but evidence 
showed Plaintiff did not have rules or know about them so he cannot be 
held negligent. The evidence also showed that master must have 
known about the bad pin or must have, with reasonable diligence and 
attention, been able to know. The Court stated, "[t]he rule appears to be 
that when it is shown that the master or his agent has placed a defective 
appliance in the hands of his servant, which occasioned his injury while 
in the exercise of due care and caution, the burden shifts, and the master 
is then required to show that he exercised due care in their selection or 
manufacture." This case is also decided based on the fellow-servant 
defense. 
Not an employee- railroad passenger. 
The Plaintiff, a fireman who occasionally served as an engineer in a 
switch yard, was injured while coupling cars when another engineer hit 
the cars he was coupling. The Defendant argued that the Plaintiff was 
negligent and the Court agreed. This case is also decided based upon 
the fellow-servant defense and is a stronger argument here. 
190 
CASE 
The New York, 
Chicago and St. 
Louis Railroad 
Company v. 
Perriguey 
(138 Ind. 414) 
The Pennsylvania 
Company v. 
McCaffrey, 
Adtnin. 
(139 Ind. 430) 
Indiana, Illinois 
and Iowa Railway 
Company v. 
Snyder, Admin 
(140 Ind. 647) 
The Bedford Belt 
Railway Co. v. 
Brown 
(142 Ind. 659) 
YEAR 
1894 
1894 
1895 
1895 
WINNER 
Reversed for 
Defendant. 
Affinned for 
Plaintiff 
Affinned for 
Plaintiff 
Reversed for 
Defendant 
INFORMATION 
The Plaintiff, a brakeman, was injured when he was thrown from an 
engine while attetnpting to relight a lantern. The train had a defective 
lantern because the wind blew it out frequently leaving the brakemen in 
darkness. The Defendant (railroad company) argued that the Plaintiff 
was negligent because he attetnpted to relight the lantern while the train 
was moving and the Court agreed. The Court also uses the fellow-
servant defense to make its decision. 
The Plaintiff, a track laborer, was killed when he fell on the track and 
was run over by a hand car. The Defendant (railroad cotnpany) argued 
that the Plaintiff was contributorily negligent for not moving from the 
track in time. The Court found that the Defendant was liable because 
the hand train was being operated by only a fireman and a braketnan 
against the established rules. When rules are violated, causing an 
accident, the employer will be held liable. 
The Plaintiff, a railroad worker, was killed in a collision. The Court 
found that the Plaintiff was not contributorily negligent. 
The Plaintiff, a railroad construction worker, was injured when some 
heavy timbers slipped off a car. The Defendant (railroad company) 
claitned that the Plaintiff was contributorily negligent because he failed 
to observe if a wedge used to hold the timbers was safe before using it. 
The Court agreed. This case is also decided based upon the assumption 
of risk defense because an injured worker cannot bring a claim against 
his employer if he knew that wedges used in the construction of a track 
on which heavy timbers are conveyed are likely to slip out of place. 
191 
CASE 
The Pennsylvania 
Co. v. Finney, 
Admin. 
(145 Ind. 551) 
Louisville, New 
Albany and 
Chicago Railway 
Co., v. Howell 
(147 Ind. 266) 
YEAR 
1896 
1896 
WINNER 
Reversed for 
Defendant 
Affirmed for 
Plaintiff 
INFORMATION 
The Plaintiff, a railroad brakeman, was injured when he was clitnbing 
down a ladder on the side of the car, facing the car, and fell into danger. 
The Court found that the Plaintiff is guilty of contributory negligence in 
descending a ladder at the side of a car with his face toward the car, 
without looking and in a dangerous place. In order to prevail, a 
Plaintiff must show both negligence on the part of the tnaster and 
freedom from negligence on the part of the servant. The Plaintiff could 
have noticed the danger with ordinary diligence so cannot now claim 
that master was negligent. 
The Plaintiff was injured when a defective coupling link caused train to 
break in two. The Defendant (railroad cotnpany) argued that the 
Plaintiff was contributorily negligent because he knew he was using 
defective couplers but the Court found that the Defendant (railroad 
company) was at fault because it knew or could have known through 
inspection that the couplers were defective. 
192 
CASE 
The New York, 
Chicago and St. 
Louis railroad. 
Co. v. Ostman, 
Admin. 
( 146 Ind. 452) 
Robertson v. The 
Chicago & Erie 
Railroad Co. 
(146 Ind. 486) 
YEAR 
1896 
1896 
WINNER 
Reversed for 
Defendant 
Affirmed for 
Defendant 
INFORMATION 
The Plaintiff, a locomotive fireman, was looking out the window (as it 
was his duty to do) and was killed when he hit his head on a pole. The 
Defendant argued that the Plaintiff was contributorily negligent because 
he chose to look out the window, knowing that other railroad employees 
were killed doing this very thing. The Court also pointed out that the 
Plaintiff was 25 years old and old enough to know better. The 
Defendant is not held liable because the employee could have known of 
the danger. 
Dissent - Howard. "I think that the facts found by the jury show that 
the company was negligent and that the deceased was free from 
contributory negligence, and tnust therefore dissent from the conclusion 
reached by the court." 
The Plaintiff, an employee in machine repair shop associated with the 
railroad, was injured while placing a steam chest on a locotnotive. He 
lifted the steam chest based upon a promise of another and was injured 
when the other employee did not assist. The Defendant (railroad 
company) argued that the Plaintiff was contributorily negligent. The 
Court based on the fellow-servant defense, which was more persuasive. 
193 
CASE 
The Louisville 
and Nashville 
railroad Co. v. 
Kemper 
(147 Ind. 561) 
Young v. 
Citizen's Street 
Railroad 
Company 
(148 Ind. 54) 
Pittsburgh, 
Cincinnati, 
Chicago and St. 
Louis Railway 
Company v. 
Montgomery 
(152 Ind. 1) 
YEAR 
1897 
1897 
1898 
WINNER 
Reversed for 
Defendant 
Affirmed for 
Plaintiff 
Affirmed for 
Plaintiff 
INFORMATION 
The Plaintiff, a railroad laborer, performed odd jobs including loading 
and unloading freight and tnoving trains along the track. While moving 
a car along the track the Plaintiff was injured because the track was 
damaged. The Defendant argued the Plaintiff was contributorily 
negligent because he knew the track was datnaged. The Court agreed. 
Defendant also alleged that the Plaintiff assutned the risk associated 
with his employment because he had perfonned these tasks for ahnost a 
year and knew the condition of the track. The Court stated "[ w ]here 
defects connected with a service are open and obvious alike to the 
tnaster and the servant and the servant voluntarily continues in the 
service and incurs the hazards of such defects, he thereby assutnes the 
perils thereof and may not recover for injures sustained therefrotn." 
The Court found the assumption of risk defense more powerful. 
Not a railroad worker but someone working laying a gas pipe next to 
railroad. 
The Plaintiff, a freight brakeman, was injured in a collision. The 
Plaintiff argued that he was free from negligence and the accident was 
caused by the negligence of an engineer. The Court agreed. Part of this 
case deals with a constitutional challenge to an early version of an 
Employers' Liability Act (Acts 1893 p. 294 sections 7083-7087; Bums 
1894, sections 5206s-5206v). The constitutional challenge fails. This 
case also deals with a contract provision waiving liability, which the 
Court found void as against public policy. 
194 
CASE 
The Wabash 
Railroad 
Company v. Ray, 
Admin. 
(152 Ind. 392) 
The Cleveland, 
Cincinnati, 
. Chicago and St. 
Louis Railway 
Company v. Berry 
(152 Ind. 607) 
Whitcomb v. 
Standard Oil 
Company 
(153 Ind. 513) 
YEAR WINNER 
1898 Reversed for 
Defendant 
11899 I Reversed for 
Defendant 
1899 Affirmed for 
Defendant 
INFORMATION 
The Plaintiff, a freight brakeman, passed over railroad track to couple 
the cars, caught his foot in one of the open spaces, and was run over and 
killed by an onco1ning train. The Defendant argued that the Plaintiff 
was contributorily negligent because he placed his foot in the open 
space. The Court agreed. However, this case is also decided based 
upon the assumption of risk defense. 
The Plaintiff, a track inspector, was injured when he was hit in the back 
by a large iron pin from a train running approximately 40 1niles per 
hour. Evidence taken as a whole does not show the Defendant's 
negligence. 
The Plaintiff, a car coupler for a railroad operated by Standard Oil, was 
injured when one of the cars he was attempting to couple was cut loose 
and kicked onto a switch at a high speed. Evidence showed that the 
Plaintiff did not know if coupling links were in good condition, and 
while attempting to fix them did not observe the buffers, which led to 
his hand being crushed. The Court found that the Plaintiff had worked 
on coupling cars before and should have known of this risk, and by not 
taking proper precautions was contributorily negligent. The Court 
found that Plaintiffs injury flowed from an ordinary danger incident to 
the business in which he was engaged and which might have been 
avoided by the exercise of due care. 
195 
CASE I YEAR 
The Terre Haute 1 1900 
and Indianapolis 
Railroad 
Company v. 
Fowler, Admin. 
(154 Ind. 682) 
City ofFort I 1901 
Waynev. 
Christie, Admin. 
(156Ind.172) 
The Balti1nore 1 1901 
and Ohio 
Southwestern 
Railway Company 
v. Peterson, 
Admin. 
(156 Ind. 364) 
WINNER 
Affirmed for 
Plaintiff 
Affinned for 
Plaintiff 
Affirmed for 
Plaintiff 
INFORMATION 
The Plaintiff, a conductor of freight trains, was killed when a storm 
knocked out some of the train tracks and his car ran off the tracks. The 
Defendant (railroad company) knew of the incident and posted so1neone 
to warn oncoming trains, but they did not do so. The Defendant argued 
that the Plaintiff was contributorily negligent because he ran the train 
even though previous storms had caused damage to the tracks. 
However, the Court did not agree and found that because there had been 
floods before, the Defendant railroad company should have known 
there might be a problem and were on effective notice. The Court 
found for the Plaintiff. 
Not a railroad etnployee. 
The Plaintiff was repairing and cleaning the railroad tracks in switch 
yard when he was pushed and kicked backward on the track and was 
killed by a car. The Defendant (railroad company) argued that the 
Plaintiff was contributorily negligent because he was not on constant 
alert or lookout for the approach of a train. The Defendant also argued 
that the Plaintiff was at fault because he had a cap on and was not 
paying attention. The Court did not agree. 
196 
CASE YEAR WINNER INFORMATION 
Indianapolis 1901 Reversed for The Plaintiff, a telegraph operator at a railroad crossing, was to keep 
: Union Railway Defendant track of coming and going trains. The Plaintiff crossed the track to get 
Company v. to work and was struck and injured by an oncoming train because he 
Houlihan could not see the train because of the posts and overgrown weeds. The 
(157 Ind. 494) Defendant (railroad company) argued that failure to notice these 
obstructions and take proper precaution was contributory negligence. 
The Court agreed. This case is also decided based on the fellow-servant 
defense. 
The Pittsburgh, 1901 Affirmed for Plaintiff, a locomotive engineer, was killed in a collision on a common 
Cincinnati, Plaintiff track. The Defendant argued that the Plaintiff was contributorily 
Chicago and St. negligent, as it was an engineer's job to anticipate or know when trains 
Louis Railway were running. The Court disagreed. The Court ruled that it was the job 
Company v. of the Defendant (railroad company) to make sure two trains were not 
Martin, Admin. on same track. 
(157 Ind. 216) 
Davis Coal 1902 Affirmed for Not a railroad etnployee. 
Company v. Plaintiff 
Polland 
(158 Ind. 607) 
The Baltimore 1902 Reversed for The Plaintiff, a locomotive engineer running a passenger train, was 
and Ohio Defendant injured in a collision. The basis of the Court's decision is the fellow-
Southwestern servant defense, but the Defendant also alleged contributory negligence. 
Railway Company 
v. Jones 
(158 Ind. 87) 
--
197 
CASE 
Wright v. 
Chicago, 
Indianapolis and 
Louisville 
Railway Cotnpany 
(160 Ind. 583) 
Baltimore and 
Ohio 
Southwestern 
Railroad 
Company v. 
Roberts 
(161 Ind. 1) 
American Rolling 
Mill Company v. 
Hullinger 
(161 Ind. 673) 
Pittsburgh, 
Cincinnati, 
Chicago & St. 
Louis Railway 
Company v. 
Lightheiser 
(163 Ind. 247) 
YEAR 
1903 
1903 
1904 
1904 
WINNER 
Reversed for 
Defendant 
Affinned for 
Plaintiff 
Reversed for 
Defendant 
Reversed for 
Defendant 
INFORMATION 
The Plaintiff, a brakeman, was riding on the train cab and was injured 
when his leg was caught in the switch while descending the cab to 
apply the brakes. The Defendant argued that the Plaintiff knew or 
could have discovered how close the switch was and was contributorily 
negligent in choosing his method of descending the cab. This case also 
discussed the assumption of the risk defense. 
The Plaintiff, a yard switchman, was injured when lumber fell off a 
train car because the tracks were too close together. The Court found 
that the Plaintiff was not contributorily negligent because he did not 
have a duty to inspect the track to discover the tracks were too close 
together. This case also discussed the assumption of risk defense. 
Not a railroad employee. 
The Plaintiff was knocked down and injured by mail car that was being 
run backwards in rail yard. The Court detennined the Plaintiff could 
not recover because the Plaintiff did not show a duty of Defendant to 
have someone posed on both ends of train, lights, etc. 
198 
CASE 
Pittsburgh, 
Cincinnati, 
Chicago & St. 
Louis Railway 
Company v. 
Collins 
(163 Ind. 569) 
Chicago, 
Indianapolis & 
Louisville 
Railway Company 
v. Barnes 
(164 Ind. 143) 
Nickey et al v. 
Steuder 
(164 Ind. 189) 
City of 
.. Indianapolis et al 
v. Cauley 
(164 Ind. 304) 
YEAR 
1904 
1905 
1905 
1905 
WINNER 
Reversed for 
Defendant 
Reversed for 
Defendant 
Reversed for 
Defendant 
Affirmed for 
Plaintiff 
INFORMATION 
The Plaintiff, a freight conductor, was injured when his train car 
collided with an interurban car. The Defendant argued the Plaintiff 
was contributorily negligent for not avoiding the accident. The Court 
agreed. 
The Plaintiff, a brakeman, was killed when he got off the train to 
uncouple two cars and was so distracted by the steam and noise that he 
could not hear the oncoming train. The oncoming train was a boxcar 
with a large width projection (and stnall space between tracks) without 
lights or bells. The Court found no negligence on the part of the 
Defendant because no duty arose to provide a safe workplace. The 
Plaintiff was therefore negligent in going between the two cars. This 
case also discussed the assutnption of risk defense. 
Not a railroad, but a sawmill. 
The Plaintiff, an interurban repairman riding on a car on bridge, was 
injured when the bridge fell pushing the Plaintiff into the White River. 
The Court held . that Defendant must prove contributory negligence. 
The Defendant (railroad company) knew bridge was in disrepair and 
used it anyway. Plaintiff did not know. Plaintiff had no knowledge or 
means of knowledge. The Court ruled that the plaintiff did not know 
about the bridge, so he cannot be held contributorily negligent. 
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CASE 
Buehner Chair 
Co. v. Feulner, By 
Next Friend 
(164 Ind. 368) 
YEAR 
1905 
Chicago Tenninal I 1905 
Transfer Railroad 
Company v. 
Vandenberg et al 
(164 Ind. 470) 
Grand Trunk I 1906 
Western Railway 
Company v. 
Melrose 
(166 Ind. 658) 
Pittsburgh, I 1906 
Cincinnati, 
Chicago & St. 
Louis Railway 
Company v. 
Lightheiser 
168 Ind. 438 
WINNER 
Affirmed for 
Plaintiff 
Affinned for 
Plaintiff 
Reversed for 
Defendant 
Affirmed for 
Plaintiff 
INFORMATION 
Not railroad etnployee. 
The Plaintiff, a braketnan, was riding on the engine of the car (as he 
was required to do) when a switch along the tracks was left partially 
open and unlocked. The Court found that the Plaintiff could not have 
discovered through proper care that the switch was open so he cannot 
be held contributorily negligent. 
The Plaintiff was injured when a train hit a switch that the railroad 
company maintained for its box cars. The Court found that the Plaintiff 
knew of this switch and is therefore contributorily negligent. The Court 
also found that the Plaintiff did not establish that the failure to tnaintain 
the switch was the proxitnate cause of his injury, so no recovery. The 
Plaintiff also argued that failure to maintain the switch was negligence 
per se, but the Court did not agree. 
The Plaintiff, charged with directing incotning trains, was injured when 
a train backed up without warning. The train that hit the Plaintiff was 
backed up without a person stationed on the back of the cab as was 
required. The Defendant (railroad cotnpany) argued that the Plaintiff 
was contributorily negligent because he was charged with directing the 
trains. The Court did not agree. This case also discussed the 
assumption of risk defense and the fellow-servant defense. 
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CASE 
Chicago & Erie 
Railroad 
Company v. 
Lawrence, Admin. 
(169 Ind. 319) 
Chicago, 
Indianapolis & 
Louisville 
Railway Company 
v. Pritchard, 
Adtnin. 
(168 Ind. 398) 
Pittsburgh, 
Cincinnati, 
Chicago & St. 
Louis Railway 
Company v. 
Simons, by Next 
Friend 
(168 Ind. 333) 
YEAR 
1906 
1906 
1907 
WINNER 
Affinned for 
Plaintiff 
Affirmed for 
Plaintiff 
Affirmed for 
Plaintiff 
INFORMATION 
The Plaintiff, a railroad switchman, was standing on the side of a train 
with a lantern because he was moving an engine with no backing lights 
and was injured when he fell off the train and was hit by another train. 
The Defendant (railroad company) argued that the Plaintiff was 
contributorily negligent because he did not take notice of the position of 
the other train car. The jury found for the Plaintiff and the Indiana 
Supreme Court affirmed. 
The Plaintiff, charged with loading timbers on train, was pinned on the 
track by falling timbers and killed by an oncoming train. The Court 
found that the Plaintiff was not negligent and further stated that the 
Defendant (railroad company) was required to provide a safe place to 
work and they did not here. 
Not a railroad employee. 
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CASE 
New York, 
Chicago & St. 
Louis Railroad 
Company v. 
Hamlin 
( 170 Ind. 20) 
Bedford Quarries 
Company v. 
Bough 
(168 Ind. 671) 
Indianapolis 
Street Railway 
Company v. Kane 
(169 Ind. 25) 
YEAR 
1907 
1907 
1907 
WINNER 
Reversed for 
Defendant 
Reversed for 
Defendant 
Affirmed for 
Plaintiff 
INFORMATION 
Plaintiff, a head switchman in charge of directing train cars, was 
coupling cars when one of the cars had a bolt sticking out further than it 
was supposed to, and the bolt caught his leg and injured him. Another 
railroad employee was charged with inspecting the bolts to ensure this 
did not happen. The Defendant (railroad company) argued that the 
Plaintiff did not show that his accident was the direct and proximate 
cause of railroad's negligence. However, the Court found that if 
Plaintiff had looked he could have discovered the defect, and failure to 
do so constitutes contributory negligence. The Court also found that 
the Plaintiff should not have atte1npted to couple the cars by 1noving in 
front of them and that the Plaintiff was negligent because he chose a 
less safe alternative. 
Not a railroad employee. 
Interurban. The Plaintiff, a track laborer, was injured when he was hit 
by a large timber while propping up a foot bridge. The Defendant 
argued that the Plaintiff was contributorily negligent because he was 
standing under the large timbers, but the Court found that the Plaintiff 
was only standing where the foreman ordered. The Court therefore 
found that the Plaintiff was not negligent. This case also discussed the 
fellow-servant defense. 
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CASE 
Pittsburgh, 
Cincinnati, 
Chicago & St. 
Louis Railway 
Company v. Ross 
(169 Ind. 3) 
Indianapolis 
Union Railway 
Company et al. v. 
Waddington, 
Administrator 
( 169 Ind. 448) 
Inland Steel 
Company v. 
Yedinak, by Next 
Friend 
(172 Ind. 423) 
YEAR 
1907 
11907 
1909 
WINNER 
Affirmed for 
Plaintiff 
j Affirmed for 
Plaintiff 
Affirmed for 
Plaintiff 
INFORMATION 
The Plaintiff, a car coupler, was injured when a conductor (also 
employed by the Defendant) ordered hitn to arrange cars on the track 
and ordered an engineer to back a train car against the ones the Plaintiff 
was attempting to couple. The Court found the Plaintiff was not 
contributorily negligent for standing on the track because he was 
following the orders of the conductor, his superior. This case also 
discussed the assumption of risk defense, finding that a contract by 
which the employee assumed all risk of negligence in working upon a 
railroad was void as against public policy, and was also in violation of 
the express provision of Section One of the Employers' Liability Act. 
The Plaintiff, a brakeman with the Indianapolis Union Railway 
Cotnpany, jumped from a tnoving train and was killed by another train 
that was exceeding the speed laws. The Defendant (railroad company) 
claimed the Plaintiff was contributorily negligent because he jutnped 
frotn a moving train, but the Court found the Plaintiff was doing his job 
in the usual manner, so there was no evidence of negligence. This case 
also discussed the fellow-servant defense, which did not apply either. 
This is not a railroad case. Plaintiff fell asleep and caused his foot to 
fall asleep but this was not deetned contributory negligence. 
203 
CASE 
Cleveland, 
Cincinnati, 
Chicago and St. 
Louis Railway 
Company et al. v. 
Gossett, Admin. 
(172 Ind. 525) 
Cleveland, 
Cincinnati, 
Chicago and St. 
Louis Railway 
Company v. 
Morrey, Admin. 
(172 Ind. 513) 
YEAR I WINNER 
1909 1 Affinned for 
Plaintiff 
1909 1 Reversed for 
Defendant 
INFORMATION 
The Plaintiff was killed by a train. The Defendant argued that the 
Plaintiff was aware of the dangers present, but the Court found for the 
Plaintiff. The Court reasoned that it is the duty of the 1naster to protect 
his servants against his own negligence, and against all unusual and 
unexpected dangers known to the master and unknown to the servant. 
The Plaintiff, a brakeman in charge of coupling train cars, was killed 
when front car moved forward and then backed up in the dark without 
warning or lights. The Defendant (railroad Company) argued that the 
Plaintiff knew that the engine would be backed up so by staying on the 
tracks, he was contributorily negligent. The Court stated, "[i]t is a well-
settled rule that where the specific facts alleged show a knowledge of 
danger, or the same opportunities for knowledge as the 1naster has, 
these allegations will overcotne the general allegation of want of 
knowledge." The Court found that the Plaintiff knew the yard was dark 
and no lights were on train, so in order to overcome the contributory 
negligence defense, the Plaintiff must show a duty to keep the rail yard 
safe or lights on the train, and he did not so. The Court found for the 
Defendant. 
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CASE 
Cleveland, 
Cincinnati, 
Chicago and St. 
Louis Railway 
Company v. 
Powers 
(173 Ind. 1 05) 
William Laurie 
Company v. 
McCullough 
(174 Ind. 4 77) 
Vandalia Coal 
Cotnpany v. 
Yetntn 
(175 Ind. 524) 
Grand Trunk 
Western Railway 
Company v. Poole 
(175 Ind. 567) 
YEAR 
1909 
1910 
1910 
1910 
WINNER 
Reversed for 
Defendant 
Reversed for 
Defendant 
Affirmed for 
Plaintiff 
Affinned for 
Plaintiff 
INFORMATION 
The Plaintiff was hit by a train running off schedule while walking 
through a train yard. While the train running off schedule is a violation 
of a safety statute, the Court found that the fact that the Plaintiff knew 
about the violation meant that he cannot recover for injuries resulting 
from this violation. The Court tnaintained that a master is not liable to 
a servant for injuries caused by defects known to the servant, unless a 
promise has been made to repair, or some other excuse justifying the 
servant in remaining in the service. A servant of a railroad cotnpany 
has no right to rely upon the train schedule, or upon the custotn of using 
certain tracks for certain trains. The Court found that the Plaintiff 
cannot recover. 
Not a railroad employee- department store slip and fall. 
Coal mine employee. 
The Plaintiff, a car coupler, was thrown under a train when coupling 
two cars together because a switch was left closed. The Defendant 
(railroad company) argued that the Plaintiff should be held at least 
partially negligent, but the Court found that the Plaintiff was not 
responsible for opening the switch, and cannot be found negligent 
because h~ believed the switch had been opened. This case also 
discussed the assumption of risk defense. 
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CASE 
Cleveland, 
Cincinnati, 
Chicago and St. 
Louis Railway 
Company v. Lynn 
( 177 Ind. 311) 
Indiana Union 
Traction 
Cotnpany v. Long 
(176 Ind. 532) 
Lake Erie and 
Western Railroad 
Company v. 
Hennessey 
(177 Ind. 64) 
Indiana Union 
Traction 
Cotnpany v. 
Abrams 
(180 Ind. 54) 
Tippecanoe Loan 
and Trust 
Company v. Jester 
(180 Ind. 357) 
YEAR 
1911 
1911 
1912 
1913 
1913 
WINNER 
Affirmed for 
Plaintiff 
Affirmed for 
Plaintiff 
Reversed for 
Defendant (but 
grant new trial) 
Affirmed for 
Plaintiff 
Reversed for 
Defendant 
INFORMATION 
Not an employee- just sotneone who did not look and listen as required 
at track. 
Interurban. The Plaintiff was injured when a car jumped the tracks due 
to defective track tie. The Court found that the Defendant (interurban) 
has a responsibility to keep the track in good repair and the Plaintiff 
cannot be held liable for operating a car on this track. 
The Plaintiff, a car inspector, is injured while lying under a car, when 
the brake failed on an oncotning car and that car hit the car the Plaintiff 
was inspecting. The Defendant argued the Plaintiff was contributorily 
negligent because he did not warn the switchman that he was going to 
be under the car when he could have used a flag or signal. The Court 
agreed the Plaintiff was at least partially negligent and therefore bars 
any recovery for the Plaintiff. 
The Plaintiff, a motorman in charge of an interurban car, was injured 
when his air brake failed. The Court determined that operating the 
interurban car without an air brake did not make the Plaintiff negligent. 
The Court found the Defendant (interurban company) was negligent for 
operating a car without a functioning air brake. 
Tenant in apartment building rather than employee. 
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CASE 
Dickason v. The 
Indiana 
Creosoting 
Company 
( 179 Ind. 640) 
Chicago and Erie 
Railroad 
Company et al v. 
Dinius 
(180 Ind. 596) 
Chicago and Erie 
Railroad 
Company v. Lain 
(181 Ind. 386) 
YEAR I WINNER 
1913 1 Affirmed for 
Defendant 
1913 1 Affirmed for 
Plaintiff 
1914 I Affinned for 
Plaintiff 
INFORMATION 
The Plaintiff, a railroad worker, was injured while tneasuring the depth 
of oil in his engine's tank by a gas explosion. The Plaintiff argued the 
Court should find that the tnaster had a responsibility to install safety 
tneasures and that failure to install safety measures led to the explosion 
and the Plaintiffs resulting injuries. The Court, however, found that 
the Plaintiff was partially negligent because he did not follow all 
possible safety precautions, even though he perfonned his duties in the 
usual manner. This Plaintiff also argued res ipsa loquiter but that 
argument failed. 
The Plaintiff, a car coupler, was injured while crossing a track when he 
fell into a hole and was struck by an oncoming train. The injury 
occurred in an area shared by two railroad companies. The Court found 
that the Plaintiff was not contributorily negligent, because it was the 
track that was unsafe and ultimately led to the injury. The Court 
concluded that the Defendant (railroad cotnpany) had a duty to provide 
a safe workplace and make any risks known to the employee ahead of 
time. The Plaintiff is not required to inspect the track and look for 
holes before beginning work, so failure to do so is not considered 
negligence. The Court also discussed the assumption of the risk 
defense. 
The Plaintiff was directed by Defendant's foreman to move a car on a 
switch track. The foreman knew where Plaintiff was and allowed 
another car on the track. That car pushed against the Plaintiffs car and 
the Plaintiff was injured. The Court found that the Plaintiff cannot be 
held negligent because he did not contribute to the accident. The Court 
also found that the Plaintiff did not assume the risk of this type of injury 
because he cannot assume that foreman would be negligent. 
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CASE YEAR 
The Wabash 1914 
Railroad 
Cotnpany v. 
Gretzinger, 
Admin. 
(182 Ind. 155) 
Vandalia Railroad 1914 
Company v. 
Stillwell 
(181 Ind. 267) 
Childress, I 1914 
Admin., v. Lake 
Erie and Western 
Railroad 
Cotnpany 
(182 Ind. 251) 
Southern Railway I 1914 
Company et al. v. 
Howerton 
( 182 Ind. 208) 
WINNER 
Affinned for 
Plaintiff 
Affirmed for 
Plaintiff 
Reversed for 
Defendant 
Reversed for 
Defendant 
INFORMATION 
The Plaintiff, a freight train conductor, was killed when a passenger 
train collided with his train, which was stationed on a side track. The 
Plaintiff did not know and had no way of knowing that the switch was 
opened back up and an accident would occur. The Court concluded that 
failing to keep the switch closed was not contributory negligence on the 
part of the Plaintiff. This case also discussed the assumption of risk 
defense. 
Plaintiff, a freight brakeman, was thrown from a railroad car and 
injured. The Court discussed the federal statute and the bulk of the 
consideration is whether the federal statute or state common law apply. 
The Court found the state com1non law applied. Under the cotnmon 
law, an employee may not recover against an employer if the etnployee 
at all contributed to his injuries. The Court found that the engineer 
conducting the train that hit the Plaintiffs railroad car was responsible 
for the accident, so the Plaintiff recovers. This Court also discussed the 
assumption of risk defense, as well as fellow-servant defense. 
Not an employee. 
Case decided based on the fellow-servant defense, even though the 
Defendant also alleged that the Plaintiff was contributorily negligent. 
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CASE 
Nordyke & 
Marmon 
Cotnpany v. 
Whitehead, 
Administrator 
(183 Ind. 7) 
Vandalia Railroad 
Company v. 
Stringer 
182 Ind. 676 
YEAR 
1914 
1914 
The Pittsburgh, I 1915 
Cincinnati, 
Chicago and St. 
Louis Railway 
Company v. 
Farmers Trust and 
Savings 
Company, 
Administrator 
183 Ind. 444 
WINNER 
Affinned for 
Plaintiff 
Affirmed for 
Plaintiff 
Reversed for 
Defendant 
INFORMATION 
The Plaintiff was hauling coal with chain attached to a rope when it 
broke and struck the Plaintiff, killing hitn. The Plaintiff argued that the 
Defendant (railroad company) knew of danger of the brittle rope and 
did not tell Plaintiff, so he cannot be found to be contributorily 
negligent. The Court also found that that the Defendant could have 
found out through regular testing other than just a straight pull that the 
rope was weak. The Plaintiff cannot be contributorily negligent for 
using the equiptnent provided by his employer. 
The Plaintiff, a brakeman, was injured when he leapt frotn a moving 
engine in response to a loud blow caused by a buildup of steam in the 
engine. The Plaintiff, at the time of his injury, was required to ride in 
the cab of the engine. The loud blast was caused by a water buildup, 
which the Court found to be the Defendant's fault. The Court 
detennined the Plaintiffs actions were not negligent and that he could 
recover. 
The Plaintiff, a railroad laborer, was killed while building a railroad 
track parallel to another track. Evidence showed that the Plaintiff was 
negligent because he did not take the proper safety precautions and the 
Court found for the Defendant. This case also discussed jurisdictional 
concerns and found that this company was engaged in interstate 
commerce. 
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CASE 
The Pittsburgh, 
Cincinnati, 
Chicago and St. 
Louis Railway 
Cotnpany v. 
Farmers Trust and 
Savings 
Cotnpany, 
Administrator 
183 Ind. 287 
Terre Haute, 
Indianapolis and 
Eastern Traction 
Company v. 
Weddle, Admin. 
183 Ind. 305 
YEAR 
1915 
1915 
WINNER 
Affinned for 
Plaintiff 
Affirmed for 
Plaintiff 
INFORMATION 
The Plaintiff, a railroad clerk responsible for recording incotning and 
outgoing cars, was hit and killed when an engine backed over hitn. The 
Defendant (railroad cotnpany) argued that the Plaintiff was 
contributorily negligent because it was his duty to know when cars are 
cotning and going. The Court found that the Plaintiff was not negligent 
as he did not have control over the engine which backed over him. The 
Court also discussed the assumption of risk defense. 
Plaintiff, a section foreman, was placed in charge of moving a work 
train. He was to go through sotne security measures first to tnake sure 
he did not collide with a passenger train. The Plaintiff's work train 
collided with a passenger train and the Plaintiff was injured. The 
Defendant (railroad cotnpany) argued that the collision was at least in 
part the fault of the Plaintiff and his recovery should be barred. The 
Defendant also maintained that the Plaintiff tnust accept some of the 
responsibility (which would bar recovery completely) because he was a 
foretnan and in charge of moving the train. However, this Court found 
that the Plaintiff was not negligent and could not have avoided the 
accident because he was not in charge of the moving passenger train. 
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CASE 
Evansville and 
Terre Haute 
Railroad 
Company v. 
Lipking, Admin. 
(183 Ind. 572) 
Chicago and Erie 
Railroad 
Company v. 
Mitchell, Adtnin 
(184 Ind. 383) 
Chicago and Erie 
Railroad 
Company v. 
Mitchell, Admin. 
(184 Ind. 588) 
YEAR 
1915 
1915 
1915 
WINNER 
Affirmed for 
Plaintiff 
Affirmed for 
Plaintiff 
Affirmed for 
Plaintiff 
INFORMATION 
Plaintiff, a car coupler, walked between the two cars he was attempting 
to couple to get a part to fix them and was hit by another car. The 
railroad foreman ordered the car that hit the Plaintiff onto the track. 
The Defendant (railroad company) argued that the Plaintiff was 
contributorily negligent in walking between two cars, while the Plaintiff 
maintained that he was acting prudently. The Court found that the 
Defendant did not provide enough evidence that the Plaintiff was 
negligent. Contributory negligence is an issue for the Defendant to 
show and this goes to the jury so hard to overturn on appeal because 
this is a high standard to tneet. This case also discusses the assumption 
of risk defense. 
The Plaintiff, a railroad car repairer, was under a car a on sidetrack 
when another engineer ran a car upon track without warning him and 
Plaintiff was killed. Defendant (railroad company) claims that the 
railroad employee responsible for placing the signal flags did not do his 
job and the fellow-servant rule would preclude recovery. The Defendant 
also claimed that the Plaintiff was contributorily negligent because he 
was under the car without making sure that the proper signal flags were 
out, but the Court did not agree with the Defendant's contentions and 
ruled in favor of the Plaintiff. 
The Court affirmed that the cotnmon law is no longer in force because 
of the new workers' compensation rule, so the fellow-servant defense, 
the contributory negligence defense and the assumption of risk defense 
are no longer available. Plaintiff, a car repairer, was killed when 
passing between two cars to reach the bolt house to obtain his tools. 
Defendant (railroad company) is responsible for his injuries. 
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CASE 
The Baltimore 
and Ohio and 
Chicago Railroad 
Company v. 
Rowan 
(104 Ind. 88) 
The Pittsburgh, 
Cincinnati and St. 
Louis Railway 
Company v. 
Adams 
( 1 0 5 Ind. 151) 
YEAR 
1885 
1886 
APPENDIXC 
THE ASSUMPTION OF RISK DEFENSE 
1880-1915 
WINNER 
Affirmed for 
Plaintiff (with 
costs) 
Reversed for 
Defendant 
(with a motion 
to make 
complaint more 
specific) 
INFORMATION 
The Plaintiff, a brakeman, hit his head on a low bridge while riding on 
the top of a train. The Defendant (RR company) argued that the 
Plaintiff assumed the risk that an accident would occur. The Court 
found that the Plaintiff did not assutne the risk because he did not know 
how low the bridge was but the Defendant did. The Court said, "[i]t 
seems to us that a railroad company is, and ought to be, required to 
construct and maintain its roadway and appendages, and its overhead 
structures, in such manner and condition that its employee or servant 
can do and perform all the labors and duties required of him, with 
reasonable safety." 
The Plaintiff, a young section hand, was acting as a brakeman when his 
pants were caught on the track and a train ran over his foot. The 
Defendant argued that the Plaintiff had assumed the risk that injury 
might occur and the Court agreed. The Court explained that the 
Plaintiff did not prove that he could not discover or did not know of the 
defective rail which led to the accident. 
212 
CASE 
Wollery, Ad1nin. 
v. The Louisville, 
New Albany and 
Chicago Railway 
Company 
( 1 07 Ind. 3 81) 
The Louisville, 
New Albany and 
Chicago Railway 
Company v. 
Frawley 
(110 Ind. 18) 
The Indianapolis 
and St. Louis 
Railway 
Company v. 
Watson 
(114 Ind. 20) 
YEAR I WINNER 
1886 1 Affirmed for 
Defendant 
1886 1 Affirmed for 
Plaintiff 
1887 I Reversed for 
Defendant 
INFORMATION 
Plaintiff was a passenger and not an e1nployee. 
The Plaintiff, a railroad coupler, was injured while coupling a car that 
had different hooks than he was used to. The Defendant argued that the 
Plaintiff accepted that injury might occur from coupling cars, but the 
Court did not agree. The Court found that workers, like the Plaintiff, do 
not assume unusual risks, like unfamiliar coupling hooks, reasoning 
that an employee who engages in dangerous employment assumes the 
ordinary risks and perils of the service only. The Court further 
maintained that defendants cannot clai1n assumption of risk when they 
know (or could have known through reasonable investigation) that their 
employees are immature, lack experience, or could not appreciate the 
dangers. 
The Plaintiff, a night watchman, was injured by an oncoming train in a 
dark railroad yard because he did not have a lantern as he requested and 
had been promised by the Defendant. The Defendant argued that the 
Plaintiff did his job, knowing that he did not have a flashlight, and 
thereby assumed the risk of any injury. The Court found that generally, 
an employee who continues in the service of his employer, after notice 
of a defect augmenting the danger, assumes the risk as increased by the 
defect. 
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CASE 
Indiana, 
Bloomington and 
Western Railway 
Company et al. v. 
Barnhart 
(115 Ind. 399) 
The Louisville, 
New Albany and 
Chicago Railway 
Company v. 
Wright 
(115 Ind. 378) 
The Louisville, 
New Albany and 
Chicago Railway 
Companyv. 
Sandford, Admin. 
(117 Ind. 265) 
The Brazil Block 
Coal Company v. 
Young 
(117 Ind. 520) 
YEAR 
1888 
1888 
1889 
1889 
WINNER 
Affinned for 
Plaintiff 
Affirmed for 
Plaintiff 
Reversed for 
Defendant 
(petition for 
rehearing 
denied) 
Reversed for 
Plaintiff 
(complaint is 
insufficient) 
INFORMATION 
The Plaintiff was injured when he was hit by a derailed train car. The 
Defendant argued that the Plaintiff had assumed the risk of injury 
because he was familiar with the tracks so the Defendant should 
therefore not be liable. The Court found for the Plaintiff because the 
track was not safe and there was a state law providing that when one 
railroad track crosses another, the company that constructed the last 
track would be liable for unsafe crossings. 
A brakeman hit his head on a low overhead bridge while riding on the 
top of the train, as required by his job. The Defendant (RR company) 
argued that the brakeman Plaintiff was responsible because he was 
aware of the bridge and therefore he assumed the risk of injury. The 
Court found that the Plaintiff did not assume the risk of injury because 
the Defendant did not provide enough warning of the low overhead 
bridge. 
The Plaintiff, a baggage master, was injured when a bridge collapsed, 
causing the train to crash. The Defendant (RR company) argued that 
the Plaintiff had assumed the risk of insufficient bridges because he had 
notice that the bridge was in disrepair and the Defendant was therefore 
not responsible. The Court agreed with the Defendant and denied 
recovery for the Plaintiff, stating that employees cannot claim damages 
for injuries if they have notice of the danger and voluntarily continue 
servtce. 
The Plaintiff was not a railroad employee. The Plaintiff was a 16 year 
old charged with tnaintaining entrances, avenues, passages, and 
roadways in mine. 
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CASE YEAR WINNER INFORMATION 
Taylor v. The 1889 Reversed for The Plaintiff, a machinist in a railroad repair shop, was injured when 
Evansville and Plaintiff his superior mechanic dropped a heavy piece of iron on the Plaintiff. : 
Terre Haute The mechanic ordered the Plaintiff to help hitn hold the heavy iron and j 
Railroad then let the iron go without warning the Plaintiff. The Defendant (RR 
Company cotnpany) argued that the Plaintiff had assumed all the risks incident to 
(121 Ind. 124) his service and therefore may not recover damages. The Court held that 
the Defendant was responsible because the accident was a result of the 
negligent actions of the Plaintiffs superior and this is not a risk that the 
Plaintiff assumes. This case also discussed the fellow-servant defense. 
- - -
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CASE 
Nall, Admin. v. 
The Louisville, 
New Albany and 
Chicago Railway 
Company 
(129 Ind. 260) 
YEAR 
1891 
WINNER 
Reversed for 
Plaintiff (with 
costs) 
INFORMATION 
The Plaintiff, a railroad repairman, was injured while attempting to save 
a falling bridge, under the orders of his superior. The Defendant argued 
that the Plaintiff had the same opportunity to notice the defect and he 
assumed the risk .of injury by continuing to work. The Court found that 
the Plaintiff did not assu1ne the risk of injury because atte1npting to 
save a falling bridge was not a duty originally contemplated by the 
Plaintiff. The Court reasons that where the Inaster orders a servant to 
do something which involves encountering a risk not contemplated in 
his employment duties, although the risk is equally open to the 
observation of both, it does not necessarily follow that the servant either 
assu1nes the increased risk or is negligent in obeying the order. The 
Court established this rule in determining if an e1nployee assumed the 
risk--if the apparent danger is such that a man of ordinary prudence 
would not take the risk, the servant acts at his peril, but unless the 
apparent danger is such as to deter a Inan of ordinary prudence from 
encountering it, the servant will not be compelled to abandon the 
service, or assume all additional risk, but may obey the order, using 
care in proportion to the risk apparently assumed. This case also 
discusses the fellow-servant defense. 
216 
CASE 
The Evansville & 
Terre Haute 
Railroad 
Company v. Duel 
(134 Ind. 156) 
Sheets, Admin., 
etc. v. Chicago 
and Indiana Coal 
Railway 
Company 
(139 Ind. 682) 
Evansville and 
Terre Haute 
Railroad Co. v. 
Tohill, Adtnin., 
etc. 
(143 Ind. 49) 
YEAR 
1893 
1894 
1895 
WINNER 
Reversed for 
Defendant 
Affirmed for 
Defendant 
Held for 
Plaintiff 
INFORMATION 
The Plaintiff, a car coupler, injured his hand when a defective throttle 
valve caused one car to hit another. The Defendant (RR company) 
argue that the Plaintiff knew of this danger because he was working on 
the throttle valve at the time of the injury, knew it was not operating 
properly, and continued with his employment, thereby accepting any 
resulting injury. The Court agreed with the Defendant, finding that the 
Plaintiff could not recover because the Plaintiff knew of the danger and 
could not prove that the Defendant knew of the danger. 
The Plaintiff, a brakeman, injured his foot when it was stuck in an 
irregularity along the track and was killed by an oncoming train. The 
Defendant (RR company) argued that the Plaintiff assumed the risk of 
injury because he voluntarily went in front of a detached car. The 
Court found that the Plaintiff assumed the risk of injury and, he 
therefore received no recovery. This case also discussed the fellow-
servant defense. 
Plaintiff was a passenger and not an etnployee. 
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CASE 
The Louisville 
and Nashville 
Railroad 
Company v. 
Kemper 
(147 Ind. 561) 
The Wabash 
Railroad 
Company v. Ray, 
Admin. 
(152 Ind. 392) 
Indiana, Illinois 
and Iowa 
Railroad 
Company v. 
Bundy 
(152 Ind. 590) 
YEAR 
1897 
1898 
1899 
WINNER 
Reversed for 
Defendant 
Reversed for 
Defendant 
Affirmed for 
Plaintiff 
INFORMATION 
The Plaintiff was injured while manually moving trains along a 
damaged track. While moving a car, the Plaintiff slipped and his foot 
was caught on the track and severed. The Defendant (RR company) 
argued that the Plaintiff knew of the condition of the track, as he had 
worked along that satne track for over one year, and has therefore 
assumed the risk of injury. The Court agreed with the Defendant and 
found that "[ w ]here defects connected with a service are open and 
obvious alike to the master and the servant and the servant voluntarily 
continues in the service and incurs the hazards of such defects, he 
thereby assumes the perils thereof and may not recover for injures 
sustained therefro1n." 
The Plaintiff, a freight brakeman, was injured when his foot became 
caught in the track, and he was hit by .an oncoming train and died. The 
Defendant (RR co1npany) argued that the Plaintiff assutned the risk of 
injury because he had worked the satne route for some tilne and was 
aware of the danger. The Court found that the Plaintiff assumed the 
risk because the hazard (the open space on the track) was open and 
obvious to the Plaintiff. 
The Plaintiff, a brakeman and car coupler, was injured when he caught 
his foot in an interlocking switch device at night. The Defendant (RR 
company) argued that the Plaintiff assumed the risk of such injury 
because he had worked in this same area for some time. The Court 
disagreed and found that the Plaintiff did not assume the risk because 
the danger was not open and obvious enough to put a man of ordinary 
prudence and caution on guard. 
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CASE I YEAR 
The Pennsylvania I 1899 
Company v. 
Ebaugh 
(152 Ind. 531) 
Louisville, New I 1899 
Albany and 
Chicago Railway 
Cotnpany v. 
Wagner 
(153 Ind. 420) 
Whitcomb v. 
Standard Oil 
Cotnpany 
(153 Ind. 513) 
1899 
WINNER 
Reversed for 
Defendant 
Affinned for 
Plaintiff 
Affirmed for 
Defendant 
INFORMATION 
The Plaintiffs ann was severed when he attempted to couple two cars 
in the dark. The Defendant (RR company) argued that the Plaintiff 
knew, or should have known, about the danger and therefore assutned 
the risk of injury .. The Court agreed. 
The Plaintiff was injured while loading a heavy truck on a flat car when 
his superior let go of the truck without telling the Plaintiff. The 
Defendant (RR company) argued that the Plaintiff assurned the risk of 
such injury. The Court disagreed and found the Defendant liable. The 
Court reasoned that the Plaintiff could not assume the risk that his 
superior would act negligently. The Court also found the Plaintiff acted 
with due care and diligence at the tirne of the accident. This case also 
mentioned the fellow-servant defense. 
The Plaintiff, a car coupler, was injured while attempting to couple two 
cars. The coupler pins were not in good condition and were not 
working. The Plaintiff reached inside the coupling mechanism, thereby 
crushing his hand. Furthermore, the Plaintiff was not made aware of 
the condition of the coupling mechanism. The Defendant (RR 
company) argued that the Plaintiff assumed the risk because he was an 
experienced car coupler and knew of the danger. The Court agreed 
with the Defendant and reasoned that Plaintiff assutned the risk because 
he knew or could have known about the condition of the coupling pins 
and because the injury resulted from a danger ordinary to his job. 
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CASE 
Chicago, 
Indianapolis & 
Louisville 
Railway 
Company v. 
Glover, Admin. 
(154 Ind. 584) 
Coyle, Admin. v. 
Pittsburgh, 
Cincinnati, 
Chicago and St. 
Louis Railway 
Co1npany 
(155 Ind. 429) 
City of Fort 
Waynev. 
Christie, Admin. 
(156 Ind. 172) 
The Baltimore 
and Ohio 
Southwestern 
Railway 
Company v. 
Peterson, Admin. 
of Estate of 
Peterson 
(156 Ind. 364) 
YEAR 
1900 
1900 
1901 
1901 
WINNER 
Reversed for 
Defendant 
Affinned for 
Defendant 
Affirmed for 
Plaintiff 
Affirmed for 
Plaintiff 
INFORMATION 
The Plaintiff, a conductor, was killed when the train platform he was 
standing on hit an embanklnent and knocked hi1n off. The Defendant 
(RR Co1npany) argued that the Plaintiff assumed the risk. The Court 
agreed because the Plaintiff knew of the condition of the track and 
continued work. 
The Plaintiff, a railroad section hand, was riding ho1ne fro1n work on 
his e1nployer' s railroad when he was thrown from the train because of a 
defect in the track. The Defendant (RR company) argued that the 
Plaintiff assumed the risk because he was riding on a freight train with 
no caboose or passenger car attached and the Court agreed. This case 
also discussed the contributory negligence defense. 
The injured party was not a railroad employee. 
The Plaintiff was killed while repairing and cleaning the tracks in a 
switch yard by a train running off schedule in violation of a city 
ordinance. The Defendant (RR company) argued that the Plaintiff 
assumed the risk of injury when he accepted employment in a 
hazardous location, but the Court did not agree. The Court found that 
the Plaintiff cannot assume the risk of the Defendant's nonobservance 
of a city ordinance. This case also discussed the contributory 
negligence defense. 
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CASE 
Davis Coal 
Cotnpany v. 
Polland 
(158 Ind. 607) 
Hollingsworth, 
Admin. v. The 
Chicago, 
Indianapolis & 
Louisville 
Railway 
Company 
( 160 Ind. 259) 
Wright v. 
Chicago, 
Indianapolis and 
Louisville 
Railway 
Cotnpany 
(160 Ind. 583) 
YEAR I WINNER 
1902 I Affirmed for 
Plaintiff 
1902 I Affirmed for 
Defendant 
1903 I Reversed for 
Defendant 
INFORMATION 
The injured party was not a railroad employee. 
The Plaintiff, a brakeman, died when the train hit a low bridge while he 
was riding it. The Plaintiff was unaware that the low bridge was 
approaching because the Defendant (RR company) did not maintain its 
warning signals. The Defendant argued that the Plaintiff knew of the 
danger because he had been warned many times and knew tnany co-
workers that were injured in this same tnanner. The Court agreed with 
the Defendant, reasoning that the Plaintiff was made aware of the 
danger and cannot later say that he did not assutne the risk. 
The Plaintiff, a brakeman, was injured while descending from the top of 
a train cab, when he stepped opposite the switch target and caught his 
leg on a fan located too close to the track. The fan severed the 
Plaintiffs leg. The Defendant argued that the Plaintiff assumed the risk 
of injury because he descended frotn the cab knowing how close he was 
to the fan. The Court agreed with the Defendant finding that the 
Plaintiff knew of the danger and had sufficient time and opportunity for 
making objections and he therefore cannot recover. The Court seetned 
reluctant to find for the Defendant but found that the evidence 
demonstrated the Plaintiff was aware of the danger and thereby 
assumed the risk of injury. 
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CASE I YEAR 
Consolidated 1 1903 
Stone Cotnpany 
v. Morgan, 
Admin. 
(160 Ind. 241) 
Consutners Paper I 1903 
Cotnpany v. Eyer 
(160 Ind. 424) 
Baltimore and 1 1903 
Ohio 
Southwestern 
Railroad 
Company v. 
Roberts 
(161 Ind. 1) 
Citizens Street I 1903 
Railroad 
Cotnpany v. Jolly 
(161 Ind. 80) 
American Rolling I 1903 
Mill Company v. 
Hullinger 
(161 Ind. 673) 
WINNER 
Affinned for 
Plaintiff 
Affirmed for 
Plaintiff 
Affinned for 
Plaintiff 
Reversed for 
Defendant 
Reversed for 
Defendant 
INFORMATION 
The injured party was not a railroad etnployee. 
The injured party was not a railroad etnployee. 
The Plaintiff, a yard switchman, was injured by falling lutnber while 
standing next to a freight train car. The Defendant (RR cotnpany) 
argued that the Plaintiff assutned the risk of injury because he worked 
in a yard where the tracks were not spaced properly to ensure that such 
an accident would not occur. The Court disagreed. The Court found 
that the Plaintiff did not assume the risk of injury because he had the 
right to presume that railroad tracks were a reasonably safe distance 
from each other. This case also discussed the contributory negligence 
defense. 
The injured party was not a railroad employee, but was a passenger. 
The injured party was not a railroad employee. 
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CASE YEAR WINNER INFORMATION 
Southern Indiana 1903 Reversed for The Plaintiff was injured by a falling stone while taking a break from 
Railway Defendant building a bridge on the jobsite. The Defendant (RR cotnpany) argued 
Company v. that the Plaintiff assumed the risk that another employee tnight act 
Harrell negligently, which could result in the Plaintiffs injury. The Court 
(161 Ind. 689) agrees. The Court found that etnployees assutne the risk of negligence 
of a fellow employee and the Plaintiff may overcome this assumption 
only by showing negligence in hiring or selection of those employees. 
This case also discussed the fellow-servant defense. 
Chicago, 11903 I Affinned for I The injured party was not a railroad employee. 
Indianapolis, & Plaintiff 
Louisville 
Railway 
Company v. 
Leachman 
(161 Ind. 512) 
Indianapolis & 1904 Reversed for The Plaintiff, an interurban track repairman, was injured while riding 
Greenfield Defendant on an employee train car to his worksite. The Defendant (interurban) 
Transit Company argued that the Plaintiff assumed the risk of injury by riding on the car. 
v. Foreman The Court agreed. This case also discussed the fellow-servant defense. 
(162 Ind. 85) 
Dill v. Marmon Reversed for The injured party was not a railroad employee. 
(164 Ind. 507) Defendant 
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CASE 
Chicago, 
Indianapolis & 
Louisville 
Railway 
Company v. 
Barnes 
(164 Ind. 143) 
City of 
Indianapolis et al. 
v. Cauley 
(164 Ind. 304) 
Robertson v. 
Ford 
(164 Ind. 538) 
YEAR 
1905 
1905 
1905 
WINNER 
Reversed for 
Defendant 
Affinned for 
Plaintiff 
Affirmed for 
Defendant 
INFORMATION 
The Plaintiff, a braketnan and car coupler, was hit by a boxcar with a 
large projection and killed while attetnpting to uncouple cars. The 
Plaintiff could not hear the approaching train because it had no lights or 
warning bells and because there was too much steam and noise in the 
rail yard. The Defendant (RR company) argued that the Plaintiff 
assumed the risk of such injury associated with his job and the Court 
agreed. The Court explained that the Plaintiffs may only recover if they 
show that they are ignorant of the risks associated with their job and the 
Plaintiff did not do so. 
The Plaintiff, an interurban repainnan, was injured when a bridge he 
was working on collapsed into the White River. The Defendant (RR 
company) argued that the Plaintiff assutned the risk of injury, but the 
Court does not agree. The Court explained that the Plaintiff could not 
assume the risk of injury because he was unaware that the bridge was in 
disrepair. This case also discussed the contributory negligence defense. 
The injured party was not a railroad employee. 
224 
CASE 
Pittsburgh, 
Cincinnati, 
Chicago and St. 
Louis Railway 
Co1npany v. 
Nicholas 
(165 Ind. 679) 
Grand Trunk 
Western Railway 
Company v. 
Melrose 
(166 Ind. 658) 
YEAR 
1906 
1906 
WINNER 
Affinned for 
Plaintiff 
Reversed for 
Defendant 
INFORMATION 
The Plaintiff, a brakeman, was ordered by the conductor (his superior) 
to put his train onto the track and stop it at a certain place on the track. 
The conductor, after giving this order, negligently failed to cut the car 
loose. When the Plaintiff applied the brake he was thrown off the train 
and injured. The Defendant (RR company) argued that the Plaintiff had 
assu1ned the risk of injury because he knew his job was dangerous, yet 
continued e1nployment. The Court does not agree. The Court reasoned 
that the Plaintiff cannot be held to have assumed the risk of injury 
because he was following orders and could not have anticipated the 
danger inherent in these actions. The Court further explained that 
assu1nption of the risk defense rests on the idea of a voluntary action 
and here the Plaintiff was following orders. 
The Plaintiff was injured when the train he was working on hit a box 
another e1nployee had left on the track and the train derailed. The 
Defendant (RR co1npany) argued that the Plaintiff assu1ned the risk of 
injury and the Court agreed. The Court did not agree with the 
Plaintiffs argument that the assumption of risk defense did not apply 
because the Defendant knew of the danger and did not use a safety 
device to protect from such injury. The Court reasoned that there was 
no legal duty to use a safety device, so the Plaintiff assumes the risk. 
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CASE 
Pittsburgh, 
Cincinnati, 
Chicago & St. 
Louis Railway 
Company v. 
Lightheiser 
(168 Ind. 438) 
Chicago & Erie 
Railroad 
Company v. 
Lawrence, 
Admin. 
(169 Ind. 319) 
Indianapolis 
Traction & 
Terminal 
Company v. Kidd 
(167 Ind. 402) 
YEAR 
1906 
1906 
1906 
WINNER 
Affirmed for 
Plaintiff 
Affinned for 
Plaintiff 
Affinned for 
Plaintiff 
INFORMATION 
The Plaintiff was hit by a train while directing the traffic at a rail 
station, when the engineer in control of one of the cars backed his car 
up without stationing anyone at the rear of the cab. The Defendant (RR 
cotnpany) argued that the Plaintiff assumed the risk of injury resulting 
frotn another employee's negligence, but the Court did not agree, 
finding that railroad employees cannot assume the risk of persons in 
charge of signal or telegraph offices, switch yards, shops, round-houses, 
locomotive engines, trains upon a railway, or of others in authority, 
since they are treated as vice-principals and not as fellow servants. 
This case also discussed the fellow-servant defense and the contributory 
negligence defense. 
The Plaintiff, a switchman, was standing on the back of a train holding 
a lantern because the train had no backing light, when the conductor hit 
another train, causing the Plaintiff to fall to his death. The Defendant 
(RR cotnpany) argued that the Plaintiff assutned the risk of injury, but 
the Court did not agree. The Court reasoned that etnployees may not 
assume the risk that their employer will violate a specific duty imposed 
by statute or municipal ordinance. This case also discussef the 
contributory negligence defense. 
The injured party was not a railroad employee. 
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CASE 
Pittsburgh, 
Cincinnati, 
Chicago & St. 
Louis Rail way 
Company v. 
Simons, by Next 
Friend 
(168 Ind. 333) 
Indianapolis 
Street Railway 
Company v. 
Kane 
(169 Ind. 25) 
Pittsburgh, 
Cincinnati, 
Chicago & St. 
Louis Railway 
Company v. Ross 
(169 Ind. 3) 
YEAR 
1907 
1907 
1907 
WINNER 
Affinned for 
Plaintiff 
Affinned for 
Plaintiff 
Affirmed for 
Plaintiff 
INFORMATION 
The injured party was not a railroad employee. 
The Plaintiff, an interurban track repair man, was hit by a large timber 
and injured while attempting to prop up a collapsed foot bridge under 
the orders of his foreman. The Defendant argued that the jury 
instructions were not followed because the lower court instructed the 
jury that a person who is hired to do railroad track repair assutnes all 
the ordinary risks of etnploytnent and cannot rely on the employer to 
provide a flawless workplace. Despite these instructions, the lower 
court found for the Plaintiff. This Court saw no reason to overturn the 
ruling. This case also discussed the fellow-servant and contributory 
negligence defenses. 
The Plaintiff, a car coupler, was injured when a conductor negligently 
ordered another engineer to back against the cars the Plaintiff was 
attempting to couple. The Defendant argued that the Plaintiff had 
signed a contract stating that he assumed all the risk incident to his 
employment, but the Court refused to enforce this contract, holding as it 
was against public policy. 
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CASE 
Fort Wayne and 
Wabash Valley 
Traction 
Company v. 
Roudebush, 
Admin. 
(173 Ind. 57) 
Cleveland, 
Cincinnati, 
Chicago and St. 
Louis Railway 
Company v. 
Morrey, Admin. 
(172 Ind. 513) 
YEAR 
1909 
1909 
WINNER 
Affinned for 
Plaintiff 
Reversed for 
Defendant 
INFORMATION 
The Plaintiff, an interurban repairman, was killed when the car he was 
working with collided with a second car. The conductor of the second 
car started moving before looking to tnake sure the first car was not in 
the way. The Defendant (interurban) argued that the Plaintiff assumed 
the risk of injury, but the Court did not agree. The Court held that 
Plaintiff cannot assume the risk that a fellow etnployee will act 
negligently, nor could the Plaintiff assutne the risk created by the 
Defendant's failure to observe a statute. The Court further held that the 
Plaintiff cannot be held to have assumed the risk because he did not 
know and could not have discovered this particular risk, reasoning that 
a servant assumes only those risks known to hitn, including when such 
risks arise from the master's negligence. 
The Plaintiff, a brakeman in charge of coupling cars in a dark train 
yard, was killed when the conductor of the train he was riding on top of 
tnoved forward for water and then backed up without warning, 
throwing the Plaintiff from the train. The Defendant (RR company) 
argued that the Plaintiff knew the car would back up after going 
forward for water, so he assumed the risk when he chose to remain on 
top of the train. The Court agreed with the Defendant, finding that the 
Plaintiff had the same opportunity to avoid the accident as the 
Defendant and he therefore assumed the risk. The Plaintiff was aware 
of the conditions in the train yard and chose to continue work. 
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CASE YEAR WINNER INFORMATION 
I 
Lake Shore and 1909 Reversed for The Plaintiff fell and was injured while walking on an employee path : 
Michigan Defendant alongside the tracks when loose dirt caused the path to deteriorate. The 
Southern Railway Defendant (RR cotnpany) argued that the Plaintiff assutned the risk 1 
Company v. because he knew of the condition of the path and used it anyway. The i 
Johnson Court agreed, even though the Plaintiff showed that the Defendant also 
1 
( 172 Ind. 548) knew of the loose dirt. 
I 
Cleveland, 1909 Reversed for The Plaintiff was injured walking through the train yard in a dense fog 1 
Cincinnati, Defendant when he was hit by a train that was running off schedule. The 
Chicago and St. Defendant (RR cotnpany) argued that the Plaintiff assumed the risk of 
Louis Railway injury by walking in a dark train yard, but the Court did not agree 
Company v. because the Plaintiff was taking the only path available. The Court, 
Powers however, ultitnately found for the Defendant on other grounds. 
(173 Ind. 1 05) 
William Laurie 1910 Reversed for The injured party was not a railroad employee. 
Company v. Defendant 
McCullough 
(174 Ind. 477) 
Oolitic Stone 1910 Affirmed for The injured party was not a railroad employee. 
Company of Plaintiff 
Indiana v. Ridge 
(174 Ind. 588) 
Vandalia Coal 1910 Affinned for The injured party was not a railroad employee. 
Company v. Plaintiff 
Yemm 
(175 Ind. 524) 
-~-·------- --
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CASE 
Grand Truck 
Western Railway 
Company v. 
Poole 
(175 Ind. 567) 
Cleveland, 
Cincinnati, 
Chicago and St. 
Louis Railway 
Company v. 
Lynn 
( 177 Ind. 3 11) 
YEAR 
1910 
1911 
Bennett, Admin. I 1911 
v. Evansville and 
Terre Haute 
Railroad 
Company et al. 
(177 Ind. 463) 
Indianapolis I 1912 
Traction and 
Terminal 
Company v. 
Matthews 
(177 Ind. 88) 
WINNER 
Affinned for 
Plaintiff 
Affirmed for 
Plaintiff 
Affirmed for 
Defendant 
Reversed for 
Defendant 
INFORMATION 
The Plaintiff, a car coupler, was thrown under a train while coupling 
two cars because another etnployee did not tnove the switch like he was 
supposed to. The Defendant (RR cotnpany) argued that the Plaintiff 
assumed the risk of injury, but the Court did not agree. 
The injured party was not a railroad employee. 
The Plaintiff, a member of a bridge gang, was killed when a large pile 
of dirt was dropped on him. The Defendant (RR company) argued that 
the Plaintiff assumed all risks of danger ordinarily incident to his work 
and the Court agreed. The Court reasoned that it is not the hazard itself 
that creates liability, but rather the failure of the employee to appreciate 
the danger of the hazard. The Court found that the Plaintiff knew his 
job was dangerous and proceeded despite the danger and he thereby 
accepted the risk associated with the job. 
The Plaintiff, an interurban employee, was injured when his car 
collided with another car that was backing up. The Defendant 
(interurban) argued that the Plaintiff accepted the risk and the Court 
agreed. The Court found that even if the Plaintiff did not know of this 
potential danger, as he claimed, he could have discovered this danger 
by the exercise of ordinary care and he is therefore liable for all 
resulting injuries. This case also discussed the fellow-servant defense. 
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CASE YEAR 
Vandalia 1912 
Railroad 
Company v. 
Parker 
(178Ind.138) 
Wabash Railroad 1913 
Company et al. v. 
Priddy et al. 
(179 Ind. 483) 
Chicago and Erie 
Railroad 
Company et al. v. 
Dinius 
(180 Ind. 596) 
Chicago & Erie 1914 
Railroad 
Company v. Lain 
(181 Ind. 386) 
WINNER 
Reversed for 
Defendant 
Reversed for 
Defendant 
Affirmed for 
Plaintiff 
Affirmed for 
Plaintiff 
INFORMATION 
The Plaintiff, a section laborer, was injured when he fell fro1n an 
overcrowded hand car operated by the Defendant's foretnan. The 
Defendant (RR company) argued that the Plaintiff assumed the risk of 
injury and the Court agreed. The Court reasoned that the Plaintiff 
assutned the risk because he could have discovered the danger of riding 
on an overcrowded hand car by the exercise of ordinary care. 
The injured party was not a railroad employee. 
The Plaintiff was injured while coupling cars when he fell into a hole 
while crossing the track. The Defendant (RR company) argued that the 
Plaintiff assumed the risk of injury when he crossed in front of a 
moving train, but the Court disagreed. The Court reasoned that the 
Defendant was required to provide a safe workplace and to tnake risks 
like these known to workers, and it did not do so. 
The Plaintiff was injured while pushing an out of order railroad car 
along the tracks, as directed by the Defendant's foreman, when another 
car was allowed on the same tracks, hitting the Plaintiffs car. The 
Defendant (RR company) argued that the Plaintiff assumed the risk 
because he knew of the dangers of the job. The Court disagreed. The 
Court maintained that the Defendant had a duty to provide a safe 
workplace and because it did not do so, the employee cannot assutne 
the risk of injury. 
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CASE YEAR WINNER INFORMATION 
The Wabash 1914 Affirmed for A switch was left open by the Defendant's etnployee and when the 
Railroad Plaintiff Plaintiff, a freight train conductor, was killed when a passenger train 
Cotnpany v. collided with the Plaintiffs train while the Plaintiffs train was 
Gretzinger, stationed on a side track. The Defendant (RR company) argued that the 
Admin. Plaintiff assumed the risk, but the Court disagreed, finding that the 
(182 Ind. 155) Plaintiff did not know and had no way of finding out that the switch 
was open on his track and that an accident would occur. Furthennore, 
the Court reasoned that the Defendant allowed passenger trains on its 
tracks to exceed the speed limit established by a city ordinance and the 
Plaintiff cannot assume risk from injuries resulting from another's 
failure to observe established ordinances. 
Vandalia 1914 Affinned for Plaintiff, a freight braketnan, was thrown fro1n a railroad car and 
Railroad Plaintiff injured. The Court discussed the federal statute and the bulk of the 
Company v. consideration is whether the federal statute or state cotnmon law 
Stillwell applies. The Defendant (RR company) argued that the Plaintiff 
(181 Ind. 267) assumed the risk of the accident but the Court did not agree. The Court 
found that, because there was a statutory violation, the Plaintiff cannot 
be held to have assumed the risk that results from this violation. This 
Court also discussed the contributory negligence and the fellow-servant 
defenses. 
-
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CASE I YEAR 
Southern Railway I 1914 
Company et al. v. 
Howerton 
(182 Ind. 208) 
Chicago and I 1914 
Eastern Illinois 
Railrod Company 
v. Conrad 
(182 Ind. 173) 
Nordyke & I 1914 
Marmon 
Company v. 
Whitehead, 
Admin. 
(183 Ind. 7) 
WINNER 
Reversed for 
Defendant (RR) 
and new trial 
granted 
Reversed for 
Plaintiff 
Affirmed for 
Plaintiff 
INFORMATION 
The Plaintiff, a track laborer, was injured while transporting rails from 
one place to another. He worked on a track where Defendant (RR 
cotnpany) placed highly explosive signal torpedoes, but he was not 
aware of the danger. The Plaintiff ran over a torpedo which exploded 
and injured his right leg. The Defendant (RR cotnpany) claimed that 
Plaintiff assumed the risk of injury and the Court agreed. The Court 
found that Plaintiff should have known about the torpedoes and that he 
was injured while riding on a car with his legs inappropriately out of 
the train. Also, the etnployee usually wore glasses and did not do so 
this day. 
The Plaintiff was injured when he fell off the Defendant's railroad 
crossing. The Defendant (RR company) argued that the Plaintiff 
assumed the risk of injury, but the Court did not agree. The Court 
found that the Plaintiff could not have assutned the risk of injury 
because there was no reason for the Plaintiff to believe that the crossing 
was not safe. 
The Plaintiff was hauling coal with a chain attached to a rope when the 
chain broke and struck the Plaintiff, killing him. The Plaintiff argued 
that the Defendant (railroad company) knew of the danger of the brittle 
rope and did not tell Plaintiff, so he cannot be found to have assumed 
the risk. The Court agreed. The Court also found that that the 
Defendant could have discovered through regular testing that the chain 
was weak. This case is decided more on the contributory negligence 
defense. 
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CASE YEAR 
The Pittsburgh, 1915 
Cincinnati, 
Chicago and St. 
Louis Railway 
Company v. 
Farmers Trust 
and Savings 
Company, 
Admin. 
(183 Ind. 287) 
Evansville and 
Terre Haute 
Railroad 
Company v. 
Lipking, Admin. 
(183 Ind. 572) 
Chicago and Erie I 1915 
Railroad 
Company v. 
Mitchell, Admin. 
(184 Ind. 588) 
WINNER 
Affinned for 
Plaintiff 
Affinned for 
Plaintiff 
Affirmed for 
Plaintiff 
INFORMATION 
The Plaintiff, a railroad laborer, was killed while building a railroad 
track parallel to another track, when a train running off schedule and 
without warning signals hit him. The Defendant (RR company) argued 
that the Plaintiff assutned the risk of injury, but the Court did not agree 
because the Defendant offered no evidence that the Plaintiff either 
knew or could have known about the approaching train. Evidence 
showed that the Plaintiff was negligent because he did not take the 
proper safety precautions and the Court found for the Defendant. This 
case also discussed jurisdictional concerns and found that this company 
was engaged in interstate cotnmerce. 
The Plaintiff, a car coupler, walked between the two cars he was 
attempting to couple to retrieve a part and was hit by another car. The 
railroad foreman ordered the car that hit the Plaintiff onto the track. 
The Defendant (railroad company) argued that the Plaintiff assumed the 
risk of injury because he was perfonning a dangerous job. The Court 
found that the Defendant did not provide enough evidence that the 
Plaintiff assumed the risk. The Court further held that the Plaintiff 
could not have assumed the risk because the Plaintiff had no way of 
knowing the foreman would not exercise ordinary caution. 
The Plaintiff, a railroad car repairer, was under a car on a sidetrack 
when another engineer ran a car upon the track without warning hitn 
and killed the Plaintiff. The Defendant (railroad company) claimed that 
the Plaintiff assumed the risk of injury when he agreed to repair cars on 
the track, but the Court did not agree, finding that the Plaintiff could not 
be held to assume the risk that another employee would place a car 
upon a track with no signal flags or warnings. This case also discussed 
the contributory negligence defense. 
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